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ABSTRACT
MITIGATION OF HARDWARE TROJAN ATTACKS ON NETWORKS-ON-CHIP
by
Jonathan Frey
University of New Hampshire, December, 2015

The Integrated Circuit (IC) design flow follows a global business model. A global business
means that the processes in the IC design flow could be outsourced, and consequently security
threats have been introduced. Security threats on hardware include side channel analysis, reverse
engineering, information leakage, counterfeit chips, and hardware Trojans (HTs).This work mainly
focuses on HT attacks, which execute a malicious operation on the system when a trigger condition
is met. Networks-on-Chip (NoCs) are a popular communications infrastructure for many-core
systems, which have proved to be a more scalable option over the traditional bus interface.
However, the high scalability and modularity provided by NoCs have introduced new
vulnerabilities in the design, leading to hardware Trojans capable of causing several Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks on the network.
A 4x4 Mesh-topology NoC with a more robust router microarchitecture is presented with
several innovations relative to the baseline. A collaborative dynamic permutation and flow unit
(flit) integrity check method is proposed to thwart an attacker from maliciously modifying the flit
content in the routers of a NoC. Our method complements other HT detection approaches for the
NoC network interfaces. Moreover, we exploit the Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) structure
and the traffic routing history to generate a unique key vector for each router to select one of the
multiple permutation configurations. Simulation and Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
results are compared between the proposed NoC microarchitecture and four other existing solutions
found in literature, and it was shown that the proposed method outperforms all of the existing
security methods.

xv

Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. The Security Issue in Hardware
The world is moving toward one that is more electronically driven, where a greater number
of people are using computers and other electronics every day. The shift towards a world with more
electronics leads to a greater demand for the production of the components that make up these
devices. Most electronic devices use integrated circuits (ICs), which are single chip packages
consisting of a collection of smaller circuits. ICs are used in practically every electronic device
today, ranging from commercial applications such as cell phones and computers, to more critical
applications like banking and military systems.
To address the supply demand of ICs, the semiconductor industry and has started to follow
a globalized business model for the IC design flow. The IC design flow is comprised of several
stages of design, fabrication, assembly, and test. The outsourcing of these processes has begun as a
result of the global business model. Figure 1.1 introduces the IC design flow, and shows outlined
vulnerabilities that are a result of outsourcing. The outsourcing of processes has led to an increase
in hardware security threats as it hands over the design to 3rd party [1-6]. This limits the trust one
can have in systems where the internal design was outsourced. Trusted hardware is especially
needed for more critical applications where a single error may have a greater impact, such as
military, government, and banking systems. Hardware security has therefore gained more attention
recently.

1

Figure 1.1. Outlined Vulnerabilities of IC Design Flow following Globalized Business Model.

1.2.

Different Hardware Attacks
Hardware attacks pose an issue to the security of systems. Attacks aimed at a system’s

hardware can cause many adverse effects on the system. Internal memory values may be changed,
secret keys can be leaked, or the circuit may degrade or even fail completely. Hardware attacks are
different than software attacks, as the latter can always be removed. Software attacks that change
the actual software may be reversed by overwriting the software with the original software again.
However, this method cannot be applied to when a hardware attack on a system alters the actual
hardware. Hardware attacks may linger with the system, or completely change the functionality of
the system. Different hardware threats include fault injection, IC counterfeiting, 3rd party
intellectual property (IP) piracy, and hardware Trojans (HTs).

2

1.2.1. Hardware Trojans
Hardware Trojans, which are malicious hardware modifications on the original chip, pose
as a serious hardware security threat. This particular security issue arose directly as a result of the
IC industry following a global business model. Figure 1.2 shows an understanding of the global
business model, and gives an idea of how many countries may be involved in the design of a
particular IC. HTs can be embedded during any stage of the IC design flow, and aim to deliver an
attack on the system that can take on a variety of forms. HTs can be designed to deliver attacks such
as Denial of Service, information leakage, data manipulation, and system degradation [7-11]. The
malicious hardware is implemented in such a way to be hard to detect, either through being small
enough to consume a negligible amount of power compared to the whole system, or by having a
very small trigger probability. HTs implemented in Intellectual Property cores designed by third
party vendors can introduce chip malfunctions and information leakage attacks on the system they
are put into [11]. During the design stage, HTs can be embedded at the Register Transfer Level
(RTL) in the design’s Hardware Description Language (HDL), or straight into the gate level netlist,
leading to logical attacks on the system [9]. At the fabrication stage, design layouts can be modified
to include a HT, changing internal circuit characteristics such as delay [12].

Figure 1.2. Global Business Model of IC Design Flow.
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HT designs are becoming more complex and hard to detect, and have become capable of
bypassing rigorous post-silicon tests. Due to the nature of HTs being triggered by a rare event, it is
extremely difficult to detect HTs with conventional testing approaches [12]. HTs can activate
through various types of trigger circuits, and deliver the respective attack via a payload circuit. HT
trigger circuits are usually modeled as sequential [5] or combinational logic circuits [3] that activate
after a specific condition is met. An example of how a HT with a sequential logic trigger circuit
would become active is if the trigger circuit required a node to have a specific logic value X number
of times. An example of how a combinational logic trigger circuit could activate would be if its
trigger condition is to have X number of different nodes have specific logic values at the same time.
There exist many hardware Trojan detection methods. Offline detection methods typically try to
activate the trigger circuit to detect the existence of HTs. The switching probability of the trigger
circuit is raised at the test time to increase the visibility of HTs [14, 15]. However, due to the hard
to detect nature of HTs, trojaned ICs may still bypass offline detection methods, leading to residual
HTs in designs. This is especially true for larger designs such as on-chip networks where complete
coverage at test time is not practical.
1.2.2. Fault Attacks
Driven by malicious intent, attackers are impelled to extract the cipher key and thus
compromise the cryptosystem through fault attacks. Fault attacks (FAs) compromise the cipher
implementation and produce faulty ciphertexts for cryptanalysts to retrieve the secret key. FA can
be executed through deliberate injection of faults into cryptographic devices by means of white
light, laser beam, voltage/clock glitch, and temperature control. Existing fault-detection methods
can effectively detect random faults in the cipher implementation, but yield a high fault bypass rate
(FBR) under fault attacks.
4

1.2.3. Counterfeit ICs
Counterfeit ICs are used or lower-grade chips that are repackaged and sold as new or highergrade chips. This security issue arose as a result of customers desiring ICs at cheaper prices, and
the ramification is that systems become less reliable. The inferior chips may cause serious problems
within the system where they are embedded. Typical problems that may arise from counterfeit ICs
are not meeting timing constraints, or even total chip failure. If implemented in a critical electronic
system, such as a military and or banking system, the likelihood that system will fail becomes
greater.
1.2.4. Third Party IP Piracy
A third party foundry may produce an excessive amount of chips, corresponding to a
particular IC design, than what was planned. The extra chips are then sold by the foundry over the
gray market. This is done without the prior permission from the chip designer.
1.3.

Thesis Contributions

1.3.1. Collaborative Dynamic Permutation and Flit Integrity Checking for NoCs
A new novel hardware Trojan mitigation method for Networks-on-Chip that works at runtime was proposed. The proposed method was compared against four other existing methods
proposed in other IEEE conference and journal papers. The baseline design was considered against
our design, which was [34, 35], and the other three methods were R-Term [38], NI-Term [36], and
R-AddrFilter [45].
We propose a collaborative dynamic permutation and flit integrity check method to thwart
an attacker from successfully modifying the flit content, especially the critical flit bits, during the
flit transmission over the NoC routers. The proposed gate-level method provides multiple
5

permutation configurations in each router, rather than in NIs. Our work complements the existing
methods [32-35, 39]. As the permutation configuration changes over time, the success rate of a HT
insertion is significantly reduced even if the attacker knows the countermeasure.
To dynamically change the permutation configuration, we propose a PUF-based key vector
generation method. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are designs that are mathematically the
same, but differ in practice due to process variations. The proposed PUF structure exploits process
variations and the random content from the router’s round-robin register to generate a dynamic key
vector for each flit permutation unit. As the process variations and the traffic conditions in each
router are unique, key vectors for dynamic permutation units in different routers are different. Thus,
the attacker is unlikely to trigger all of the HTs in the different routers, simultaneously.
Consequently, a trojaned packet cannot be successfully transferred to the destination to complete
the malicious task.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that provides experimental results from
the simulations of the gate-level NoC implementation. Quantitative throughput, link availability,
traffic hotspot migration, bandwidth depletion, FPGA-based hardware overhead, and average
packet latency of five methods are extensively compared. In addition to malicious destination
addresses, this work further considers the loss of flit type information, which is induced by the
inserted HTs.

6

1.4.

Thesis Organization

The following chapters of the thesis are organized as described below:
Chapter 2 introduces background information on Hardware Security, Hardware Trojans and
general IC security countermeasures, NoC security and countermeasures, and crypto-attacks and
fault detection.
Chapter 3 introduces the basics of NoCs, as well as the building of the baseline NoC in the
Verilog Hardware Description Language (HDL).
Chapter 4 introduces more on the proposed collaborative HT mitigation method and the
Verilog coding of it.
Chapter 5 introduces the testing schemes used for the proposed collaborative HT mitigation
method, as well as a comparison of results from the proposed method and the other existing
solutions.
Chapter 6 implements the proposed method from Chapter 4 into an AES module, and it is
shown whether the design can protect against crypto-attacks with a greater or worse success rate.
Chapter 7 discusses the main thesis contribution, the other relevant contributions, and finally
the thesis is summarized.
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Chapter 2. Background
2.1.

Hardware Security
Unwanted changes and malicious additions to electronic circuit designs have become results

of companies looking for cheaper ways to sell their high quality product, mainly due to companies
looking for the cheapest foundries that will manufacture their product. These inclusions can be
designed to be undetected and activate at almost random times or based on extremely rare events
occurring in a particular order. The results of these malicious inclusions can be of a wide range,
including resource hogging, system malfunctions, system degradation, data deletion, and even
secret data leakage.
The five main stages of the Integrated Circuit (IC) design flow are specifications, design,
fabrication, test, and package/assembly. Figure 2.1 shows the IC design flow and points out the
stages that are considered trusted and those that are considered untrusted. The design stage is a
viable option for insertion of malicious hardware, but this assumes an insider within the company
designing the system. The fabrication stage is the most likely target to insert malicious hardware as
the system’s design is already out of the hands of the one who designed it. These problematic
additions to hardware during the fabrication process have become known as Hardware Trojans.
Hardware Trojans can be inserted into each of the different abstraction levels of designs. The
different abstractions include, the system, register transfer, gate, transistor, and physical levels.
Figure 2.2 shows a basis of what must be done at a particular abstraction level to insert a HT. At
the system level, an extra system with HTs can be inserted between physical systems that are
already designed and built. At the system level, HTs can cause information leakage and
manipulation of data flowing through the extra system. HTs can be inserted into the register transfer
level by the modification of logic. This can include an extra parameter in a conditional statement.
8

HTs inserted at the gate level require the addition of extra logic gates. An example of a gate-level
HT can be seen in Figure 2.3, which follows in the next section. Transistor abstraction level HTs
are achieved by modifying parameters of the switches/transistors. This includes the modification
(thinning or widening) of the transistors channels, or width/length ratios. HTs at the transistor level
can cause problems such as an imbalance in current and a change in delay characteristics. Delay
characteristics in digital circuits are important as setup and hold time constraints can be violated
easily. The modification of a design’s layout, or physical abstraction, can cause HTs at this
abstraction level. The modification of wire lengths/widths can cause several problems at the layout,
including

the

widening

of

clock

networks

to

change

delay

characteristics

combination/separation of physical connections.

SPECIFICATION

TOOLS
STANDARD CELLS

DESIGN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
BLOCKS

MODELS

ASIC

FPGA

FAB INTERFACE
CONFIGURATION FILE
GENERATION

MASK

FABRICATION
DEVICE
CONFIGURATION

FAB

WAFER PROBE

DIE AND PACKAGE

PACKAGE AND TEST

OPERATION AND
MONITOR

DEPLOY AND
MONITOR

TRUSTED

UNTRUSTED

Figure 2.1. Integrated Circuit design flow with trusted and untrusted stages.
9

and

System level
Change
protocol

RT level

Constraints
Additional gates

Change logic

Gate level

Modify layout

Transistor level

Modify
parameters

Modify wiring
Physical level

Figure 2.2. Insertion of HTs at different abstraction levels.

Hardware Trojans have become a serious issue in the ICs world today due to the wide usage
of ICs in banking and military systems. If a banking system was to leak passwords or even fail, it
is unknown what would happen to the currency supposedly safe to store there, meanwhile if a
military system were to fail, unthinkable disasters could occur, leaving a level of damage done one
would think is improbable.
2.2.

Hardware Trojan Countermeasures
A lot of the previous work done on HT detection methods is done at the test-time. Offline

detection methods presented in [14-16] aim to identify HTs by increasing the probability that the
trigger circuit activates. The results of the offline tests are compared with a “golden model” to detect
any abnormalities in the design. Figure 2.3 shows a basic understanding of a HT circuit model. If
the HT model shown in Figure 2.3 is applied to a crypto-system, the end result may be look
something like Figure 2.4. The HT payload in Figure 2.4 shows how a simple circuit can bypass a
very complex system operation.
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Figure 2.3. Basic Hardware Trojan circuit model.

Figure 2.4. Hardware Trojan bypassing an example system.

Side Channel Analysis [17-21] is an effective offline method for the detection of HTs. This
process works through the examination of side channel signals. Some side channel signals include
electromagnetic radiation, delay characteristics, and power characteristics. The extracted side
channel data is then compared to what it should look like via a golden model. As transistor size is
constantly decreasing, it is becoming easier for side channel signals generated by HTs, such as delay
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and power consumption, to be masked within the process variations of the system. This means that
it will be harder to detect HTs during offline testing methods with the analysis of side-channel
signals. The idea of a golden model is also unrealistic as process variations still exist and HTs can
easily be masked within the deviation.
I/O ports and bit widths are also increasing in embedded systems. This leads to an increased
testing time for system verification, making complete coverage of the system costly with respect to
money and time. A typical attack would not include HTs in every IC, but to inject them into a
random amount of ICs, to further reduce the detection probability. HTs that are difficult to trigger,
or depend on large amount of combinational logical input conditions to be satisfied, are especially
hard to detect with logical I/O testing. Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) [14, 15] is an
effective method in detecting HTs that trigger with combinational logic conditions. ATPG is
essentially an I/O test where, given certain input patterns, the output is logically compared to what
it should look like given the respective input. ATPG becomes less effective when the logical trigger
condition becomes more complex and depends on an increased amount of nodes.
IP core authentication can be performed by various techniques presented in [11, 27-29].
Recently, the Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) [27] concluded that one of the most
challenging hardware security areas is the lack of HT detection methods at and before the Register
Transfer Level (RTL). This requirement also applies to the Network-on-Chip (NoC) community.
HTs maliciously inserted in a NoC can lead to information leakage, unauthorized memory accesses
and denial of service (DoS) attacks, e.g. incorrect path routing, deadlock, and livelock [2, 10].
At run-time, the time and economic cost for replacing components is impracticable. Instead,
run-time solutions can provide a last level of defense for systems to mitigate the effects of HTs.
Run-time approaches focus more on the effects of the HT payload that delivers the attack, as the
12

trigger circuit has already bypassed offline methods. In this work, HTs that are placed in the design
netlist are specifically addressed, as advocated by SRC in [27], and a run-time solution with low
performance overhead is provided for NoCs.
2.3.

Fault Countermeasures
Fault-detection methods are typically used to ensure the integrity of the cryptographic

process. When fault attacks become a security concern, conventional fault-detection methods are
first chosen [48]. In the evaluation stage, the existing works [47, 55-57, 60, 62-65] only consider
the scenario that faults randomly happen in the cipher implementation. As fault attacks are
intentional, we need to rigorously consider the scenario that the attacker may inject faults that have
potential to bypass the fault-detection mechanism. For instance, the fault-detection methods shown
in Fig. 2.4 cannot detect the faults injected in the input, i.e. intermediate state registers. This is
because both data paths receive the same faulty input, and no difference will be observed at the
comparison stage. As a result, a faulty ciphertext can bypass the fault detection.
Moreover, each method has its own limitation. In the Double Modular Redundancy (DMR)
method in Fig. 2.5(a), if the fault attack is performed at the same time and location on the two F(∙)
functions, the DMR detection will fail. This kind of fault attack is feasible, as the two F(∙) copies
are identical. For a lightweight cipher like SIMON, the reverse function for fault detection in Fig.
2.5(b) is likely designed with a symmetric architecture. The reverse function may fail if the
recovered intermediate state i is corrected by a symmetric fault before the comparison for fault
detection. In the work [55, 56], the intermediate state is permuted before F(∙), as shown in Fig.
2.5(c). As pointed out in [56], permutation can possibly fail because the permuted input bits may
share the same logic value. Similar to DMR, the masking scheme shown in Fig. 2.5(d) cannot detect
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faults injected at the same time and location in the two F(∙) functions. This problem cannot be
resolved even if the order of masking is extended [13].
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Figure 2.5. Typical fault-detection methods. (a) DMR [3], (b) reverse function [11], (c)
permutation [9, 10], (d) masking. F(∙) represents one round function for the cryptographic
algorithm.

2.4.

Introduction to the Network-on-Chip
As the number of transistors integrated on a single die grows, increasingly IP cores are

connected with the Network-on-Chip (NoC) infrastructure. A basic understanding of a Networkon-Chip can be seen in Figure 2.6. NoCs were designed as an effective communications
infrastructure for many-core systems. IP cores, such as processing and memory elements, need to
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communicate with each other to execute instructions. Mesh NoCs, like the one seen in Figure 2.6,
communicate on a packet basis. Each packet is organized into several flow units, or flits. Each flit
contains a header to let the NoC know if it is the start, middle, or end of a packet. The header content
of a flit contains other important information such as which IP core it was sent from, or the source
address, and which IP core the data is being sent to, or the destination address. Each IP core is
connected to a respective Network Interface (NI). The IP core’s NI is responsible for packetizing
the data that the IP core is sending, and depacketizing the data being received by the IP core. After
packetization, the data is sent over the network, where it is moved by a series of routers, one at a
time, toward its destination. Each NI is connected to one router, and the routers are connected in a
mesh format. Routers interpret the header content of flits, and this is how they decide from what
port the router must send the data out of. Each router has five input and five output ports
corresponding to different port directions. A “local” port direction is assigned to the data being sent
to and from the respective IP core. The other four port directions are cardinal north, south, east, and
west. Source and destination addresses are assigned based on the router ID numbers. Each router in
the network has its own ID number, which corresponds to where in the network it is. The routers’
IDs are assigned based on their X and Y coordinates in the network.
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Figure 2.6. Basic understanding of 4x4 mesh-topology NoC.

Figure 2.6 shows the traditional router ID naming standard. For the 4x4 mesh NoC shown
in Figure 2.6, there are a total of 16 routers, meaning that with Eq. 2.1, the ID must take up 4 bits.
Two of the ID bits are assigned to the X direction, and the other two bits are assigned to the Y
direction. The ID bits are formed for a 4x4 mesh NoC in the format {YY, XX}, which happens to
agree in binary as to what the router’s number is. The last part of the header content is the flit type.

𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠𝐼𝐷 = ⌈ log 2 (# 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠) ⌉

Equation 2.1

Depending on the size of the data being transmitted, the packet size may vary, which
translates to more flits per packet. There are four types of flits; empty, payload, header, tail. Flits
are given two bits to determine their type; 00 for an empty flit, 01 for a header flit, 10 for a tail flit,
and 11 for a payload flit. Packets are organized by starting with a header flit to denote the start of a
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packet, then several payload flits depending on the size of the data being sent, and lastly a tail flit
to denote the packet being transmitted has ended. Figure 2.7 shows a basic understanding of the
NoC packet format. Figure 2.7 also defines the critical flit fields which are the destination address,
source address, and the flit type fields.

Figure 2.7. NoC packet format with critical flit fields labeled.

The path that flits take along the network depends on the routing method used. An example
of a routing method is XY Routing, where the packet will move from its source X address to its
destination X address first, then will move from its source Y address to its destination Y address.
YX Routing is another approach, but moves the packet in the Y direction first, then the X direction.
For simplification, it is further assumed that simulations are run with the XY Routing approach.
Flits received at a router port will be stored in that port’s First-In-First-Out (FIFO) registers.
Once the data leaves the FIFO, it enters the Full Crossbar, which interprets the header content of
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the flit and determines flit type and the appropriate destination port from which to send this data
out. Lastly, the data is stored in the output FIFO of the appropriate port to be sent out.
2.5.

Countermeasures for On-chip Networks
Networks on Chip (NoCs) were introduced to be a solution for the scalability problem that

Systems on Chip (SoCs) had with communications. Although an effective solution, these new
communication structures came with their own problems, not least of which is security. Issues such
as Denial of Service (DoS), illegal read accesses leading to extracted secret keys, and illegal write
accesses leading to buffer overflow and overwritten data, have been introduced as security problems
with NoCs. There exist general methods for the protection of Networks on Chip, just as is the same
for Hardware Trojans, but no method exists to ensure complete security for the system. Some
general methods for protection include the use of request verification through the use of look up
tables (LUTs), exchanging secret information through the use of Virtual Channels, and dividing the
network into secure IP core and non-secure IP core zones to allow only secure information to be
sent to and from the secure zone, which is considered safe from malicious inclusions. Figure 2.8
shows two cases where HTs inserted in NoCs can cause hardware attacks.

Figure 2.8. HT payloads affecting NoCs. On the left, a HT inserted in the FIFO will overwrite
data, while on the right, HTs inserted in the Route Computation unit will cause incorrect path
routing.
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An architecture called a Data Protection Unit (DPU) is introduced in [34, 35]. The DPU is
a hardware structure placed in the communication infrastructure of the NoC, particularly next to
certain Network Interfaces (NIs). When a packet, the structure of data within NoC systems, is sent
from an IP core, it enters its individual NI and is then transferred to the NI that belongs to the target
IP core. The DPU will be placed within the NI of either the target or the sending IP core, in which
it will read a part of the data within the packet and check its table to view the access rights of the
packet’s operation and either block the transmission or allow it to be sent. This approach also claims
to offer no latency added as the DPU’s operation is performed in parallel.
In [43], multiple design strategies of NoCs are presented to increase security. The division
of a NoC into secure and non-secure areas increases security by separating crucial IP cores away
from IP cores that may try to attack it. The first design strategy in strictly to prevent attacks that
consume the bandwidth of the network. By implementing Virtual Channels, certain packets can be
can be given a higher priority than other packets, allowing the higher priority packet to be allowed
to complete its path before the lower priority packet. The non-secure areas of the NoC will generally
send packets of lower priority and are allowed to enter the secure area, but will allow packets being
sent in the secure area, which has higher priority, to complete their paths and not consume the secure
area’s paths.
The second design strategy in [43] presents three different methods to separate the secure
and non-secure areas of the NoC. The first separation method only has non-secure IP cores in the
non-secure area, and nothing else. A packet that is sent from the non-secure area enters the secure
area and is forced to go through a NI. The NI will filter packets with irregular target paths, helping
to counter unauthorized read/write attacks, and gives the packet a path that will limit path
interruption with other packets, which helps to block DoS attacks like bandwidth consuming. The
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second method has NIs and routers in the non-secure area to allow non-secure area IP cores to
communicate with each other. The secure area contains a filter that only allows packets headed for
the secure IP cores into the secure area. This prevents deadlock and livelock errors by preventing
non-secure IP core packets headed for other non-secure IP cores from entering the secure area and
interrupting secure packets. The third method uses path instructions to find incorrect or malicious
data within packets. When a packet is sent, it is given a path instruction that it must follow in order
to reach the target IP. Upon arrival at the target IP, the instruction must read “end of path,” or else
the packet is removed. Every router the packet passes checks the path instructions to ensure that the
end-of-path instruction exists in order to avoid livelock and deadlock situations, and checks that the
current instruction is not the end of path instruction. In either of those situations the router will
remove the packet.
2.6.

Chapter Summary
In this chapter, hardware security, Networks-on-Chip, hardware Trojans, and fault tolerance

are discussed. Recent NoC security methods from IEEE conferences and journals were also
presented. Although existing security methods address some attacks that can target NoCs, some
more advanced attacks, such as Denial of Service attacks, can still hinder network performance.
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Chapter 3. Networks-on-Chip
3.1.

Baseline NoC Design

3.1.1. Design
To deploy our method, first we had to develop a Network-on-Chip testing environment. The
testing environment was designed using the Hardware Description Language (HDL) Verilog. In
Verilog, modules are made to represent hardware or logic. Lower modules can be interconnected
within a top Module, to represent a larger circuit. A testbench is usually made that calls the top
module and runs the design through given conditions preset by the user.
A 3x3 NoC was first designed given skeleton code provided by Dr. Qiaoyan Yu. The code
had originally been for a 3x3 torus-topology NoC, but was ultimately modified to become a 4x4
mesh-topology NoC. Many of the following module names have been slightly altered to fit different
tests. Therefore, a basic name will be given to each module to help the reader understand which
module we are currently talking about. A top module where the 9 routers modules are instantiated
and connected is the main goal. Each router was made within its own module named “five-port
router.” The five-port router module is an individual router for the network, and is made up of
several smaller submodules. A basic understanding of the five port router structure can be seen in
Figure 3.1. The router should have 5 data inputs but it also needs a few other input signals to
determine integrity, and also determine the status of the network. Write request signals, or wrreq in
the code, are needed to be logic high when writing data to an input FIFO. CurrentID sets the source
address for each flit, which helps determine how the packet will be routed by comparing CurrentID
of the current router with the source address of an incoming packet. The source address of an
incoming packet will be the CurrentID of the router connected to the NI the data came. Therefore,

21

comparing the source address and CurrentID, the direction in which the data should exit depending
on the routing algorithm, can be computed easily. AlmostFull_in is another input signal to the fiveport router. This signal allows the current router to see if it can send data to the surrounding routers
based on knowing if the input FIFO of the router at the next hop is full or not. If this signal was not
implemented, the network could be flooded and data could be overwritten before being sent out of
the FIFO. The NoC routers are symmetric. Therefore, to have extra input signals being received at
one router, this means routers must output more than just the data as well. Extra output signals
include wrreq_out, which is connected to wrreq of a surrounding router and almost_full, which is
connected to AlmostFull_in of a surrounding router. Lastly, every router is connected to the
network’s clock (CLK) and reset signals.

East Input Port

East Output Port

South Input Port
West Input Port
North Input Port

South Output Port
Arbiters &
Crossbar

West Output Port
North Output Port

Local Input Port

Local Output Port

Figure 3.1. Baseline Five Port Router structure.
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Arbiter

Input FIFO
Controller

Output FIFO
Controller

Figure 3.2. Flow of data from beginning to end of one input/output port pair.

Figure 3.2 shows the path of one flit from an input port of the five-port router to an output
port of the five-port router. Basic signal flow and design submodules are also shown in Figure 3.2.
The Verilog code for the hardware modules can also be translated to a schematic using Synopsys
Design Vision. The design is first analyzed and elaborated by Design Vision, then a schematic of
the design is displayed. The schematic, which can be found in the appendix section, shows several
submodules in their basic I/O form for simplification, but examining this, it lets us see an image
that looks similar to Figure 3.2. The submodules of five-port router include “Info Extraction,”
“Circular Output FIFO,” “Input FIFO,” “Round Robin,” “Full Crossbar,” and “Port Admission.”

3.1.2. Submodules
3.1.2.1.

Input FIFO
This module is the first that the flits enter. The input FIFO consists of 8 “stagereg31.v”

submodules. Each stagereg31 module acts as 32 D-Flip-Flops (DFFs) in parallel. Therefore, the
input FIFO has 8 “stages.” In order to write to the FIFO, the write request signal “wrreq” must be
logic high. The DFFs will store the 32 bit data in parallel until the data is ready to be moved out of
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the FIFO. Each stage can effectively hold one 32 bit flit of a packet. If the FIFO depth is greater
than the length of a packet, then the FIFO may hold more than one packet at a given time. The basic
I/O and internal circuitry of the input FIFO module can be found in the appendix section.

3.1.2.2.

Full Crossbar
After a flit leaves from the input FIFOs, it enters the Full Crossbar module. In addition to

its own functionality, the Full Crossbar module also has two submodules. These two submodules
are the Info Extraction and Port Admission modules. The submodules are responsible for passing
signals to the Round Robin module, which is the arbiter that will determine output port priority, and
for translating the critical flit data. The critical flit data translation will be passed to the Full Crossbar
to grant an input port a connection to an output port. The submodules’ basic I/O and internal
circuitry for the Full Crossbar module can be found in the appendix section.

3.1.2.3.

Info Extraction
The Info Extraction module looks at vital flit information and determines from which port

the data should leave. Vital flit information are bits that, if altered, could cause adverse effects. The
packet’s destination address, source address, and flit type are all vital to the packet. If the destination
address is changed, the data will be sent to the wrong address. This can especially clog networks,
as they expect some sort of format in which data are sent, and not abiding by these rules may lead
to congestion. If the flit type is changed, then the network may be congested while waiting for a
specific flit type. If a tail flit is lost, the packet’s transmission may become endless [45]. This is
because another submodule’s signal grants permission for the Full Crossbar to dedicate a single
input-port/output-port pair to a packet once a header flit is detected. This will cause the input24

port/output-port connection to be locked, and it cannot be released to allow other packets to use that
output port. The basic I/O and internal circuitry of this submodule can be found in the appendix
section.

3.1.2.4.

Port Admission
The Port Admission module grants permission for the Full Crossbar to connect an input data

port to its respective output data port. Port Admission passes router input signals and Info Extraction
output signals to its submodule Round Robin. The Round Robin module grants priority based on
direction to the incoming/outgoing flits. The basic I/O and internal circuitry of the module can be
found in the appendix section.

3.1.2.5.

Round Robin
The Round Robin module is the router’s arbiter. This module grants priority to certain ports

over other ports in race conditions. This module calculates the Port_Ad internal signal, which is
required for the crossbar to route data. Port_Ad determines the output port to which each input port
with incoming data gets connected. This will make the Full Crossbar lock the connection between
the input port and output port until a tail flit is detected. The basic I/O and internal wiring for the
Round Robin module can be found in the appendix section.

3.1.2.6.

Circular Output FIFO
The Circular Output FIFO module is used for the output buffers of the router. This module

is responsible for reading the tail flit and determining if it should set the wrreq_out bit to. Wrreq_out
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will act as the input wrreq to an adjacent router. Similar to the input FIFO module, inside the
Circular FIFO module there are 8 parallel 32 bit shift register stages made using the stagereg31
element. The difference between the output and input FIFOs is that the output FIFO has a circular
design element. The circular element of this FIFO is for NACK signals. The basic external I/O
schematic and the internal schematic of the Circular FIFO module can be found in the appendix.
3.1.3. Top Module
Once the five-port router module and all of its submodules were verified to work, a top
module was made to connect the 3x3 Mesh NoC. The top module should consist of 9 five-port
router submodules. The routers should be connected appropriately to the surrounding routers. A
basic router node can be seen in Figure 3.3. For simplicity, just the incoming and outgoing data are
shown in Figure 3.3. The data for each router was named in the fashion shown in Figure 3.3. The
data’s appropriate name takes the form of “data_{[Router#],[Direction]}.” The router number is
just the ID number of the router in decimal. The direction bits are given as follows: leaving east =
0, leaving south = 1, leaving west = 2, leaving north =3, and leaving local = 4. Therefore, for router
R0, the data out of the east port is named data_00.
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Figure 3.3. Basic I/O ports of a five-port router

To connect multiple routers, the I/O ports were connected based on Figure 3.4. The west
port output of router R1 becomes the input of the east port of router R0, and the east port out of
router R0 becomes the input of the west port of router R1. Data_12 will be a new input into router
R0, and other input signals such as wrreq will need to be connected in this same way. Other inputs
and outputs that are vectors of bits are named in a similar fashion as incoming and outgoing data.
Therefore, input signals such as wrreq and data_in into the east port of router R0 will be named
wrreq_12 and data_12. Output signals such as wrreq_out and dataout are named this way as well.
The rest of the routers can be connected in a similar way, with an end result looking like Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.4. Configuring routers together to create the NoC topology.

Figure 3.5. Final 3x3 NoC that was designed.
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3.2.

FPGA Implementation for 3x3 NoC
The 3x3 mesh NoC was synthesized to a Nexys 4 Artix-7 Field Programmable Gate Array

(FPGA) to report the hardware cost of the design. A picture of the FPGA used for synthesis can be
seen in Figure 3.6. Table 3.1 shows the FPGA slice/register utilization numbers. FPGA synthesis
of designs is important, as it directly shows if the design can be implemented into hardware or not,
and utilization numbers provide a designer with knowing how a design compares with others.
Comparison of slice and register utilization will directly lead to the knowledge of area overhead,
which can also give rise to knowledge of power consumption and possibly delay characteristics.

Figure 3.6. FPGA used for logic synthesis and measurement of area overhead.

Table 3.1. FPGA Logic Slice Utilization of 3x3 NoC design.
Utilization Available Utilization (%)
Slice LUTs

11150

63400

17.59

Slice Registers

8950

126800

7.06
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3.3.

Testing the Baseline NoC
Once the 3x3 NoC was finished, both Mentor Graphics ModelSim and Cadence NCVerilog

were used to compile and elaborate the design. NCSim was used to generate timing diagrams of
each signal of interest. The testing and functionality of the design was verified using the signal
waveforms generated during the simulation time. Next, the ability to send packets was tested by
sending pseudo packets manually through the network and verifying that the packets reached the
destination. This was done by manually injecting 32 bit flit vectors into the local port of a specific
router. An initial statement of the testbench was used to inject the flits at certain times using delays.
Initial statements execute once during a simulation time and are usually used to set initial conditions
of signals. Initial statements are also not synthesizable. To generate a packet, first a header flit was
injected, then several payloads, and then lastly a tail flit. Each flit is injected a clock cycle apart, as
this is the minimum time that can be used to inject a single flit. An “Always" statement in Verilog,
which activates whenever the value of its statement toggles, was added to the testbench to detect
the presence of a received flit at the local output port of all routers. Any time the value of a local
output port register was greater than 0 (any other 32 bit output flit besides all zeros), would trigger
the “always” statements. The statement then extracted information such as flit type, source address,
destination address, and how many cycles it took to get to the local port from when it was latched
into the input FIFO from the source router’s NI. This information was then written to a dedicated
.txt file for a router receiving the flit. This allowed one to observe if a sent packet was received at
the target router or not. This would prove especially helpful when inserting hardware Trojans into
the design later, where we visibly see packets arriving at incorrect destination addresses. Many
conditions were tested, such as multiple packets arriving at a destination router at the same time to
test priority, and multiple packets crossing a single router at the same time.
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As the end goal of this research was to use a 4x4 mesh NoC, the number of routers was
increased to 16. The final 4x4 NoC takes the form of the one seen earlier in Figure 2.4. As the
number of nodes increased, it was found that it would be too difficult to check waveforms manually
to observe outcomes. A lot of automation was built into the testbench to read and write data to and
from text files. Text files were eventually used to read traffic trace files to determine input packets.
Traffic trace files are with respect to the input local port of a router, and were generated using a
custom built MATLAB script that would randomly pick destination addresses of other routers. A
second clock was used to perform read operations from the trace files to read a destination address.
The read destination addresses were of the form in Figure 3.7, where a read of 100 would
correspond to a destination address of router R0, while a read of 1600 would correspond to a
destination address of router R15.

Figure 3.7. Format for trace file reads.

Once a destination address was read, a loop would be triggered that would latch the read
destination address into the header flit of a new packet. The header flit is then sent out and the loop
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would properly inject a predetermined amount of payload flits, and then finally a tail flit. Each flit
is injected one clock cycle apart from one another. The clock period of the clock that sends out the
packets has to be a fraction of the primary clock’s period in order not to cut off packets midway
through generating them. For N flits in a packet, the clock period relation can be seen in Eq. 3.1.

Equation 3.1

There is an offset of 1 in the denominator that can be attributed to an empty flit (all zeros)
placed after every tail flit of a packet. This was necessary to reset the write request signal from the
local input port FIFO between packets to ensure the control signals operated properly. Equation 3.1
can be rearranged as seen in Eq. 3.2, where lambda is defined as the packet injection rate.

Equation 3.2

Different packet injection rates were used to vary the amount of stress on the network due
to traffic. The packet length N was chosen to be constant at 4 flits to ease the verification processes
of using the waveforms. In testing, we used 9 different injection rates that varied between 0.0769
and 0.2 were used.
NoC traffic was monitored by recording the number of flits being transmitted over the links
between the routers. This value once during each clock cycle and the value was written to a .txt file
with each injection rate having a different file. This was done with a method similar to the one used
to detect flits at the local output port. At the negative edge of every clock cycle, the testbench would
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record how many links had values that were greater than 0, denoting there is currently a flit being
transmitted over those links. This helped define the metric link availability, which is defined as the
number of links not transmitting data during a clock cycle.
3.4.

Chapter Summary
The basics of on chip networks, coding of the baseline NoC, FPGA synthesis of the NoC,

and basic testing methods for the NoC were presented in this chapter.
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Chapter 4. Proposed Collaborative Dynamic Permutation and Flit Integrity
Checking
4.1.

Big Picture of Proposed Method
The proposed HT mitigation method aims to detect and mitigate the HT attacks that (1)

modify the flit type, (2) change the legal destination address to an unauthorized destination, and (3)
sabotage the integrity of a packet.

Flit

Critical flit
bits

Control
signals

Key bits

Proposed Local Key
Management Module

Flitin
Flit ECC

Dynamic Bit
Permutation

Crossbar

Input FIFO
Proposed
Route
Computation
Input FIFO
Controller

Arbiter

Output FIFO

Output FIFO
Controller

Dynamic Bit
De-permutation

DeECC

Flitout

Partial Bit
De-Permutation
& DeECC

Figure 4.1. One proposed input and output port pair for hardware Trojan detection and mitigation.
Solid blocks highlight our innovations over the generic router architecture.

A generic mesh-NoC composed of five-port routers is assumed, as shown in Fig. 3.18. One
pair of input and output ports (shadowed area in Fig. 3.2) is used as an example to present the
novelty of the router design developed for this thesis. As highlighted in the solid blocks in Fig. 4.1,
seven changes were made to the generic router shown. To direct a packet to its original destination,
the critical flit fields (i.e. source/destination address and flit type bits) cannot be altered. Hence, it
is proposed to first encode the critical flit fields with a 1-bit Error Control Code (ECC) to address
the HT-induced flit integrity loss. Next, a Dynamic Bit Permutation technique is applied to the
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packet buffers so that critical information bits in a packet are ‘randomly’ stored in the buffer from
the adversary’s point of view. The randomness is achieved by adding a key vector, which is
dynamically generated by the Local Key Generation Module. As the key vector varies over time,
the permutation configuration is uncertain at the static analysis time and thus the adversary cannot
easily place HTs to perform successful attacks at the design time. Symmetrically, the Dynamic Bit
De-Permutation is applied at the output port. After de-permutation, an ECC decoder (DeECC)
facilitates the router to detect and correct all 1 bit errors on the critical flit content. The Proposed
Route Computation unit is designed to interpret multiple versions of the permutated flit content
into a request to use the correct output port for the next routing hop. To reduce the hardware cost,
it is proposed to use Partial Bit De-Permutation and DeECC to correctly interpret important
internal and external signals such as write request and FIFO buffer status signals.
4.2.

Innovations over the Baseline
It is proposed to integrate a key-based dynamic permutation mechanism with an error

control codec to address HTs inserted in the router. The overview of the proposed collaborative
method is shown in Fig. 4.1. To minimize the hardware cost and maximize the error correction
strength, only the critical flit bits (i.e. header, tail and destination address bits) are encoded with the
flit ECC encoder. Together with the non-critical flit bits, the codeword from the ECC encoder is
permuted before being stored in the input FIFO. The proposed route computation unit processes the
critical flit bits by partially de-permuting and partially error control decoding before the normal
route computation. This is because the partial de-permutation and decoder outputs are only used to
generate a valid output-channel request. If the loss of flit integrity is detected, the flit, if correctable,
is corrected or the packet is dropped. An uncorrectable bit error will trigger a permutation
configuration update.
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The flit permutation technique obfuscates the flit content to a certain degree, so that the
attacker cannot easily implement a HT to modify the flit content. In addition, the permuting
mechanism may distance the positions of the target bits of a DoS attack; as a result, not all critical
flit bits are modified by the HT. The distributed error bits can allow the use of a simple error
correction code to reconstruct the critical flit bits and prevent the depletion of bandwidth
accordingly. The error detection and correction capability available in our router provides a second
line of defense to thwart HTs if the attacker successfully bypasses the dynamic permutation.
As shown in Fig. 4.1, the local key applied to the flit permutation (FP), flit de-permutation
(FDP) and partial flit de-permutation (PFDP) is the same. To further reduce the overhead induced
by the key utilization, one can share one key with five pairs of input and output ports per each
router. The proposed method can be extended to dynamically change the permutation configuration
once an error is detected in the critical flit field bits.
4.2.1. Permutation
It is proposed to permute the flit bit positions before storing the flit to the input buffer, and
de-permute the flit after the output buffer. The principle of this permutation is as expressed in Eq.
4.1.

flitdp (t , i, j )   dp  flit(t , i, j ), key(t , i, j )

Equation 4.1

The variables i and j in Eqs. 4.1 and 4.2 are the router ID and the input port ID, respectively.
Variables flit(t) and flitdp(t) are the original flit and the flit after dynamic permutation at the time t,
respectively. The function Φdp[] stands for our proposed dynamic permutation algorithm, which is
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a function of the incoming flit(t) and the key vector generated at run-time. Like other data
permutation methods, the permutation algorithm itself is a linear mapping process. Figures 4.2 and
4.3 show two example cases of permuted bits given different key vectors.
To add a non-linear property to the permutation, we configure the permutation mapping
with an unfixed key vector, Key(i, j, t). The key vector is the output of a PUF-based structure and
varies with process variations and the dynamic challenge vector X, as expressed in Eq. 4.2. The
challenge vector X(t, i, j) depends on the routing history in each router’s output port. More about
the PUF-based controller follows in section 4.2.2.
Key (t , i, j )  f P rocess Variation , X t , i, j 

Equation 4.2

Flit(t1, i, j)

Key
Vector
1

HEAD Data bit
bit
[5:3]

TAIL Data bit
bit [11:9]

Data bit
[8:6]

DEST
bit [0]

Data bit
[23:20]

SRC
bit [2]

MUX

MUX

MUX

MUX

HEAD bit

TAIL bit

DEST bit
[0]

SRC bit
[2]

Flitdp(t1, i, j)

Figure 4.2. One example of using a multiplexer network to permute bits, which is decided by a
configuration based on key vector 1.

37

Flit(t2, i, j)

Key
Vector
2

HEAD Data bit
bit
[5:3]

TAIL Data bit
bit [11:9]

Data bit
[8:6]

DEST
bit [0]

Data bit
[23:20]

SRC
bit [2]

MUX

MUX

MUX

MUX

Data bit
[3]

Data bit
[10]

DEST bit
[0]

Data bit
[21]

Flitdp(t2, i, j)

Figure 4.3. Another example of permuted bits given a different key vector.

4.2.2. PUF-based Local Key Generation
The key bits determine which permutation algorithm for the flit permuting and de-permuting
modules to use at the current time. To prevent the attacker from attacking the permutation
mechanisms, we proposed to dynamically change the key for the permutation algorithm at run-time.
The key is generated locally in each router. As shown in Fig. 4.1, each pair of input and output ports
needs to have one proposed local key management module. No central key management is needed.
This further hardens our method against the adversary as the local router keys will differ at runtime. As the flit permutation configuration in each router is different, cracking one router would not
guarantee the malicious packet to have full network access to successfully reach its destination.
We exploit the PUF-like structure [41, 42] and the traffic-pattern-dependent content saved
in the round-robin register to generate a random key vector. As shown in Fig. 4.4, the PUF-like
network is made up of multiplexers that propagate a flit bit along a path determined by the
multiplexer challenge vector. Due to process variations, the propagation delays between multiplexer

38

inputs are slightly different. Thus, each multiplexer will have two different inputs. The challenge
vector controls which multiplexer inputs propagate to their respective outputs. The output of the
multiplexer is latched by the key registers at the key clock edge (KeyCLK in Fig. 4.4). The period
of the user-defined key clock pulse should be longer than the time needed for all packets left in the
input and output buffers to move to the next hop. If eight permutation algorithms are sufficient to
obfuscate the flit, a 3-bit key vector is needed for run-time dynamic permutation.

Flit bit

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

X[0]

X[1]

X[2]

DQ

DQ

Key[0]

DQ

Key[1]

Key CLK

Figure 4.4. PUF-like structure used for key generation at run-time.

39

Key[2]

X0[n]
RRReg4[n]
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Q
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Q
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D

Q

D

Q

D

Q

D

Q

RRReg3[n]
RRReg2[n]
RRReg1[n]
RRReg0[n]

CLK

Figure 4.5. Challenge vector generation circuit.

Besides the process variation, the proposed method further dynamically changes the
challenge vector using the internal value of the Round-Robin Registers (RRReg) in each router. As
the RRReg value is set based on the output port requests from the real-time packet traffic, different
routers will have unique RRReg values at a given time. Moreover, the RRReg value varies with
different traffic traces extracted from the NoC application. It is proposed to exploit the time
differential concept to design the RRReg-based challenge vector generator. Equations 4.3-4.5
express how the RRReg content at different clock cycles is used to generate the challenge vector
X, where RRReg0[n] is the value of the 0th RRReg bit at clock cycle n, and RRReg0[n-2] is the 0th
RRReg bit stored at clock cycle (n-2). D Flip-Flops were used to create shift registers that store the
RRReg history, as shown in Fig. 4.5. In addition, the key depends on the incoming flit, thus it cannot
be predicted at the design time. This unpredictability further increases the difficulty to execute a
successful HT attack at run-time.
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X 2 [n]  ( RRReg0 [n  3])  ((! X 2 [ n  3]) & ((RRReg4 [n  6])
 ( RRReg3[n  6])  ( RRReg2 [n  6])  ( RRReg1[n  6])))

Equation 4.3

X1[n]  ( RRReg 2 [n  2])  ( RRReg1[n  2])

Equation 4.4

X 0 [n]  ( RRReg 4 [n  1])  ( RRReg 3[n  1])

Equation 4.5

4.2.2.1.

Dynamic Key Update
The time relation of the key vector generation and internal router signals is shown in Fig.

4.6. When it is time to change the key, we wait until a tail flit arrives, signifying that a full packet
has been received. As shown in Fig. 4.6, upon arrival of the tail flit (1), the input buffer controller
forces the input buffer full signal to be high, in order to stop more flits from entering the input
buffers. Once the input buffer full signal is forced to high, transition (2) happens, and the key
generation network is turned on and allows an incoming flit bit to enter the key generation unit. As
soon as all of the router’s output buffers are emptied, transition (3) occurs. Transition (3) leads to a
clock pulse for the key generation unit that is generated to latch the random key vector at the current
time (4). The negative edge of the clock pulse leads to transitions (5) and (6), which turn off the
key generation network, and sets the buffer signals back to normal, respectively.
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Tail Flit
Arrival
Forced Input
Buffer Full
New Key
Generation
Enable

(1)
(2)

(6)

Output Buffer
Empty

(5)

(3)
Key CLK
Key Vector

Current Key

(4)

New Key

Figure 4.6. Example timing diagram of how dynamic key updates itself.

4.3.

Proposed NoC Design
The proposed method mainly differs from the baseline design in the five-port router module.

A system block diagram for the proposed five-port router module can be seen in Figure 4.7. The
flit encoding, flit decoding, flit bit permutation, flit bit de-permutation, local key generation, and a
configurable route computation module are the additions we made to the router.

42

Flit In

Flit ECC
Encoder

FP

Control signals

PFDP

Input
FIFO
&
Ctrl

PDeECC
Route
Comp.

Crossbar
Switch

Proposed Route
Computation

Critical flit bits
Full flit bits
FP: flit permutation
FDP: flit de-permutation
ECC: error correction
coding Encoder
PFDP: partial flit depermutation

Output
FIFO &
Ctrl

Flit DeECC
FDP
Flit Out

Figure 4.7. Block level schematic of the proposed five-port router, with flit flow.

4.3.1. Proposed Submodules
The addition of several submodules was needed in order to represent the hardware additions
made over the baseline design. The five-port router submodules for the proposed method include,
“Permutation,” “De-Permutation,” “Partial Flit De-Permutation,” “Hamming(15, 11) Encoder,”
“Hamming(15, 11) Decoder.” Many of the baseline submodules had to be edited as well, as an Error
Correction Code (ECC) is part of our proposed method, and the 4 ECC parity bits increase the bit
width from 32 to 36. As the ECC is on both ends of the router, all bit widths inside the router are
36 bits, and the bit widths over the external links remain at 32 bits.
4.3.1.1.

Hamming(15, 11) Encoder
This module is responsible for applying the ECC to the incoming data. The ECC used was

a Hamming (15, 11) code, which can correct all one bit errors.
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When data is transmitted, the zone where the data is transmitted, between the transmitter
and receiver, is called the channel. Channels differ and can be modeled in several ways, but usually
the point of modeling a channel is to express the rate of error to which the transmitted data is
exposed. A simple data communications scheme can be seen in Figure 4.8, where the message u is
sent over the channel, and the message 𝑢̂ is received on the other side. A hat is used over the received
message to denote that there may be a change with respect to the input u.

Channel

Figure 4.8. Basic understanding of data communications over a channel.

With an original message without coding applied, upon arrival at the receiver there is no
way to tell if that received message is actually what was sent. In channel coding, the goal is to detect
and correct errors in the received message to increase the integrity of the data. This is done by
concatenating additional bits into the message to create a codeword. The additional bits are formed
from the parity subsets of the message bits. For a Hamming (n,k) code, where k is the message
length, and n is the codeword length, the amount of parity bits m that are concatenated is equal to n
– k, as seen in Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9. Codeword length (n) vs. Message length.

For a Hamming code with m parity bits, the message length and codeword length can be
found in the equalities seen in Eqs. 4.6 and 4.7:

Equation 4.6
Equation 4.7
The addition of redundancy to the message lowers the effective rate of the code, as seen in
Eq. 4.8.

Equation 4.8

The m parity bits of a codeword are calculated using the generator matrix of the particular
code. The generator matrix G, is a k x n matrix that encodes any message u into a codeword v. Eq.
4.9 expresses that any message u multiplied with the generator matrix G, will result in a
corresponding codeword v.

Equation 4.9
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The generator matrix consists of two submatrices, a k x k identity matrix and a k x (n – k)
submatrix formed by the code’s parity check equations. This deduces that there are m parity check
equations. The first submatrix places the original message into the codeword, and the second
submatrix is responsible for tagging on the redundancy bits to the codeword. Eq. 4.10 shows the
systematic form of a generator matrix.

Equation 4.10

Given a Hamming(15, 11) code, where codeword length is 15, and message length of 11,
we therefore have 15-11 = 4 bits of redundancy. With m = 4, we have four parity check equations,
which, for a Hamming(15, 11) code, are expressed in Eqs. 4.11-4.14 below:

Equation 4.11
Equation 4.12
Equation 4.13
Equation 4.14

Finally, the generator matrix for a Hamming(15, 11) code can be seen below in Eq. 4.15.
To implement the encoder in hardware, only XOR gates are needed because they act perfectly as a
bitwise modulo-2 addition operation. An equivalent circuit that generates one of the redundancy
bits, made out of 2-input XOR gates, can be seen in Figure 4.10.
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Equation 4.15

Figure 4.10. Equivalent circuit for redundancy bit calculation using XOR2 instead of XOR7.
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A length of 11 un-coded bits was chosen, as we care mostly about the 10 bits in the critical
flit field of each header flit. For our 4x4 implementation, the critical flit field bits consist of the 4
bit destination address, 4 bit source address, and 2 bit flit type. The flit structure for header, payload,
and tail flits can be seen in Figure 4.11. The LSBs in this case are the critical field flit bits,
meanwhile in real applications the MSBs correspond to the critical field flit bits.

Figure 4.11. New 36 bit Flit Structures.

4.3.1.2.

Hamming(15, 11) Decoder
This module removes the ECC redundancy bits that were concatenated into the flit, and also

corrects one bit errors in the information bits. To correct errors, the module uses correction circuits
based off of each error vector’s syndrome. As any codeword can be made up by linearly adding
other codewords, for a given error vector the set of all of the possible received codewords is made
up of the Galois Field 2 (GF(2)) addition (also known as modulo-2 addition) of the error vector
with the set of all of the possible generated codewords. Due to this linearity, all received codewords
with a given error vector will exhibit the same syndrome. This means that each output bit has a
dedicated correction circuit that will always flip and correct the corresponding output bit when the
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specific syndrome is present that corresponds to an error on that bit. This decoding method is next
examined in detail.
From the generator matrix seen in Eq. 4.10, one can obtain another matrix which is defined
as the parity check matrix. The parity check matrix definition can be seen in Eq. 4.16:

Equation 4.16
Equation 4.17
Equation 4.18
Equation 4.19

Equation 4.20

The expressions seen in Eqs. 4.17-4.20 are also true for Hamming codes. The variables r, v,
e, and s, in Eqs. 4.18-4.20, correspond to the following: v is a valid codeword generated by Eq. 4.9,
e is an error vector, r is the received codeword which is a modulo-2 sum of a valid codeword and
an error vector, and finally s is the syndrome. The H matrix used in this work can be seen in Eq.
4.21. As Hamming codes are both perfect and linear, rather than equating v to a specific codeword
and e to a specific error vector, one can instead generalize both of these variables to a set of all
possible codewords and error vectors respectively. Another interesting property of linear codes is
that by combining two valid codewords, one can create another valid codeword, and this is how a
set of all possible codewords can be made. This linearity means that in Eq. 4.20, all valid codewords
will give the same syndrome, and all received codewords that incur a specific error vector will
generate the same syndrome. Generalizing, all one bit errors on the same bit position will trigger
the same syndrome, and detection of this syndrome can lead to the detection of an error on that
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position, and then the bit error can be corrected. To correct a bit error on a given position, the
corresponding syndrome can be used to create an error-correcting circuit for that one bit position.
An example error-correcting circuit for a Hamming(15, 11) code is shown in Figure 4.12.

Data[2]*

[1

1

0

Data[2]

0 ] = Syndrome[3:0]

Figure 4.12. Example of error correction circuit. The AND gate will only have an output of one
when the corresponding syndrome is met. When that syndrome is met, the output of 1 from the
AND gate, will flip the respective bit using with the XOR gate.

Equation 4.21

4.3.1.3.

Permutation
The Permutation module is responsible for permuting the input data. For the method

presented here, 8 different permutation configurations were used as this provided “good enough”

50

flit bit obfuscation. The permutation method works as explained in section 4.2.1. The permutation
module was originally designed for 32 bits, but was extended to 36 due to the ECC parity bits.
4.3.1.4. De-Permutation
The De-Permutation module is responsible for de-permuting the output data, prior to
decoding. For the method proposed here, 8 different permutation configurations are used and
therefore 8 de-permutation configurations were needed. The de-permutation module works as the
dual of the permutation module, and acts to permute the data back to its original position before
permutation.
4.3.1.5.

Partial Flit De-Permutation (PFDP)
The Partial Flit De-Permutation module is a submodule within in the Circular FIFO and

Info Extraction modules. This module provides permutation for an output of shorter length than the
length of the input. The number of MUXes needed is equal to the amount of outputs. Still, the 36
bit (extended because of parity) flit data is needed as an input to the module due to the flit content
being able to be permuted to any other position in the flit.
4.3.1.6. PUF
The PUF module is responsible for dynamically updating the key vector that controls the
permuting modules. The PUF network accepts a bitstream, and that bitstream propagates along
MUXes with different delays on the lines. The MUX lines are controlled by the challenge bits
generated by the hardware seen in Figure 4.5.
4.4. Chapter Summary
In this chapter, the main design of the thesis was presented. Submodules that build upon the
baseline NoC to create the proposed method were also introduced. In the next chapter, the proposed

51

method presented here will be tested and compared to existing NoC security methods. Several
metrics will be used to measure the integrity and security of each method under the effects of certain
hardware attacks.

52

Chapter 5. Testing of Multiple NoC Methods
5.1.

Attack Model and Experimental Setup
The primary focus of this thesis work is at the router level, therefore the techniques proposed

here address the hardware Trojans that perform Denial of Service (DoS) type attacks in NoC routers.
The consequence of DoS attacks includes bandwidth depletion, incorrect path routing, deadlock
and livelock [7]. More specifically, hardware Trojans in routers can maliciously change the
source/destination address or flit type information of a packet that has left the transmitter NI. If a
Trojan payload modifies the destination address of a packet, that packet could be directed to an
unauthorized IP core. A drop of the header flit or tail flit will result in the incomplete packet being
retained in the router until some operation arrives to reset the router. In the rest of this section, all
methods above suffering those HTs which are injected between the Input FIFO and the route
computation module, are evaluated. Three HT types—destination address (i.e. DEST HT), header
bits (i.e. HEAD HT), and tail bits (i.e. TAIL HT) — were considered in the experiments presented
in this section. The HT injection spots were on routers center routers R5 and R9, and corner router
R0. HTs were injected into the middle routers as the incurred effects should be more detrimental
for routers with more traffic passing through. A corner router was chosen as another injection spot
to view the effects of a HT inside a router with fewer I/O ports.
The proposed method was compared with existing methods [34, 36, 38, 43]. The work in
[34] presents a data protection unit (DPU) in detail to address the potential hardware Trojans
attacking the NoC NI. Saponara et al [44] follow a similar idea to detect if the memory access is
out of the secure memory range in the NI. It is assumed that address filtering should always be done
at the network interface. Hereafter, DPU is referred to as Baseline in the rest of this work. In [36],
a counter-based traffic adjustment NI is presented to address the packet loss and thus bandwidth
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depletion due to hardware Trojans. Here to this method is refrred to as NI-Term. When a packet
without a tail flit is left in the NoC network, that packet cannot move forward and will block future
packets entering the network, thus resulting in the network bandwidth depletion. Timeout
mechanisms [45, 46] are typically utilized to resolve the bandwidth depletion induced by deadlock
or link faults. Similarly, the work [38] uses a counter to terminate the current packet transmission
if malicious behavior is detected. In this thesis he timeout mechanism is applied to the router by
manually inserting a tail flit after a pre-determined time in order to terminate the transmission of
the current packet. This method is referred to as R-Term. The data protection unit [34] and the
wrapper method in [36] are not designed for router level hardware Trojan detection. The work [45]
proposes to investigate the feasibility of applying address filters to NoC routers. Despite minor
differences, the key principle for the DPU and Wrapper methods is to check whether the pair of
source and destination addresses carried in the header flit matches to the table of legal sourcedestination pairs. If the address pair is not legal, that packet is filtered out by the router. Hereafter,
this method is referred to as R-AddrFilter.
5.2.

Generation of Test Scripts, Traffic Patterns, and the other NoC Designs
A lot of time and effort was put into recreating the NoC designs to which the proposed

methods of this thesis are compared with. The baseline design presented in Chapter 3 was used as
the DPU design. This is fair in the sense that this design’s protection method lies in the NI and
anything that happens over the NoC fabric will not be observed until the receiver NI. Therefore, all
of the designs, including those proposed here, use the DPU method in the NI. Again, this is fair
because it is NI-level protection, and does not directly affect NoC-level protection, as will be shown
in section 5.3. The NI-Term, R-Term, and R-AddrFilter methods were all built on top of the baseline
method to create separate testbenches.
54

As packet injection rate, the type of HT, and the number of HTs injected into the system,
there were many tests involved. This is because each of the possible cases should be tested for each
design. A total of 108 simulations of each design were generated, as this equates to 3x4x9, which
represent HT cases (DEST, HEAD, TAIL), injected HT numbers (0-3), and the 9 packet injection
rates used. As there are a total of 5 different designs, a minimum of 540 simulations were needed
to generate the data presented in 5.3. Each simulation could take several minutes to do, and
parameters in the code would have to be changed manually, so it was unrealistic to manually record
the data of all 108 cases. Therefore, a bash script was developed to test multiple Verilog designs
using a bash script. The bash script is also able to compile modules and change internal parameters,
which would prove helpful. The use of Define functions in Verilog enabled the scripts to change
internal parameters of the module with external commands. Each script contains 108 sections, with
each section having many lines and a small change compared to the others. Python was used to
generate the testing scripts for each design, as this would prove more efficient than manually writing
the thousand plus lines in each script.
To be consistent with the other methods, the new NoC designs were tested in the same way
as the reference designs. It was decided to split the NoC into two zones as the other methods do;
secure and non-secure zones. A basic understanding of the two zones can be seen in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 also shows the injection sites of the HTs. These two zones are based on the integrity of
the IP cores to which the routers are connected. There is no functional difference between any of
the routers in either the secure or non-secure zones. A new traffic trace had to be generated to allow
only the secure zones to send packets to each other and vice versa for the non-secure zones.
MATLAB’s random number generator (RNG) was used to generate all of the traffic traces needed
for both debugging and testing the designs. This would allow for a proper, yet random, distribution
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of the destination routers of each traffic trace file. For instance, router R0 has the same probability
to send a packet to router R1, R4, R5, R10, R11, R14, or R15.

Figure 5.1. NoC split into secure and non-secure zones for testing.

5.3.

Results

5.3.1. Throughput
The throughput of different methods was compared by examining the total number of valid
packets received by the NoC NIs in the given simulation time. A valid packet was considered as
one that eventually reaches its original destination address rather than a modified destination. By
comparing the performance shown in Figs. 5.2 (a), (b), and (c) one can see that the proposed method
receives the same amount of valid packets for the same traffic injection rate, regardless of how
many HTs are inserted. In contrast, other methods drop significantly in the number of received valid
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packets as more HTs are inserted. The traffic injection rate, λ, was 0.2 packets per cycle per node.
For the single DEST HT scenario, the proposed method improves the number of received packets
by up to 6.4%, 70.1%, 14.3%, and 11.5% over the baseline, NI-Term, R-Term, and R-AddrFilter,
respectively. For the three DEST HTs scenarios, the proposed method achieves even better
throughput performance than other methods. The proposed approach can successfully receive
43.1% more packets than R-AddrFilter. The proposed method is better than the other methods for
the DEST HT scenario because it is able detect and correct a 1 bit change to the destination address.
In Fig. 5.3 the impact of HEAD HTs on the number of received packets is shown. Again,
our method outperforms other approaches. This is because when a header flit is dropped, the other
methods cannot recover that flit, and the packet is lost. The throughput of the proposed method
remains unchanged with the introduction of HTs. The other methods, however, receive 43.3% fewer
packets in the three HEAD HTs case than the zero HEAD HT case. In addition, the throughput of
the R-Term, R-AddrFilter and baseline methods will remain equal, as no protection is provided by
those methods against HEAD HTs. This is different than the throughput performance shown in Fig.
5.2.
When the TAIL HT causes tail flit losses, a more radical change in the number of received
packets is observed than in the prior HT cases. As shown in Fig. 5.4, the proposed method
outperforms the other methods by receiving more valid packets when TAIL HTs are introduced.
The proposed method achieves the same throughput in the TAIL HT cases as in the HEAD HT
cases. The impact of the different HT types on the throughput of the other methods is more
significant. For instance, as shown in Fig. 5.4(b), the R-AddrFilter method receives 94% fewer
packets than the proposed method. This performance drop is more than what was observed in the
HEAD HT case. The performance drop is more detrimental because the absence of tail flits will not
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allow all routing paths to release, resulting in the network bandwidth depleting rapidly. The R-Term
method is designed to handle TAIL HTs after a pre-defined waiting period. As the number of
inserted HTs increases, multiple routers waiting for the timeout to insert tail flits will block new
packets from being injected to the network, thus resulting in a significant decrease in the number of
received packets.
Compared to the baseline method, the proposed method improves the throughput by 6.4%
(for 1 DEST HT case) and 43.12% (for 3 DEST HT case) at the greatest injection rate. When the
HT controls the header flit bits of the NoC packet, the proposed method provided 11.6% and
43.67% increases in throughput over the baseline method for 1 HEAD HT and 3 HEAD HTs,
respectively. If the HT compromises the tail bits of the NoC packet, the proposed method achieves
up to a 98.8% improvement in throughput for the 3 TAIL HTs scenario over the baseline method.

Figure 5.2. Number of valid packets received. (a) No HT, (b) 1 DEST HT, and (c) 3 DEST HTs.

58

Figure 5.3. Number of valid packets received. (a) No HT, (b) 1 HEAD HT, and (c) 3 HEAD HTs.

Figure 5.4. Number of valid packets received. (a) No HT, (b) 1 TAIL HT, and (c) 3 TAIL HTs.
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5.3.2. Link Availability
Variation in the number of received packets shown in Figs. 5.2-5.4 demonstrates, from a
throughput perspective, how different methods are intended to mitigate bandwidth depletion if a
HT is present. In this section the effectiveness of each HT mitigation method from a link availability
point of view is examined. The link switching activity of each NoC link is recorded throughout the
simulation, and the total number of idle links at each clock cycle is accumulated. Given a traffic
trace, a smaller number of idle links indicates a more severe level of bandwidth depletion.
In equation 5.1, the network bandwidth availability as the ratio of the number of cycles that
n links are idle over the total number of simulation cycles.
Availabili tyn idle links 

Cycles for n Idle Links

Equation 5.1

Total Simulation Cycles

The subplot (a) depicted in each of Figs. 5.5-5.7 shows the link availability of the baseline
NoC without a HT insertion. Figure 5.5 shows the bandwidth availability of the NoC given a
specific HT mitigation method against three DEST type HTs injected into the NoC router. If the
histogram plot displays a peak towards more idle links for a higher availability, then the
corresponding HT mitigation method successfully manages the presence of HTs. In contrast, if the
peak is shifted more toward a smaller amount of idle links, then the method may be suffering more
from the depleted link bandwidth. As shown in Fig. 5.5, the R-AddrFilter and NI-Term methods
exhibit less link availability than the baseline, R-Term, and proposed methods if the DEST HTs
appear in the routers. The proposed method achieves a 19.1% and 22.5% higher average link
availability than the R-AddrFilter and NI-Term methods, respectively.
The impact of three HEAD HTs on the link availability achieved by different methods is
next examined. Comparing Figures 5.5 and 5.6, one can see that only the proposed method obtains
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the same link availability with that of the baseline without any HTs. This is because the proposed
method detects the HEAD HT and reconstructs the packet header flit in the same clock cycle, while
the other methods lack protection against HEAD HTs. With three HEAD HTs injected in the NoC
routers, the average number of idle links for the baseline, R-Term, and R-AddrFilter methods is
reduced by 10% over the baseline NoC with the 0 HT case. The NI-Term method suffers from a
29.8% decrease in the average number of available links over the 0 HT case. The decreases in the
link availability of the other methods are a result of the extra payload and tail flits propagating into
the router FIFOs, hindering the network performance as those flits will waste the FIFO buffer space.
If three TAIL HTs are injected to the NoC routers, the proposed method is the only one that
follows the trend of the baseline without HTs case, as shown in Fig. 5.7. Due to the HT payload
effects, the other methods show signs of bandwidth depletion as certain links have data stuck on
them for extended periods of time. The proposed method improves the average link availability by
33.7%, 33.7%, 26.4%, and 43.7% over the baseline, R-AddrFilter, NI-Term, and R-Term methods,
respectively.
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Figure 5.5. Link availability comparison among methods that suffer from DEST HTs.

Figure 5.6. Link availability comparison among methods that among methods that suffer from
HEAD HTs.
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Figure 5.7. Link availability comparison among methods that among methods that suffer from
TAIL HTs.

5.3.3. Traffic Hotspot/Coldspot Migration and Bandwidth Depletion
The arrival activity of new flits at each output port of the routers was monitored to estimate
the switching activity (thus power consumption) of each router throughout the entire simulation.
The total number of different flits transferred through each router is accumulated and then plotted
in a node-type plot, as shown in Figs. 5.8-5.10. Each square in the figure represents the switching
activities of one router with the corresponding coordinates in the physical NoC implementation.
The color of each square indicates the intensity of the number of output port switching operations
occurring over the entire simulation period. Figures 5.8-5.10 show the impact of two DEST HTs,
two HEAD HTs, and two TAIL HTs on the router switching activities, respectively. The tile plots
of each method were compared to the baseline NoC without HTs in the network, which is subplot
(a) in each figure.
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Compared to the tile plots in Fig. 5.8, the proposed method exhibits the closest activity
compared to the baseline with 0 HTs. The proposed method has more intense switching on two
routers over the baseline due to a measurement error, which whenever correction occurred it
counted as two switching operations instead of one. Less switching of the routers in the other
methods is either because the contaminated packets are filtered out by the HT mitigation method
(e.g. R-AddrFilter), or because the packets are transmitted based on a counter (e.g. NI-Term). The
baseline NoC with 2 DEST HTs differs from the 0 HT case at a few routers due to data being routed
to the wrong local port. Another example is router R1 (X=2 and Y=1) in the baseline NoC, which
exhibits more switching activity with 2 HTs than with 0 HTs. This is because R1’s neighbor routers
R0 (X=1 and Y=1) and R5 (X=2 and Y=2) are the HT injection sites. Traffic mitigation due to the
DEST HTs can also be seen on router R4 (X=1, Y=2).
The tile plots for the HEAD HT case are shown in Fig. 5.9. As all of the methods, excluding
the proposed method, cannot prevent the effects of the HEAD HTs, those methods will have less
link usage at the affected routers. This is an indication that the R-Term, Baseline, R-AddrFilter, and
NI-Term methods receive fewer packets than the baseline NoC without the HT case, which is
confirmed by the results in Fig. 5.3. Note that the NI-Term method receives the least number of
packets as the total traffic for the simulation is less than that of the other methods due to the counterbased traffic adjustment.
Figure 5.10 shows the tile plots for the traffic condition of the NoC with different HT
mitigation against two TAIL HTs. Only the R-Term and proposed methods can mitigate TAIL HTs,
and therefore the other methods will suffer from bandwidth depletion. The proposed method
corrects the tail flit if a HT is detected. On the contrary, the R-Term method depends on a counter
to release the suspended packet transmission. The counter-based waiting process eventually makes
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the network halt. This is why the overall switching activity for the R-Term method is low for this
case, even though this method provides some protection against TAIL attacks.

Figure 5.8. Traffic hotspot migration and bandwidth depletion induced by DEST HTs.
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Figure 5.9. Traffic hotspot migration and bandwidth depletion induced by HEAD HTs.

Figure 5.10. Traffic hotspot migration and bandwidth depletion induced by TAIL HTs.
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5.3.4. Effective Average Packet Latency
The packet latency is the time interval from the moment when the packet is completely
injected into the network to the time when the tail flit of that packet arrives in the packet destination.
Figure 5.11 shows the average packet latency of the proposed method, which does not increase with
an increasing number of DEST HTs. When the traffic injection rate increases, the average latency
variation is within only 2.2%.
As some HTs in the other methods can make designs have erratic latency results (for
instance, infinite latency), the average latency would become meaningless. Therefore, an effective
average latency metric is used to compare the latency performance among different methods. As
expressed in Eq. 5.2, the effective average latency (i.e. Avg. LatencyEffective) is the product of the real
average latency for all valid packets and the ratio of the valid packets received by the baseline
without HTs over those collected by the method under test.

Avg . LatencyEffective  Avg . Latency *

Valid Packets Baseline w / o HT

Equation 5.2

Valid Packets method under test

Using this effective latency, we are able to consider the impact of HTs on latency fairly,
given that some methods will never receive the packets affected by HTs. As shown in Fig. 5.12, the
proposed method improves the effective average latency by up to 63.4%, 68.2%, and 98.9% over
the existing methods for the single DEST HT, single HEAD HT, and single TAIL HT scenarios,
respectively.
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Figure 5.11. Average packet latency for a wide range of traffic injection rate and different number
of HTs.

Figure 5.12. Effective average packet latency.
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5.4.

Probability of HT Attack Success (PAS)

5.4.1. PAS for the Case of Countermeasure Unknown
The probability of attack success (PAS) was used as a metric to evaluate the obfuscation
efficiency of the proposed bit permuting mechanism. PAS is defined as the ratio of the number of
cases that the hardware Trojan successfully selects the bits belonging to the flit field of interest over
the total number of test cases. If the attackers do not have sufficient knowledge of the specific
permutation configuration, they will simply overwrite the interested field at the position that they
blindly guessed.
Figure 5.13 shows the PAS achieved by the proposed permutation method against tail bit
attacks for NoCs with flit sizes of 32-bits, 64-bits and 128-bits. Without the permutation, it is
assumed that the hardware Trojan can always successfully control the tail bit, i.e. PAS will be 1.
Since the permutation configuration is dynamically chosen by the key vector, in the proposed
method PAS is less than 1, as shown in Fig. 5.13. The impact of the flit width on the PAS for the tail
bit attack. Simulation results show that the average PAS of the proposed method are 0.0206, 0.0104,
and 0.0053 for 32-bit flits, 64-bit flits, and 128-bit flits, respectively.
Figure 5.14 shows the probability of partially or completely identifying and replacing the
exact flit-field positions with intended malicious content. The flit field of interest has a binary vector
that may have overlapped bits with the malicious intention bits. Even if the adversary does not
correctly guess all of the target bits, they still may change the target field to a different malicious
vector. As shown in Fig. 5.14, the attacker can successfully perform an attack by changing one of
the destination address bits with a probability of 82.2%. The successful change of 3 destination
address bits occurs with probability of 1.37%, which is over one order of magnitude lower than the
1-bit cases. The probability for 6-bit changes on the destination address is zero among one million
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test cases. Figure 5.14 indicates that the proposed error control code can obtain a PAS below 10-6
even if a 5-bit malicious vector is injected by the attacker.
5.4.2. PAS for When the Adversary Knows the Countermeasure
The goal of the HT countermeasures in [36, 38, 39] and the proposed approaches is to
minimize the HT attack success rate (PAS). A lower PAS means a more secure design. Previous work
[36, 38, 39] assumes that the attacker does not have the knowledge of the HT countermeasure
mechanisms used in the design. Unfortunately, this assumption is not always valid if the attacker
has access to the design details. The methods in [36, 38, 39] yield a PAS of 1 when the applied HT
countermeasure is known to the adversary. This is because the adversary may be able to change the
restricted memory range and mute the counter for HT detection. In contrast, the proposed method
assumes that the adversary may know the bit permuting mechanism in the design, but they do not
know the exact key vector. This is because the key vector is uniquely generated at each router at
run-time. As shown in Fig. 5.15, PAS significantly decreases with the increasing number of
permutation configurations used. The nonlinear trend line is predicted by a power function
y=0.4887x-1.402. As predicted, if the number of permutation configurations available in the router
is equal to 16, the proposed method achieves a PAS 1.04*10-2 in the case that the countermeasure
is known to the adversary. The proposed method PAS is two orders of magnitude less than that of
previous work [36, 38, 39].
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Figure 5.13. Success rate PAS of tail bit attacks for different number of permutation
configurations available in a router.

4-bit change:
0.05198%
2-bit change:
16.35633%

3-bit change:
1.37491%

6-bit change:
0.00000%
5-bit change:
0.00092%

1-bit change:
82.21586%

Figure 5.14. Statistical pie chart for the number of valid bits that an adversary modifies on
destination address to perform a successful attack.
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Figure 5.15. Probability of attack success PAS of the proposed method if the adversary knows the
permutation configurations applied in the router.

5.5. Randomness of Challenge Bits
The randomness of the dynamic permutation configuration is achieved by the following two
factors: (1) the PUF structure implemented in each router produces different select bits due to
process variations, and (2) the challenge bits from the round-robin table depend on the real-time
traffic injection rate and traffic pattern. As a result, the selection of the dynamic permutation
configuration is unknown at the design time. In each NoC router, eight configurations of dynamic
bit permutation were implemented. Figure 5.16 shows the occurrences of different PUF challenge
vectors over 21,000 clock cycles. As can be seen, each router demonstrates a unique characteristic
of the occurrence frequency for the permutation configurations. Figure 5.16 clearly indicates that
the round-robin table based dynamic permutation can make the permutation configuration
unpredictable, thus raising the bar for the attacker to insert a meaningful hardware Trojan.

72

Figure 5.16. Occurrence numbers of PUF challenge vectors for different NoC routers. The X-axis
is the decimal number of each dynamic permutation configuration ID. The Y-axis is the number
of occurrence times of that challenge vector in the total simulation period.

The traffic traces for Figure 5.17 were the secure and non-secure zone cases shown in Fig.
5.1, with a traffic injection rate of 0.143 packets per cycle per node. The impact of different traffic
injection rates and traffic traces on the occurrences of different challenge vectors were also
examined. As shown in Fig. 5.17, different traffic injection rates for the same traffic trace can lead
to significant differences on the occurrence frequency of different challenge vectors. For instance,
the configurations 0 and 5 yield -73.9% and +141.4% occurrence changes, respectively, when the
traffic injection rate λ varies from 0.143 to 0.2 packets per cycle per node. As the uniform traffic
trace is injected into the network, the frequencies of some challenge vectors (e.g. 1 and 7) are more
than doubled.
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Figure 5.17. Impact of different traffic injection rates and traffic traces on the occurrence of
different PUF challenge vectors for the dynamic permutation configuration.

5.6. Area Overhead/FPGA Synthesis
Each of the five designs examined here was synthesized to the FPGA seen in Fig. 3.21. The
resource utilization (which relates to the area of the device) was measured for each design, and can
be seen in Table 5.1. The biggest impact on area most likely comes from the permuting mechanisms,
and the decoders.
Table 5.1. Device Resource Utilization.
Design
Baseline
NI-Term
R-Term
R-AddrFilter
Proposed

FPGA
Resource
Slice LUTs
Slice Registers
Slice LUTs
Slice Registers
Slice LUTs
Slice Registers
Slice LUTs
Slice Registers
Slice LUTs
Slice Registers
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FPGA
Utilization Rate
42.77%
16.99%
52.00%
17.37%
48.59%
18.03%
57.24%
17.80%
65.74%
19.11%

5.7. Chapter Summary
Results obtained through Verilog and MATLAB simulations were presented in this chapter.
The Verilog results were compared between the proposed new method and four other methods. It
was found that the proposed method outperformed the other methods when HTs were introduced
into the system.
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Chapter 6. AES Power Obfuscation with Dynamic Permutation
6.1. Introduction
In an Internet of Things (IoT) application, sensors, actuators, and simple data collection
devices are connected through the internet. Among those connected devices, at least one data
computation chip is needed to analyze the massive amount of data and make a corresponding
decision. Due to the important role that the computation chip plays, it is assumed that some
cryptographic algorithm (at least a lightweight one) will be applied to that chip. It is proposed to
exploit the dynamic permutation method, which was presented in Chapter 4, to protect the
processing unit from hardware attacks, more specifically hardware Trojan insertions and sidechannel attacks simultaneously.
Dynamic permutation changes the original order of the information received from the
sensor. As the processing unit handles a dynamically permuted message, the attacker cannot
precisely execute a hardware Trojan attack at a pre-defined condition. Multiple possibilities of
permutation patterns increase the search space for the attacker to successfully reverse engineer the
processing unit, or execute a meaningful attack. Even if the attacker has certain knowledge of the
processing unit design, the dynamic aspect of the permutation method makes it harder to precisely
launch an attack. A random number generator or the cryptographic module can control the
dynamicity. If the cryptographic module detects an invalid message, a new permutation
configuration will be requested. With this framework, the processing node is obfuscated by the
dynamic feature.
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6.2. Experimental Setup
Data collection and transfer devices are also typical IoT devices. As a case study, we use a
router for a Network-on-Chip (NoC) is used to explain in detail how to design the dynamic
permutation to thwart hardware Trojan insertions and also make side-channel attacks harder to
execute.
The main function of a router is to interpret the header information of a data packet from
other NoC nodes and then direct that packet to the next routing hop. In a generic NoC router, each
pair of input and output ports is composed of input and output FIFOs, FIFO controllers, a crossbar,
and an arbiter. As shown in Fig. 4.1, the proposed dynamic bit permutation is placed before the
input FIFO, while the dynamic bit de-permutation is appended after the output FIFO. To detect
whether any hardware Trojan changes the packet integrity, an error control coding method can be
applied to the packet. The route computation is executed only when the packet integrity is sustained.
The critical component in this router design is the permutation configuration module. The
dynamic aspect of the permutation method is achieved by a random number generator followed
with modulo operation, as opposed to the PUF method used in chapter 4. It is assumed that the
router has a unique identifier, RID, and the dynamic selection bits for the permutation unit are
defined as DPSEL. A random DPSEL is obtained through Eq. 6.1 below.

DPSEL (t) = RNG (t) % (β ∗ RID)

Equation 6.1

where RNG(t) is the random number generated at the moment t, which typically is an integer times
the minimum clock period. The symbol ‘%’ stands for modulo operation. If the range of the random
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number generator is sufficiently large (compared with RID), the choice of DPSEL is evenly
distributed in the range of [0, β * RID-1]. The parameter β is the bit width ratio between DPSEL and
RID. Normally, the DPSEL is updated after a given period. Once the alarm signal from a
cryptographic module arrives, the DPSEL is promptly modified to mitigate the hardware Trojan
attack. As a hardware Trojan is triggered by a specific condition, a new DPSEL is very likely to lead
that Trojan triggering condition to vanish.
6.3. Results
An advanced encryption standard (AES) module with a 128-bit key and the proposed router
were implemented in Verilog HDL. The HDL codes were synthesized in Xilinx ISE 14.6 and then
downloaded to the SAKURA-G FPGA board, as shown in Fig. 6.1. With the assistance of Pythonbased ChipWhisperer [85] software, the power traces were captured for side-channel analysis
attacks.

SAKURA-G
BOARD

Open

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.1. Experimental setup for SCA attack. (a) SAKURA-G board with an OpenADC
mounted. (b) ChipWhisperer interface capturing one power trace.
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6.3.1. Crypto Key Retrieval Speed
The goal of the power-based side-channel attack is to retrieve the cipher key used in the
cryptographic module. The leak of a cipher key leads to the loss of security assurance provided by
the cryptographic module. As dynamic permutation potentially changes the power consumption
profile for the processing unit, the proposed method makes it more difficult to retrieve the key. The
increased difficulty is due to the obfuscation of the power waveform due to the dynamically
changing permutation configuration. The average partial guessing entropy (APGE) is used as a
metric to evaluate the speed of the cipher key retrieval [80]. It is assumed that all subkeys are
retrieved when APGE falls below 10 [81].
6.3.1.1. Impact of Processing Unit Area on Speed of Key Retrieval
A side-channel analysis attack is able to retrieve the crypto key if one has a sufficient
number of power traces. As shown in Fig. 6.2(a), the APGE for the AES reaches below 6, and this
indicates that all of the subkeys for AES have been found. The combination of the AES module and
a processing unit, router or NoC in our experiment results in the noticeable increase in the
corresponding APGE of the processing unit with AES protection. The baseline router and the
corresponding NoC are for a generic 4x4 mesh NoC. The proposed method is built in the generic
NoC with dynamic permutation and its run-time configuration unit. Fig. 6.2(a) shows that the
proposed processing unit design increases the APGE by factors of 82.3, 5.8, and 3.6 over AES,
AES-Router-Baseline, and AES-NoC-Baseline, respectively. This means, if the proposed method
is applied, more power traces are needed to find the complete key vector. This can also be
interpreted as the proposed method makes it more difficult to retrieve the subkey bytes through
correlation power analysis (CPA). Fig. 6.2(b) shows the speed of subkeys retrieval over the number
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of the power traces. As can be seen, the proposed method yields fewer subkey bytes than the AES
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AES-Router-Baseline
AES-NoC-Proposed
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6
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2
0

No. of Power Traces

Figure 6.2. Impact of the size of processing unit on the key retrieving speed. (a) APGE and (b) the
number of retrieved subkey bytes.

6.3.1.2. Impact of Selection Randomness on the Speed of Retrieving Keys
To reduce the hardware cost, a modular counter (CNT) was implemented to mimic RNG(t).
The result of CNT(t) % (β * RID) allows for some randomness in the run-time selection of the bit
permutation configuration. As the width of RID is as same as DPSEL in this experiment, β is equal to
1. The results in this subsection are based on the processing unit including an AES module and a
proposed router. The width of the modular counter was varied from 0 to 10 bits. The 0-bit CNT
means a fixed permutation pattern. A modular counter with more width generates a larger data
range, and thus more random options for permutation.
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Figure 6.3. Impact of the selection randomness on the key retrieving speed. (a) APGE and (b) the
number of retrieved subkey bytes.

As shown in Fig. 6.3(a), the 10-bit counter successfully makes the crypto key almost
irretrievable, as the APGE remains nearly flat with the increasing number of power traces. The
number of retrieved subkey bytes, shown in Fig. 6.3(b), also confirms that only two bytes of subkey
are found for the 10-bit CNT case. However, the obtained benefit on key retrieval does infinitely
increase with the size of the counter. As shown in Fig. 6.3(a), the variation of APGE for 3- to 10bit CNT cases is not significant. This indicates that a small variation on the selection of different
permutation patterns can effectively thwart power-based side-channel attacks.
6.3.2. Area Overhead (FPGA Results)
The hardware cost of the XC6SL75 FPGA implementation is shown in Table 6.1. The AESRouter-Proposed (i.e. static permutation) method increases the number of occupied slices by 33.9%
over the AES-Router-Baseline. If one introduces a 5-bit counter to dynamically permute the bit
order, this method costs 88.5% more FPGA area. For security-critical application, this amount of
hardware overhead is acceptable.
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Table 6.1. Hardware Cost in FPGA Implementation.
Design

AES

Number of
Slice
769
Registers
Number of
2663
Slice LUTs
Number of
Occupied
828
Slices

AES-Router- AES-Router- AES-RouterAES-Router- AES-NoC- AES-NoC- AES-RouterProposed-3- Proposed-5- Proposed-10Baseline
Baseline Proposed Proposed
bit CNT
bit CNT
bit CNT
1184

5,620

11,263

1,497

2,059

2,688

2,656

3584

14,182

22,201

4,546

4,583

5,990

6,544

1034

4,934

6,912

1,385

1,366

1,949

1,957

6.4. Chapter Summary
To protect the processing unit in AES applications used for the IoT, it was proposed to use
the collaborative method presented in chapter 4 to provide obfuscation of the data being processed.
It was seen that the proposed method can effectively help protect the processing unit from HT
insertions and side-channel attacks simultaneously. The dynamic aspect of the permutation method
helped protect the processing units by delaying the time it takes to retrieve a given key for AES by
increasing the number of power traces needed to do so.
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Chapter 7. Discussion
7.1.

Summary
The globalization of the business model used by the IC industry has helped reduce the costs

of supply. Outsourcing of the fabrication, assembly, and manufacturing stages have proved to
reduce the production cost of chips, but have also introduced several security issues in electronic
hardware. Hardware attacks that aim to change design functionality, steal design secrets, and cause
information leakage have all been introduced as a result of the globalized business model.
A prevalent type of hardware attack that was introduced directly from outsourcing, is that
of the Hardware Trojan. General methods exist to detect the presence of Hardware Trojans in
designs at test time, but with the complexity of these malicious circuits increasing, it is becoming
harder to detect them with conventional methods. Although general detection methods exist, there
is a lack of detection methods for on-chip networks. Trojans in on-chip networks can cause Denial
of Service, information leakage, and design trade secret leakage. To thwart Hardware Trojans in
Networks-on-Chip, a run-time method, as opposed to conventional offline methods, is proposed
and provides active mitigation of Hardware Trojans that cause Denial of Service attacks.
In chapter 4, a novel method to mitigate residual HT attacks is introduced. This method is
different than existing offline approaches as it is assumed that residual HTs have already bypassed
the offline detection methods. The basis of the proposed method is that it provides integrity to
packets traveling over the NoC, and it also lowers the chance that an attack affects the targeted area.
To provide packet integrity, Error Control Coding, in the form of a Hamming Code, is used not
only to detect errors present in the packet flits, but to also correct vital instructions that may have
been maliciously changed. To lower the probability of a successful attack, a bit permutation method
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is proposed that rearranges the bits going into a NoC router. Within the router, extra hardware is
added so instructions can still be interpreted correctly. A collaborative method combines the prior
two methods to detect multiple bit errors and trigger a change in the bit arrangement to effectively
spread out the multiple bit error.
In chapter 5, the proposed method is compared to four other methods that aim to increase
the security of NoCs. Each of these methods is from recent IEEE literature. Results are presented
that compare the packet throughput, effective average latency, link availability, and link usage of
the five different methods. For packet throughput, the number of valid packets received by a
particular design is compared with that of the others. A valid packet, is defined as one that is
received at the target IP core to which it was originally sent. Any other packet that arrives at a local
port that is illegal or incorrect with regard to the original destination is considered an invalid packet.
The results presented in 5.3.1 show that the proposed method outperforms the other methods with
regard to throughput, providing an increase of 6.4-43.12%, 11.6-43.67%, and up to 98.8% for
DEST, HEAD, and TAIL HTs respectively. The interval of an increase in throughput depends on
the number of HTs that were injected into the system.
For link availability, the amount of data on the NoC links between routers was measured at
every clock cycle of the simulation time. This enabled a view of the amount of traffic on the links
at a given simulation time, and this variable was plotted this data over the entire simulation time in
the form of histogram plots, seen in section 5.3.2. It was seen that that the proposed method
outperforms the rest for link availability, and an in-depth analysis of the improvement over the other
methods can be found in section 5.3.2.
Results for link usage, which can be found in section 5.3.3, show of a graphical
representation of the traffic flow in the network over the entire simulation time. Migrations of hot
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spots in the network, compared to an ideal “no HT” model, mean that the network has been
rerouting traffic the wrong way due to HTs that affect the destination address of a header flit. Cold
spot migration shows that a zone of the network is undergoing depleted bandwidth, due to extra
flits probably missing their header flit. Dropping the tail flit will also cause bandwidth depletion,
but in this case the depletion is due to paths not being freed up to other packets requesting
permission to use that path. It was seen that the proposed method exhibits the most similar plot to
the ideal case.
In section 5.3.4 the effective latency was examined for each HT mitigation method. The
proposed method achieved an average effective latency between 63.4-98.9% better (smaller) than
the existing approaches.
In chapter 6, the proposed collaborative method was exploited to protect the processing
units in an AES application against HT insertions and side-channel attacks simultaneously. The
permutation method, and the dynamicity provided by it, helps to obfuscate the data within the
processing unit. This will help delay the time it takes to retrieve a given key for AES by increasing
the amount of power traces needed.
The limitations of the proposed method lies in its area overhead. In Tables 5.1 and 6.1, it is
shown that the proposed method incurs the largest area overhead of the designs with which it was
compared. This is most likely due to the large networks of MUXes that comprise the permuting
modules, as well as the increase in internal bit widths in routers for the ECC parity bits. The increase
in bit width also means that extra registers are needed in the FIFOs, and other modules require extra
hardware to process and send these bits through the router.
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7.2.

Other work
While working at the Reliable VLSI systems lab at UNH, several other papers were worked

on, including the strengthening of crypto-systems by creating a more robust fault detection method,
and by using an emerging technology (memristors), in place of traditional CMOS gates.
7.2.1. Crypto-system Security
Security is a crucial concern for the development of trustworthy embedded systems.
Cryptographic algorithms are commonly used to ascertain security of the system. Driven by
malicious intent, attackers are impelled to extract the cipher key and thus compromise the embedded
system. As embedded systems are typically hardware constrained and are used for critical and
potentially sensitive contexts, lightweight ciphers are preferred for security. Hence it is imperative
to explore effective fault-detection methods for lightweight ciphers.
We propose a new microarchitecture to thwart fault attacks that place symmetric faults on
the two encryption data paths. To further reduce the FBR for SIMON, we propose a new faultdetection algorithm that integrates operand permutation and masking techniques. Closed-form
expressions for de-permutation and de-masking in SIMON are provided in this letter. Our method
is assessed under two fault attack scenarios (random and symmetric fault injections) with bit-flip,
stuck-at-0, and stuck-at-1 fault models. Simulation results show that our method minimizes the FBR
to zero with the fault attack scenarios of symmetric fault location and stuck-at-0 fault injections.
Overall, the proposed method outperforms the existing fault-detection methods in multiple fault
attack conditions, at the cost of 5% more area overhead than the most hardware-efficient fault
detection method.
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7.2.2. Memristor-based SIMON Cipher
The fourth fundamental circuit element, memristor, attracts increasing attention because of
its memory characteristic. The special memory behavior of the memristor has been exploited to
design control systems, memory arrays, logic gate, and security primitives in previous work.
However, the power characteristics of the memristor have not been widely studied yet. In this work,
we used a memristor model that is suitable for circuit simulation to investigate the power
characteristics of the memristor itself and memristor-based logic gates. Our simulation results
indicate that memristor has different power characteristic compared with CMOS devices. The peak
power of memristor-based gates does not monotonically increases with input voltage amplitude;
instead, the combination of input period length and voltage amplitude determines the occurrence of
power peak. The reason is that the power consumption of memristors depends on the effective
memristor width, which is controlled by the input. We further examine the feasibility of utilizing
memristors to implement a new block cipher, SIMON. Our studies show that the unique power
characteristic of memristor based SIMON may add extra challenges for extraction of the secret key
from the cipher as it introduces 94% power deviation while power sampling.
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APPENDIX A – Module Schematics
1. Submodule schematics
a. Five-port router

Figure A.1. External schematic of five-port router module, with I/O ports.
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Figure A.2. Internal schematic of five-port router, with internal module connections.
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b. Input FIFO

Figure A.3. External schematic for the input FIFO module, showing I/O pins.

Figure A.4. Internal schematic of the input FIFO, showing internal register connections.
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c. Full Crossbar

Figure A.5. Full Crossbar external schematic with I/O ports.

101

Figure A.6. Full Crossbar internal schematic with submodule connections.
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d. Info Extraction

Figure A.7. External schematic of Info Extraction module, with I/O ports.

Figure A.8. Internal schematic of Info Extraction module.

103

e. Port Admission

Figure A.9. External schematic of Port Admission module, with I/O ports.

Figure A.10. Internal schematic of Port Admission module.
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f. Round Robin

Figure A.11. System level schematic of Round Robin module

Figure A.12. Internal circuitry of Round Robin module

105

g. Circular FIFO

Figure A.13. System level schematic of Circular FIFO module

Figure A.14. Internal Circuitry for Circular FIFO module.
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APPENDIX B - Verilog Code
a. Top Module (Testbench)
`timescale 1ns/1ps
//This testbench is to test all HT cases on the HT mitigation method of filtering illegal address
/*
This testbench is used to test the impact of HT numbers, location, and types on the NOC performance
@Yu & Frey, 12/14/2015
`define HT0 //
`define HT1 //Router 0
`define HT2 //additional Router 5
`define HT3 //additional Router 10, the HT definition is accumulated
`define HT32 //additional Router 15, the HT definition is accumulated
`define CENTER_ROUTER
`define BOUNDARY_ROUTER
`define MULTI_ROUTER //if this is not defined, single router is controlled by HT, otherwise,
multiple Router is controlled
`define DEST_HT
`define HEAD_HT
`define TAIL_HT
//define those parameters on the ncverilog command line
*/
//Define which HT type, and which case (0-3HT)
//`define HT1 //additional Router 0
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//`define HT2
//`define HT3
//`define TAIL_HT
//`define DEST_HT
//`define HEAD_HT

module NoC4x4_Proposed_SecureZoneCorrection;

parameter filename0 = "SecureZoneTest0.txt";
parameter filename1 = "SecureZoneTest1.txt";
parameter filename2 = "SecureZoneTest2.txt";
parameter filename3 = "SecureZoneTest3.txt";
parameter filename4 = "SecureZoneTest4.txt";
parameter filename5 = "SecureZoneTest5.txt";
parameter filename6 = "SecureZoneTest6.txt";
parameter filename7 = "SecureZoneTest7.txt";
parameter filename8 = "SecureZoneTest8.txt";
parameter filename9 = "SecureZoneTest9.txt";
parameter filename10 = "SecureZoneTest10.txt";
parameter filename11 = "SecureZoneTest11.txt";
parameter filename12 = "SecureZoneTest12.txt";
parameter filename13 = "SecureZoneTest13.txt";
parameter filename14 = "SecureZoneTest14.txt";
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parameter filename15 = "SecureZoneTest15.txt";
parameter filename16 = "SecureZoneTestBandwidthAndCycles.txt";
parameter filename17 = "SecureZoneTestCycles.txt";
parameter filename18 = "SecureZoneTestBandwidth.txt";
parameter filename19 = "SecureZoneTestPacketInfo_placeholder.txt";
parameter injection = 1600;

//Trigger Signals
reg fivehead,fivetail,fivedest,zerotail,zerohead,zerodest,sevenhead,seventail,sevendest;

//correct/wrong packet check
integer
corr0,corr1,corr2,corr3,corr4,corr5,corr6,corr7,corr8,corr9,corr10,corr11,corr12,corr13,corr14,corr
15, corrtotal,rtotal;
integer ps0,ps1,ps2,ps3,ps4,ps5,ps6,ps7,ps8,ps9,ps10,ps11,ps12,ps13,ps14,ps15,pstotal;
//other
integer links0, links1, links2, links3, links4, links5, links6, links7, links8, links9, links10, links11,
links12, links13, links14, links15, links16, links17, links18, links19, links20, links21, links22,
links23, links24, links25, links26, links27, links28, links29, links30, links31, links32, links33,
links34, links35, links36, links37, links38, links39, links40, links41, links42, links43, links44,
links45, links46, links47 ;
integer code0, code1, code2, code3, code4, code5, code6, code7, code8, code9, code10, code11,
code12, code13, code14, code15;
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integer op_file0, op_file1, op_file10, op_file11, op_file12, op_file13, op_file14, op_file15, op_file2,
op_file3, op_file4, op_file5, op_file6, op_file7, op_file8, op_file9, op_file16, op_file17, op_file18,
op_file19;
integer r_file0, r_file1, r_file2, r_file3, r_file4, r_file5, r_file6, r_file7, r_file8, r_file9, r_file10,
r_file11, r_file12, r_file13, r_file14, r_file15;
integer rpackets0, rpackets1, rpackets10, rpackets11, rpackets12, rpackets13, rpackets14,
rpackets15, rpackets2, rpackets3, rpackets4, rpackets5, rpackets6, rpackets7, rpackets8, rpackets9;
reg trigger; //HT trigger
reg

CLK,CLK2;

reg

reset;

//Interconnections
integer packetsSent;
integer packetsreceived;
integer BW;
wire

wrreq_00;

wire

wrreq_01;

wire

wrreq_02;

wire

wrreq_03;

wire

wrreq_04;

wire

wrreq_10;

wire

wrreq_11;

wire

wrreq_12;

wire

wrreq_13;
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wire

wrreq_14;

wire

wrreq_20;

wire

wrreq_21;

wire

wrreq_22;

wire

wrreq_23;

wire

wrreq_24;

wire

wrreq_30;

wire

wrreq_31;

wire

wrreq_32;

wire

wrreq_33;

wire

wrreq_34;

wire

wrreq_40;

wire

wrreq_41;

wire

wrreq_42;

wire

wrreq_43;

wire

wrreq_44;

wire

wrreq_50;

wire

wrreq_51;

wire

wrreq_52;

wire

wrreq_53;

wire

wrreq_54;

wire

wrreq_60;

wire

wrreq_61;
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wire

wrreq_62;

wire

wrreq_63;

wire

wrreq_64;

wire

wrreq_70;

wire

wrreq_71;

wire

wrreq_72;

wire

wrreq_73;

wire

wrreq_74;

wire

wrreq_80;

wire

wrreq_81;

wire

wrreq_82;

wire

wrreq_83;

wire

wrreq_84;

wire

wrreq_90;

wire

wrreq_91;

wire

wrreq_92;

wire

wrreq_93;

wire

wrreq_94;

wire

wrreq_100;

wire

wrreq_101;

wire

wrreq_102;

wire

wrreq_103;

wire

wrreq_104;
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wire

wrreq_110;

wire

wrreq_111;

wire

wrreq_112;

wire

wrreq_113;

wire

wrreq_114;

wire

wrreq_120;

wire

wrreq_121;

wire

wrreq_122;

wire

wrreq_123;

wire

wrreq_124;

wire

wrreq_130;

wire

wrreq_131;

wire

wrreq_132;

wire

wrreq_133;

wire

wrreq_134;

wire

wrreq_140;

wire

wrreq_141;

wire

wrreq_142;

wire

wrreq_143;

wire

wrreq_144;

wire

wrreq_150;

wire

wrreq_151;

wire

wrreq_152;
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wire

wrreq_153;

wire

wrreq_154;

reg

NACK_in_E;

reg

NACK_in_S;

reg

NACK_in_W;

reg

NACK_in_N;

reg

NACK_in_L;

wire

almost_full_00;

wire

almost_full_01;

wire

almost_full_02;

wire

almost_full_03;

wire

almost_full_04;

wire

almost_full_10;

wire

almost_full_11;

wire

almost_full_12;

wire

almost_full_13;

wire

almost_full_14;

wire

almost_full_20;

wire

almost_full_21;

wire

almost_full_22;

wire

almost_full_23;
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wire

almost_full_24;

wire

almost_full_30;

wire

almost_full_31;

wire

almost_full_32;

wire

almost_full_33;

wire

almost_full_34;

wire

almost_full_40;

wire

almost_full_41;

wire

almost_full_42;

wire

almost_full_43;

wire

almost_full_44;

wire

almost_full_50;

wire

almost_full_51;

wire

almost_full_52;

wire

almost_full_53;

wire

almost_full_54;

wire

almost_full_60;

wire

almost_full_61;

wire

almost_full_62;

wire

almost_full_63;

wire

almost_full_64;

wire

almost_full_70;

wire

almost_full_71;
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wire

almost_full_72;

wire

almost_full_73;

wire

almost_full_74;

wire

almost_full_80;

wire

almost_full_81;

wire

almost_full_82;

wire

almost_full_83;

wire

almost_full_84;

wire

almost_full_90;

wire

almost_full_91;

wire

almost_full_92;

wire

almost_full_93;

wire

almost_full_94;

wire

almost_full_100;

wire

almost_full_101;

wire

almost_full_102;

wire

almost_full_103;

wire

almost_full_104;

wire

almost_full_110;

wire

almost_full_111;

wire

almost_full_112;

wire

almost_full_113;

wire

almost_full_114;
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wire

almost_full_120;

wire

almost_full_121;

wire

almost_full_122;

wire

almost_full_123;

wire

almost_full_124;

wire

almost_full_130;

wire

almost_full_131;

wire

almost_full_132;

wire

almost_full_133;

wire

almost_full_134;

wire

almost_full_140;

wire

almost_full_141;

wire

almost_full_142;

wire

almost_full_143;

wire

almost_full_144;

wire

almost_full_150;

wire

almost_full_151;

wire

almost_full_152;

wire

almost_full_153;

wire

almost_full_154;

wire

[31:0] data_00;

wire

[31:0] data_01;
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wire

[31:0] data_02;

wire

[31:0] data_03;

wire

[31:0] data_04;

wire

[31:0] data_10;

wire

[31:0] data_11;

wire

[31:0] data_12;

wire

[31:0] data_13;

wire

[31:0] data_14;

wire

[31:0] data_20;

wire

[31:0] data_21;

wire

[31:0] data_22;

wire

[31:0] data_23;

wire

[31:0] data_24;

wire

[31:0] data_30;

wire

[31:0] data_31;

wire

[31:0] data_32;

wire

[31:0] data_33;

wire

[31:0] data_34;

wire

[31:0] data_40;

wire

[31:0] data_41;

wire

[31:0] data_42;

wire

[31:0] data_43;

wire

[31:0] data_44;
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wire

[31:0] data_50;

wire

[31:0] data_51;

wire

[31:0] data_52;

wire

[31:0] data_53;

wire

[31:0] data_54;

wire

[31:0] data_60;

wire

[31:0] data_61;

wire

[31:0] data_62;

wire

[31:0] data_63;

wire

[31:0] data_64;

wire

[31:0] data_70;

wire

[31:0] data_71;

wire

[31:0] data_72;

wire

[31:0] data_73;

wire

[31:0] data_74;

wire

[31:0] data_80;

wire

[31:0] data_81;

wire

[31:0] data_82;

wire

[31:0] data_83;

wire

[31:0] data_84;

wire

[31:0] data_90;

wire

[31:0] data_91;

wire

[31:0] data_92;
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wire

[31:0] data_93;

wire

[31:0] data_94;

wire

[31:0] data_100;

wire

[31:0] data_101;

wire

[31:0] data_102;

wire

[31:0] data_103;

wire

[31:0] data_104;

wire

[31:0] data_110;

wire

[31:0] data_111;

wire

[31:0] data_112;

wire

[31:0] data_113;

wire

[31:0] data_114;

wire

[31:0] data_120;

wire

[31:0] data_121;

wire

[31:0] data_122;

wire

[31:0] data_123;

wire

[31:0] data_124;

wire

[31:0] data_130;

wire

[31:0] data_131;

wire

[31:0] data_132;

wire

[31:0] data_133;

wire

[31:0] data_134;

wire

[31:0] data_140;
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wire

[31:0] data_141;

wire

[31:0] data_142;

wire

[31:0] data_143;

wire

[31:0] data_144;

wire

[31:0] data_150;

wire

[31:0] data_151;

wire

[31:0] data_152;

wire

[31:0] data_153;

wire

[31:0] data_154;

wire

[4:0] empty_0;

wire

[4:0] empty_1;

wire

[4:0] empty_2;

wire

[4:0] empty_3;

wire

[4:0] empty_4;

wire

[4:0] empty_5;

wire

[4:0] empty_6;

wire

[4:0] empty_7;

wire

[4:0] empty_8;

wire

[4:0] empty_9;

wire

[4:0] empty_10;

wire

[4:0] empty_11;

wire

[4:0] empty_12;
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wire

[4:0] empty_13;

wire

[4:0] empty_14;

wire

[4:0] empty_15;

wire[31:0] data_in0, data_in1,data_in2, data_in3, data_in4, data_in5, data_in6, data_in7, data_in8,
data_in9, data_in10, data_in11, data_in12, data_in13, data_in14, data_in15;
reg inreq0, inreq1, inreq2, inreq3, inreq4, inreq5, inreq6, inreq7, inreq8, inreq9, inreq10, inreq11,
inreq12, inreq13, inreq14, inreq15;
reg[13:0] Count;
reg[7:0] ID0, ID1, ID2, ID3, ID4, ID5, ID6, ID7, ID8, ID9, ID10, ID11, ID12, ID13, ID14, ID15;
reg[9:0] Info0, Info1, Info2, Info3, Info4, Info5, Info6, Info7, Info8, Info9, Info10, Info11, Info12,
Info13, Info14, Info15;
reg[4:0] Dest0, Dest1, Dest2, Dest3, Dest4, Dest5, Dest6, Dest7, Dest8, Dest9, Dest10, Dest11,
Dest12, Dest13, Dest14, Dest15;
integer Destr0, Destr1, Destr2, Destr3, Destr4, Destr5, Destr6, Destr7, Destr8, Destr9, Destr10,
Destr11, Destr12, Destr13, Destr14, Destr15;
reg[3:0] D0, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7, D8, D9, D10, D11, D12, D13, D14, D15;
reg[3:0] src0, src1, src2, src3, src4, src5, src6, src7, src8, src9, src10, src11, src12, src13, src14,
src15;
integer spackets0, spackets1, spackets2, spackets3, spackets4, spackets5, spackets6, spackets7,
spackets8, spackets9, spackets10, spackets11, spackets12, spackets13, spackets15, spackets14;

fiveportrouter4_Trojaned R0(
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.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(wrreq_12),
.wrreq_S(wrreq_33),
.wrreq_W(1'b0),
.wrreq_N(1'b0),
.wrreq_L(inreq0),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(almost_full_12),
.AlmostFull_in_S(almost_full_33),
.AlmostFull_in_W(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_N(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b0000),
.dataino_E(data_12),
.dataino_L(data_in0),
.dataino_N(32'h00000000),
.dataino_S(data_33),
.dataino_W(32'h00000000),
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.valid_in({~empty_1[2], ~empty_3[3], 1'b0, 1'b0, 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_00),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_01),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_02),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_03),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_04),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_00),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_01),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_02),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_03),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_04),
.dataout_E(data_00),
.dataout_S(data_01),
.dataout_W(data_02),
.dataout_N(data_03),
.dataout_L(data_04),
.empty(empty_0),
.TailHT_Trigger(zerotail), //HT triggers
.HeadHT_Trigger(zerohead),
.DestHT_Trigger(zerodest)
);

fiveportrouter4 R1(
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.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(wrreq_22),
.wrreq_S(wrreq_43),
.wrreq_W(wrreq_00),
.wrreq_N(1'b0),
.wrreq_L(inreq1),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(almost_full_22),
.AlmostFull_in_S(almost_full_43),
.AlmostFull_in_W(almost_full_00),
.AlmostFull_in_N(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b0001),
.dataino_E(data_22),
.dataino_L(data_in1),
.dataino_N(32'h00000000),
.dataino_S(data_43),
.dataino_W(data_00),
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.valid_in({~empty_2[2], ~empty_4[3], ~empty_0[0], 1'b0, 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_10),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_11),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_12),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_13),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_14),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_10),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_11),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_12),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_13),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_14),
.dataout_E(data_10),
.dataout_S(data_11),
.dataout_W(data_12),
.dataout_N(data_13),
.dataout_L(data_14),
.empty(empty_1)
);

fiveportrouter4 R2(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(wrreq_92),

126

.wrreq_S(wrreq_53),
.wrreq_W(wrreq_10),
.wrreq_N(1'b0),
.wrreq_L(inreq2),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(almost_full_92),
.AlmostFull_in_S(almost_full_53),
.AlmostFull_in_W(almost_full_10),
.AlmostFull_in_N(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b0010),
.dataino_E(data_92),
.dataino_L(data_in2),
.dataino_N(32'h00000000),
.dataino_S(data_53),
.dataino_W(data_10),
.valid_in({~empty_9[2], ~empty_5[3], ~empty_1[0], 1'b0, 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_20),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_21),
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.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_22),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_23),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_24),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_20),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_21),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_22),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_23),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_24),
.dataout_E(data_20),
.dataout_S(data_21),
.dataout_W(data_22),
.dataout_N(data_23),
.dataout_L(data_24),
.empty(empty_2));

fiveportrouter4 R3(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(wrreq_42),
.wrreq_S(wrreq_63),
.wrreq_W(1'b0),
.wrreq_N(wrreq_01),
.wrreq_L(inreq3),

128

.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(almost_full_42),
.AlmostFull_in_S(almost_full_63),
.AlmostFull_in_W(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_N(almost_full_01),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b0100),
.dataino_E(data_42),
.dataino_L(data_in3),
.dataino_N(data_01),
.dataino_S(data_63),
.dataino_W(32'h00000000),
.valid_in({~empty_4[2],~empty_6[3], 1'b0, ~empty_0[1], 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_30),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_31),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_32),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_33),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_34),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_30),
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.almost_full_S(almost_full_31),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_32),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_33),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_34),
.dataout_E(data_30),
.dataout_S(data_31),
.dataout_W(data_32),
.dataout_N(data_33),
.dataout_L(data_34),
.empty(empty_3));

fiveportrouter4_Trojaned R4(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(wrreq_52),
.wrreq_S(wrreq_73),
.wrreq_W(wrreq_30),
.wrreq_N(wrreq_11),
.wrreq_L(inreq4),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
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.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(almost_full_52),
.AlmostFull_in_S(almost_full_73),
.AlmostFull_in_W(almost_full_30),
.AlmostFull_in_N(almost_full_11),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b0101),
.dataino_E(data_52),
.dataino_L(data_in4),
.dataino_N(data_11),
.dataino_S(data_73),
.dataino_W(data_30),
.valid_in({~empty_5[2], ~empty_7[3], ~empty_3[0], ~empty_1[1], 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_40),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_41),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_42),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_43),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_44),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_40),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_41),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_42),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_43),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_44),
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.dataout_E(data_40),
.dataout_S(data_41),
.dataout_W(data_42),
.dataout_N(data_43),
.dataout_L(data_44),
.empty(empty_4),
.TailHT_Trigger(fivetail), //HT triggers
.HeadHT_Trigger(fivehead),
.DestHT_Trigger(fivedest) );

fiveportrouter4 R5(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(wrreq_102),
.wrreq_S(wrreq_83),
.wrreq_W(wrreq_40),
.wrreq_N(wrreq_21),
.wrreq_L(inreq5),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
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.AlmostFull_in_E(almost_full_102),
.AlmostFull_in_S(almost_full_83),
.AlmostFull_in_W(almost_full_40),
.AlmostFull_in_N(almost_full_21),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b0110),
.dataino_E(data_102),
.dataino_L(data_in5),
.dataino_N(data_21),
.dataino_S(data_83),
.dataino_W(data_40),
.valid_in({~empty_10[2], ~empty_8[3], ~empty_4[0], ~empty_2[1], 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_50),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_51),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_52),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_53),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_54),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_50),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_51),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_52),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_53),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_54),
.dataout_E(data_50),
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.dataout_S(data_51),
.dataout_W(data_52),
.dataout_N(data_53),
.dataout_L(data_54),
.empty(empty_5));

fiveportrouter4 R6(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(wrreq_72),
.wrreq_S(wrreq_123),
.wrreq_W(1'b0),
.wrreq_N(wrreq_31),
.wrreq_L(inreq6),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(almost_full_72),
.AlmostFull_in_S(almost_full_123),
.AlmostFull_in_W(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_N(almost_full_31),
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.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b1000),
.dataino_E(data_72),
.dataino_L(data_in6),
.dataino_N(data_31),
.dataino_S(data_123),
.dataino_W(32'h00000000),
.valid_in({~empty_7[2], ~empty_12[3], 1'b0, ~empty_3[1], 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_60),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_61),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_62),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_63),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_64),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_60),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_61),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_62),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_63),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_64),
.dataout_E(data_60),
.dataout_S(data_61),
.dataout_W(data_62),
.dataout_N(data_63),
.dataout_L(data_64),
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.empty(empty_6)
);

fiveportrouter4_Trojaned R7(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(wrreq_82),
.wrreq_S(wrreq_133),
.wrreq_W(wrreq_60),
.wrreq_N(wrreq_41),
.wrreq_L(inreq7),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(almost_full_82),
.AlmostFull_in_S(almost_full_133),
.AlmostFull_in_W(almost_full_60),
.AlmostFull_in_N(almost_full_41),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b1001),
.dataino_E(data_82),
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.dataino_L(data_in7),
.dataino_N(data_41),
.dataino_S(data_133),
.dataino_W(data_60),
.valid_in({~empty_8[2], ~empty_13[3], ~empty_6[0], ~empty_4[1], 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_70),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_71),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_72),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_73),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_74),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_70),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_71),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_72),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_73),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_74),
.dataout_E(data_70),
.dataout_S(data_71),
.dataout_W(data_72),
.dataout_N(data_73),
.dataout_L(data_74),
.empty(empty_7),
.TailHT_Trigger(seventail), //HT triggers
.HeadHT_Trigger(sevenhead),
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.DestHT_Trigger(sevendest)
);

fiveportrouter4 R8(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(wrreq_112),
.wrreq_S(wrreq_143),
.wrreq_W(wrreq_70),
.wrreq_N(wrreq_51),
.wrreq_L(inreq8),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(almost_full_112),
.AlmostFull_in_S(almost_full_143),
.AlmostFull_in_W(almost_full_70),
.AlmostFull_in_N(almost_full_51),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b1010),
.dataino_E(data_112),
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.dataino_L(data_in8),
.dataino_N(data_51),
.dataino_S(data_143),
.dataino_W(data_70),
.valid_in({~empty_11[2], ~empty_14[3], ~empty_7[0], ~empty_5[1], 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_80),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_81),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_82),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_83),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_84),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_80),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_81),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_82),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_83),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_84),
.dataout_E(data_80),
.dataout_S(data_81),
.dataout_W(data_82),
.dataout_N(data_83),
.dataout_L(data_84),
.empty(empty_8)
);
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fiveportrouter4 R9(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(1'b0),
.wrreq_S(wrreq_103),
.wrreq_W(wrreq_20),
.wrreq_N(1'b0),
.wrreq_L(inreq9),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_S(almost_full_103),
.AlmostFull_in_W(almost_full_20),
.AlmostFull_in_N(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b0011),
.dataino_E(32'd0),
.dataino_L(data_in9),
.dataino_N(32'd0),
.dataino_S(data_103),
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.dataino_W(data_20),
.valid_in({1'b0, ~empty_10[3], ~empty_2[0],1'b0, 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_90),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_91),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_92),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_93),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_94),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_90),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_91),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_92),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_93),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_94),
.dataout_E(data_90),
.dataout_S(data_91),
.dataout_W(data_92),
.dataout_N(data_93),
.dataout_L(data_94),
.empty(empty_9)
);

fiveportrouter4 R10(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
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.wrreq_E(1'b0),
.wrreq_S(wrreq_113),
.wrreq_W(wrreq_50),
.wrreq_N(wrreq_91),
.wrreq_L(inreq10),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_S(almost_full_113),
.AlmostFull_in_W(almost_full_50),
.AlmostFull_in_N(almost_full_91),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b0111),
.dataino_E(32'd0),
.dataino_L(data_in10),
.dataino_N(data_91),
.dataino_S(data_113),
.dataino_W(data_50),
.valid_in({1'b0, ~empty_11[3], ~empty_5[0], ~empty_9[1], 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_100),

142

.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_101),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_102),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_103),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_104),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_100),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_101),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_102),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_103),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_104),
.dataout_E(data_100),
.dataout_S(data_101),
.dataout_W(data_102),
.dataout_N(data_103),
.dataout_L(data_104),
.empty(empty_10)
);

fiveportrouter4 R11(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(1'b0),
.wrreq_S(wrreq_153),
.wrreq_W(wrreq_80),
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.wrreq_N(wrreq_101),
.wrreq_L(inreq11),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_S(almost_full_153),
.AlmostFull_in_W(almost_full_80),
.AlmostFull_in_N(almost_full_101),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b1011),
.dataino_E(32'd0),
.dataino_L(data_in11),
.dataino_N(data_101),
.dataino_S(data_153),
.dataino_W(data_80),
.valid_in({1'b0, ~empty_15[3], ~empty_8[0], ~empty_10[1], 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_110),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_111),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_112),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_113),
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.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_114),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_110),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_111),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_112),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_113),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_114),
.dataout_E(data_110),
.dataout_S(data_111),
.dataout_W(data_112),
.dataout_N(data_113),
.dataout_L(data_114),
.empty(empty_11)
);

fiveportrouter4 R12(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(wrreq_132),
.wrreq_S(1'b0),
.wrreq_W(1'b0),
.wrreq_N(wrreq_61),
.wrreq_L(inreq12),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),

145

.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(almost_full_132),
.AlmostFull_in_S(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_W(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_N(almost_full_61),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b1100),
.dataino_E(data_132),
.dataino_L(data_in12),
.dataino_N(data_61),
.dataino_S(32'd0),
.dataino_W(32'd0),
.valid_in({~empty_13[2], 1'b0, 1'b0, ~empty_6[1], 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_120),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_121),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_122),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_123),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_124),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_120),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_121),
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.almost_full_W(almost_full_122),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_123),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_124),
.dataout_E(data_120),
.dataout_S(data_121),
.dataout_W(data_122),
.dataout_N(data_123),
.dataout_L(data_124),
.empty(empty_12)
);

fiveportrouter4 R13(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(wrreq_142),
.wrreq_S(1'b0),
.wrreq_W(wrreq_120),
.wrreq_N(wrreq_71),
.wrreq_L(inreq13),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
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.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(almost_full_142),
.AlmostFull_in_S(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_W(almost_full_120),
.AlmostFull_in_N(almost_full_71),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b1101),
.dataino_E(data_142),
.dataino_L(data_in13),
.dataino_N(data_71),
.dataino_S(32'd0),
.dataino_W(data_120),
.valid_in({~empty_14[2], 1'b0, ~empty_12[0], ~empty_7[1], 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_130),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_131),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_132),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_133),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_134),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_130),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_131),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_132),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_133),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_134),
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.dataout_E(data_130),
.dataout_S(data_131),
.dataout_W(data_132),
.dataout_N(data_133),
.dataout_L(data_134),
.empty(empty_13)
);

fiveportrouter4 R14(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(wrreq_152),
.wrreq_S(1'b0),
.wrreq_W(wrreq_130),
.wrreq_N(wrreq_81),
.wrreq_L(inreq14),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(almost_full_152),
.AlmostFull_in_S(1'b0),
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.AlmostFull_in_W(almost_full_130),
.AlmostFull_in_N(almost_full_81),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
.CurrentID(4'b1110),
.dataino_E(data_152),
.dataino_L(data_in14),
.dataino_N(data_81),
.dataino_S(32'd0),
.dataino_W(data_130),
.valid_in({~empty_15[2], 1'b0, ~empty_13[0], ~empty_8[1], 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_140),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_141),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_142),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_143),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_144),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_140),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_141),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_142),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_143),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_144),
.dataout_E(data_140),
.dataout_S(data_141),
.dataout_W(data_142),
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.dataout_N(data_143),
.dataout_L(data_144),
.empty(empty_14)
);

fiveportrouter4 R15(
.CLK(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq_E(1'b0),
.wrreq_S(1'b0),
.wrreq_W(wrreq_140),
.wrreq_N(wrreq_111),
.wrreq_L(inreq15),
.NACK_in_E(NACK_in_E),
.NACK_in_S(NACK_in_S),
.NACK_in_W(NACK_in_W),
.NACK_in_N(NACK_in_N),
.NACK_in_L(NACK_in_L),
.AlmostFull_in_E(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_S(1'b0),
.AlmostFull_in_W(almost_full_140),
.AlmostFull_in_N(almost_full_111),
.AlmostFull_in_L(1'b0),
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.CurrentID(4'b1111),
.dataino_E(32'd0),
.dataino_L(data_in15),
.dataino_N(data_111),
.dataino_S(32'd0),
.dataino_W(data_140),
.valid_in({1'b0, 1'b0, ~empty_14[0], ~empty_11[1], 1'b1}),
.wrreq_out_E(wrreq_150),
.wrreq_out_S(wrreq_151),
.wrreq_out_W(wrreq_152),
.wrreq_out_N(wrreq_153),
.wrreq_out_L(wrreq_154),
.almost_full_E(almost_full_150),
.almost_full_S(almost_full_151),
.almost_full_W(almost_full_152),
.almost_full_N(almost_full_153),
.almost_full_L(almost_full_154),
.dataout_E(data_150),
.dataout_S(data_151),
.dataout_W(data_152),
.dataout_N(data_153),
.dataout_L(data_154),
.empty(empty_15)
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);

assign data_in0 = {Count[13:0],D0[3:0],ID0[3:0],Info0[9:0]};
assign data_in1 = {Count[13:0],D1[3:0],ID1[3:0],Info1[9:0]};
assign data_in2 = {Count[13:0],D2[3:0],ID2[3:0],Info2[9:0]};
assign data_in3 = {Count[13:0],D4[3:0],ID4[3:0],Info4[9:0]};
assign data_in4 = {Count[13:0],D5[3:0],ID5[3:0],Info5[9:0]};
assign data_in5 = {Count[13:0],D6[3:0],ID6[3:0],Info6[9:0]};
assign data_in6 = {Count[13:0],D8[3:0],ID8[3:0],Info8[9:0]};
assign data_in7 = {Count[13:0],D9[3:0],ID9[3:0],Info9[9:0]};
assign data_in8 = {Count[13:0],D10[3:0],ID10[3:0],Info10[9:0]};
assign data_in9 = {Count[13:0],D3[3:0],ID3[3:0],Info3[9:0]};
assign data_in10 = {Count[13:0],D7[3:0],ID7[3:0],Info7[9:0]};
assign data_in11 = {Count[13:0],D11[3:0],ID11[3:0],Info11[9:0]};
assign data_in12 = {Count[13:0],D12[3:0],ID12[3:0],Info12[9:0]};
assign data_in13 = {Count[13:0],D13[3:0],ID13[3:0],Info13[9:0]};
assign data_in14 = {Count[13:0],D14[3:0],ID14[3:0],Info14[9:0]};
assign data_in15 = {Count[13:0],D15[3:0],ID15[3:0],Info15[9:0]};

initial
begin
`ifdef HT1
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`ifdef DEST_HT
begin
fivetail <= 1'b0;
fivedest <= 1'b1;
fivehead <= 1'b0;
zerotail <= 1'b0;
zerohead <= 1'b0;
zerodest <= 1'b0;
sevenhead <= 1'b0;
seventail <= 1'b0;
sevendest <= 1'b0;
end
`else
`ifdef HEAD_HT
begin
fivetail <= 1'b0;
fivedest <= 1'b0;
fivehead <= 1'b1;
zerotail <= 1'b0;
zerohead <= 1'b0;
zerodest <= 1'b0;
sevenhead <= 1'b0;
seventail <= 1'b0;
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sevendest <= 1'b0;
end

`else
`ifdef TAIL_HT
begin
fivetail <= 1'b1;
fivedest <= 1'b0;
fivehead <= 1'b0;
zerotail <= 1'b0;
zerohead <= 1'b0;
zerodest <= 1'b0;
sevenhead <= 1'b0;
seventail <= 1'b0;
sevendest <= 1'b0;
end //tail lost
`else
begin
fivetail <= 1'b0;
fivedest <= 1'b0;
fivehead <= 1'b0;
zerotail <= 1'b0;
zerohead <= 1'b0;
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zerodest <= 1'b0;
sevenhead <= 1'b0;
seventail <= 1'b0;
sevendest <= 1'b0;
end
`endif //TAIL_HT
`endif //HEAD_HT
`endif //DEST_HT
`else
`ifdef HT2
`ifdef DEST_HT
begin
fivetail <= 1'b0;
fivedest <= 1'b1;
fivehead <= 1'b0;
zerotail <= 1'b0;
zerohead <= 1'b0;
zerodest <= 1'b1;
sevenhead <= 1'b0;
seventail <= 1'b0;
sevendest <= 1'b0;
end
`else
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`ifdef HEAD_HT
begin
fivetail <= 1'b0;
fivedest <= 1'b0;
fivehead <= 1'b1;
zerotail <= 1'b0;
zerohead <= 1'b1;
zerodest <= 1'b0;
sevenhead <= 1'b0;
seventail <= 1'b0;
sevendest <= 1'b0;
end//header lost
`else
`ifdef TAIL_HT
begin
fivetail <= 1'b1;
fivedest <= 1'b0;
fivehead <= 1'b0;
zerotail <= 1'b1;
zerohead <= 1'b0;
zerodest <= 1'b0;
sevenhead <= 1'b0;
seventail <= 1'b0;
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sevendest <= 1'b0;
end //tail lost
`else
begin
fivetail <= 1'b0;
fivedest <= 1'b0;
fivehead <= 1'b0;
zerotail <= 1'b0;
zerohead <= 1'b0;
zerodest <= 1'b0;
sevenhead <= 1'b0;
seventail <= 1'b0;
sevendest <= 1'b0;
end
`endif //TAIL_HT
`endif //HEAD_HT
`endif //DEST_HT
`else
`ifdef HT3
`ifdef DEST_HT
begin
fivetail <= 1'b0;
fivedest <= 1'b1;

158

fivehead <= 1'b0;
zerotail <= 1'b0;
zerohead <= 1'b0;
zerodest <= 1'b1;
sevenhead <= 1'b0;
seventail <= 1'b0;
sevendest <= 1'b1;
end
`else
`ifdef HEAD_HT
begin
fivetail <= 1'b0;
fivedest <= 1'b0;
fivehead <= 1'b1;
zerotail <= 1'b0;
zerohead <= 1'b1;
zerodest <= 1'b0;
sevenhead <= 1'b1;
seventail <= 1'b0;
sevendest <= 1'b0;
end//header lost
`else
`ifdef TAIL_HT
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begin
fivetail <= 1'b1;
fivedest <= 1'b0;
fivehead <= 1'b0;
zerotail <= 1'b1;
zerohead <= 1'b0;
zerodest <= 1'b0;
sevenhead <= 1'b0;
seventail <= 1'b1;
sevendest <= 1'b0;
end//tail lost
`else
begin
fivetail <= 1'b0;
fivedest <= 1'b0;
fivehead <= 1'b0;
zerotail <= 1'b0;
zerohead <= 1'b0;
zerodest <= 1'b0;
sevenhead <= 1'b0;
seventail <= 1'b0;
sevendest <= 1'b0;
end
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`endif //TAIL_HT
`endif //HEAD_HT
`endif //DEST_HT
`else
begin
fivetail <= 1'b0;
fivedest <= 1'b0;
fivehead <= 1'b0;
zerotail <= 1'b0;
zerohead <= 1'b0;
zerodest <= 1'b0;
sevenhead <= 1'b0;
seventail <= 1'b0;
sevendest <= 1'b0;
end
`endif//HT3
`endif//HT2
`endif//HT1*/

links0 = 0;
links1 = 0;
links2 = 0;
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links3 = 0;
links4 = 0;
links5 = 0;
links6 = 0;
links7 = 0;
links8 = 0;
links9 = 0;
links10 = 0;
links11 = 0;
links12 = 0;
links13 = 0;
links14 = 0;
links15 = 0;
links16 = 0;
links17 = 0;
links18 = 0;
links19 = 0;
links20 = 0;
links21 = 0;
links22 = 0;
links23 = 0;
links24 = 0;
links25 = 0;
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links26 = 0;
links27 = 0;
links28 = 0;
links29 = 0;
links30 = 0;
links31 = 0;
links32 = 0;
links33 = 0;
links34 = 0;
links35 = 0;
links36 = 0;
links37 = 0;
links38 = 0;
links39 = 0;
links40 = 0;
links41 = 0;
links42 = 0;
links43 = 0;
links44 = 0;
links45 = 0;
links46 = 0;
links47 = 0;
end
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always @(data_00 or almost_full_00)
begin
if((|data_00 >0) | (almost_full_00))
links0 = links0 + 1;
else
links0 = links0 ;
end

always @(data_01 or almost_full_01)
begin
if((|data_01 >0) | (almost_full_01))
links1 = links1 + 1;
else
links1 = links1 ;
end

always @(data_10 or almost_full_10)
begin
if((|data_10 >0) | (almost_full_10))
links2 = links2 + 1;
else
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links2 = links2 ;
end

always @(data_11 or almost_full_11)
begin
if((|data_11 >0) | (almost_full_11))
links3 = links3 + 1;
else
links3 = links3 ;
end

always @(data_12 or almost_full_12)
begin
if((|data_12 >0) | (almost_full_12))
links4 = links4 + 1;
else
links4 = links4 ;
end

always @(data_20 or almost_full_20)
begin
if((|data_20 >0) | (almost_full_20))
links5 = links5 + 1;
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else
links5 = links5 ;
end

always @(data_21 or almost_full_21)
begin
if((|data_21 >0) | (almost_full_21))
links6 = links6 + 1;
else
links6 = links6 ;
end

always @(data_22 or almost_full_22)
begin
if((|data_22 >0) | (almost_full_22))
links7 = links7 + 1;
else
links7 = links7 ;
end

always @(data_30 or almost_full_30)
begin
if((|data_30 >0) | (almost_full_30))
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links8 = links8 + 1;
else
links8 = links8 ;
end

always @(data_31 or almost_full_31)
begin
if((|data_31 >0) | (almost_full_31))
links9 = links9 + 1;
else
links9 = links9 ;
end

always @(data_33 or almost_full_33)
begin
if((|data_33 >0) | (almost_full_33))
links10 = links10 + 1;
else
links10 = links10 ;
end

always @(data_40 or almost_full_40)
begin
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if((|data_40 >0) | (almost_full_40))
links11 = links11 + 1;
else
links11 = links11 ;
end

always @(data_41 or almost_full_41)
begin
if((|data_41 >0) | (almost_full_41))
links12 = links12 + 1;
else
links12 = links12 ;
end

always @(data_42 or almost_full_42)
begin
if((|data_42 >0) | (almost_full_42))
links13 = links13 + 1;
else
links13 = links13 ;
end

always @(data_43 or almost_full_43)
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begin
if((|data_43 >0) | (almost_full_43))
links14 = links14 + 1;
else
links14 = links14 ;
end

always @(data_50 or almost_full_50)
begin
if((|data_50 >0) | (almost_full_50))
links15 = links15 + 1;
else
links15 = links15 ;
end

always @(data_51 or almost_full_51)
begin
if((|data_51 >0) | (almost_full_51))
links16 = links16 + 1;
else
links16 = links16 ;
end
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always @(data_52 or almost_full_52)
begin
if((|data_52 >0) | (almost_full_52))
links17 = links17 + 1;
else
links17 = links17 ;
end

always @(data_53 or almost_full_53)
begin
if((|data_53 >0) | (almost_full_53))
links18 = links18 + 1;
else
links18 = links18 ;
end

always @(data_60 or almost_full_60)
begin
if((|data_60 >0) | (almost_full_60))
links19 = links19 + 1;
else
links19 = links19 ;
end
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always @(data_61 or almost_full_61)
begin
if((|data_61 >0) | (almost_full_61))
links20 = links20 + 1;
else
links20 = links20 ;
end

always @(data_63 or almost_full_63)
begin
if((|data_63 >0) | (almost_full_63))
links21 = links21 + 1;
else
links21 = links21 ;
end

always @(data_70 or almost_full_70)
begin
if((|data_70 >0) | (almost_full_70))
links22 = links22 + 1;
else
links22 = links22 ;

171

end

always @(data_71 or almost_full_71)
begin
if((|data_71 >0) | (almost_full_71))
links23 = links23 + 1;
else
links23 = links23 ;
end

always @(data_72 or almost_full_72)
begin
if((|data_72 >0) | (almost_full_72))
links24 = links24 + 1;
else
links24 = links24 ;
end

always @(data_73 or almost_full_73)
begin
if((|data_73 >0) | (almost_full_73))
links25 = links25 + 1;
else
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links25 = links25 ;
end

always @(data_80 or almost_full_80)
begin
if((|data_80 >0) | (almost_full_80))
links26 = links26 + 1;
else
links26 = links26 ;
end

always @(data_81 or almost_full_81)
begin
if((|data_81 >0) | (almost_full_81))
links27 = links27 + 1;
else
links27 = links27 ;
end

always @(data_82 or almost_full_82)
begin
if((|data_82 >0) | (almost_full_82))
links28 = links28 + 1;
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else
links28 = links28 ;
end

always @(data_83 or almost_full_83)
begin
if((|data_83 >0) | (almost_full_83))
links29 = links29 + 1;
else
links29 = links29 ;
end

always @(data_91 or almost_full_91)
begin
if((|data_91 >0) | (almost_full_91))
links30 = links30 + 1;
else
links30 = links30 ;
end

always @(data_92 or almost_full_92)
begin
if((|data_92 >0) | (almost_full_92))
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links31 = links31 + 1;
else
links31 = links31 ;
end

always @(data_101 or almost_full_101)
begin
if((|data_101 >0) | (almost_full_101))
links32 = links32 + 1;
else
links32 = links32 ;
end

always @(data_102 or almost_full_102)
begin
if((|data_102 >0) | (almost_full_102))
links33 = links33 + 1;
else
links33 = links33 ;
end

always @(data_103 or almost_full_103)
begin
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if((|data_103 >0) | (almost_full_103))
links34 = links34 + 1;
else
links34 = links34 ;
end

always @(data_111 or almost_full_111)
begin
if((|data_111 >0) | (almost_full_111))
links35 = links35 + 1;
else
links35 = links35 ;
end

always @(data_112 or almost_full_112)
begin
if((|data_112 >0) | (almost_full_112))
links36 = links36 + 1;
else
links36 = links36 ;
end

always @(data_113 or almost_full_113)
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begin
if((|data_113 >0) | (almost_full_113))
links37 = links37 + 1;
else
links37 = links37 ;
end

always @(data_120 or almost_full_120)
begin
if((|data_120 >0) | (almost_full_120))
links38 = links38 + 1;
else
links38 = links38 ;
end

always @(data_123 or almost_full_123)
begin
if((|data_123 >0) | (almost_full_123))
links39 = links39 + 1;
else
links39 = links39 ;
end
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always @(data_130 or almost_full_130)
begin
if((|data_130 >0) | (almost_full_130))
links40 = links40 + 1;
else
links40 = links40 ;
end

always @(data_132 or almost_full_132)
begin
if((|data_132 >0) | (almost_full_132))
links41 = links41 + 1;
else
links41 = links41 ;
end

always @(data_133 or almost_full_133)
begin
if((|data_133 >0) | (almost_full_133))
links42 = links42 + 1;
else
links42 = links42 ;
end
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always @(data_140 or almost_full_140)
begin
if((|data_140 >0) | (almost_full_140))
links43 = links43 + 1;
else
links43 = links43 ;
end

always @(data_142 or almost_full_142)
begin
if((|data_142 >0) | (almost_full_142))
links44 = links44 + 1;
else
links44 = links44 ;
end

always @(data_143 or almost_full_143)
begin
if((|data_143 >0) | (almost_full_143))
links45 = links45 + 1;
else
links45 = links45 ;
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end

always @(data_152 or almost_full_152)
begin
if((|data_152 >0) | (almost_full_152))
links46 = links46 + 1;
else
links46 = links46 ;
end

always @(data_153 or almost_full_153)
begin
if((|data_153 >0) | (almost_full_153))
links47 = links47 + 1;
else
links47 = links47 ;
end

initial
begin
op_file0 = $fopen(filename0, "w");
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op_file1 = $fopen(filename1, "w");
op_file2 = $fopen(filename2, "w");
op_file3 = $fopen(filename3, "w");
op_file4 = $fopen(filename4, "w");
op_file5 = $fopen(filename5, "w");
op_file6 = $fopen(filename6, "w");
op_file7 = $fopen(filename7, "w");
op_file8 = $fopen(filename8, "w");
op_file9 = $fopen(filename9, "w");
op_file10 = $fopen(filename10, "w");
op_file11 = $fopen(filename11, "w");
op_file12 = $fopen(filename12, "w");
op_file13 = $fopen(filename13, "w");
op_file14 = $fopen(filename14, "w");
op_file15 = $fopen(filename15, "w");
op_file16 = $fopen(filename16, "w");
op_file17 = $fopen(filename17, "w");
op_file18 = $fopen(filename18, "w");
op_file19 = $fopen(filename19, "w");

r_file0 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR0.txt","r");
r_file1 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR1.txt","r");
r_file2 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR2.txt","r");
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r_file3 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR3.txt","r");
r_file4 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR4.txt","r");
r_file5 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR5.txt","r");
r_file6 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR6.txt","r");
r_file7 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR7.txt","r");
r_file8 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR8.txt","r");
r_file9 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR9.txt","r");
r_file10 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR10.txt","r");
r_file11 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR11.txt","r");
r_file12 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR12.txt","r");
r_file13 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR13.txt","r");
r_file14 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR14.txt","r");
r_file15 = $fopen("SecureZoneTraceR15.txt","r");

end

initial
begin
CLK = 1'b0;
CLK2 = 1'b0;
reset = 1'b1;
Count = 14'd0;
trigger = 1'b0;

182

NACK_in_E = 1'b0;
NACK_in_S = 1'b0;
NACK_in_W = 1'b0;
NACK_in_N = 1'b0;
NACK_in_L = 1'b0;
BW = 0; //measures bandwidth x/48
ps0 = 0;
ps1 = 0;
ps2 = 0;
ps3 = 0;
ps4 = 0;
ps5 = 0;
ps6 = 0;
ps7 = 0;
ps8 = 0;
ps9 = 0;
ps10 = 0;
ps11 = 0;
ps12 = 0;
ps13 = 0;
ps14 = 0;
ps15 = 0;
pstotal = 0;
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src0 = 4'b0000;
src1 = 4'b0001;
src2 = 4'b0010;
src3 = 4'b0011;
src4 = 4'b0100;
src5 = 4'b0101;
src6 = 4'b0110;
src7 = 4'b0111;
src8 = 4'b1000;
src9 = 4'b1001;
src10 = 4'b1010;
src11 = 4'b1011;
src12 = 4'b1100;
src13 = 4'b1101;
src14 = 4'b1110;
src15 = 4'b1111;
Dest0 = 5'd0;
Dest1 = 5'd0;
Dest2 = 5'd0;
Dest3 = 5'd0;
Dest4 = 5'd0;
Dest5 = 5'd0;
Dest6 = 5'd0;
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Dest7 = 5'd0;
Dest8 = 5'd0;
Dest9 = 5'd0;
Dest10 = 5'd0;
Dest11 = 5'd0;
Dest12 = 5'd0;
Dest13 = 5'd0;
Dest14 = 5'd0;
Dest15 = 5'd0;
D0 = 4'd0;
D1 = 4'd0;
D2 = 4'd0;
D3 = 4'd0;
D4 = 4'd0;
D5 = 4'd0;
D6 = 4'd0;
D7 = 4'd0;
D8 = 4'd0;
D9 = 4'd0;
D10 = 4'd0;
D11 = 4'd0;
D12 = 4'd0;
D13 = 4'd0;
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D14 = 4'd0;
D15 = 4'd0;
spackets0 = 0;
spackets1 = 0;
spackets2 = 0;
spackets3 = 0;
spackets4 = 0;
spackets5 = 0;
spackets6 = 0;
spackets7 = 0;
spackets8 = 0;
spackets9 = 0;
spackets10 = 0;
spackets11 = 0;
spackets12 = 0;
spackets13 = 0;
spackets14 = 0;
spackets15 = 0;
rpackets0 = 0;
rpackets1 = 0;
rpackets2 = 0;
rpackets3 = 0;
rpackets4 = 0;
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rpackets5 = 0;
rpackets6 = 0;
rpackets7 = 0;
rpackets8 = 0;
rpackets9 = 0;
rpackets10 = 0;
rpackets11 = 0;
rpackets12 = 0;
rpackets13 = 0;
rpackets14 = 0;
rpackets15 = 0;
inreq0 = 1'b0;
inreq1 = 1'b0;
inreq2 = 1'b0;
inreq3 = 1'b0;
inreq4 = 1'b0;
inreq5 = 1'b0;
inreq6 = 1'b0;
inreq7 = 1'b0;
inreq8 = 1'b0;
inreq9 = 1'b0;
inreq10 = 1'b0;
inreq11 = 1'b0;
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inreq12 = 1'b0;
inreq13 = 1'b0;
inreq14 = 1'b0;
inreq15 = 1'b0;
ID0 = 8'h00;
ID1 = 8'h00;
ID2 = 8'h00;
ID3 = 8'h00;
ID4 = 8'h00;
ID5 = 8'h00;
ID6 = 8'h00;
ID7 = 8'h00;
ID8 = 8'h00;
ID9 = 8'h00;
ID10 = 8'h00;
ID11 = 8'h00;
ID12 = 8'h00;
ID13 = 8'h00;
ID14 = 8'h00;
ID15 = 8'h00;
Info0 = 10'd0;
Info1 = 10'd0;
Info2 = 10'd0;
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Info3 = 10'd0;
Info4 = 10'd0;
Info5 = 10'd0;
Info6 = 10'd0;
Info7 = 10'd0;
Info8 = 10'd0;
Info9 = 10'd0;
Info10 = 10'd0;
Info11 = 10'd0;
Info12 = 10'd0;
Info13 = 10'd0;
Info14 = 10'd0;
Info15 = 10'd0;
corr0 = 0;
corr1 = 0;
corr2 = 0;
corr3 = 0;
corr4 = 0;
corr5 = 0;
corr6 = 0;
corr7 = 0;
corr8 = 0;
corr9 = 0;
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corr10 = 0;
corr11 = 0;
corr12 = 0;
corr13 = 0;
corr14 = 0;
corr15 = 0;
corrtotal = 0;
rtotal = 0;
#900
reset = 1'b0; //initialization done, start tests
packetsreceived = 0;
packetsSent = 0;
trigger = 1'b1;
#8501000;
rtotal

=

rpackets0+rpackets1+rpackets2+rpackets3+rpackets4+rpackets5+rpackets6+rpackets7+rpackets8+
rpackets9+rpackets10+rpackets11+rpackets12+rpackets13+rpackets14+rpackets15;
corrtotal

=

corr0+corr1+corr2+corr3+corr4+corr5+corr6+corr7+corr8+corr9+corr10+corr11+corr12+corr13+
corr14+corr15;
$fwrite(op_file16, "%d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n
%d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n
%d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n
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%d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n %d \n" ,ps0, ps1, ps2, ps3, ps4, ps5, ps6,
ps7, ps8, ps9, ps10, ps11, ps12, ps13, ps14, ps15, pstotal, rpackets0, rpackets1, rpackets2, rpackets3,
rpackets4, rpackets5, rpackets6, rpackets7, rpackets8, rpackets9, rpackets10, rpackets11, rpackets12,
rpackets13,

rpackets14,

rpackets15,

rtotal,corr0,corr1,corr2,corr3,corr4,corr5,corr6,corr7,corr8,corr9,corr10,corr11,corr12,corr13,corr1
4,corr15, corrtotal);
$fwrite(op_file19, "%d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n
%d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n
%d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n %d\n
%d\n %d\n ",links0, links1, links2, links3, links4, links5, links6, links7, links8, links9, links10,
links11, links12, links13, links14, links15, links16, links17, links18, links19, links20, links21,
links22, links23, links24, links25, links26, links27, links28, links29, links30, links31, links32,
links33, links34, links35, links36, links37, links38, links39, links40, links41, links42, links43,
links44, links45, links46, links47);
#100
$fclose(op_file0);
$fclose(op_file1);
$fclose(op_file2);
$fclose(op_file3);
$fclose(op_file4);
$fclose(op_file5);
$fclose(op_file6);
$fclose(op_file7);

191

$fclose(op_file8);
$fclose(op_file9);
$fclose(op_file10);
$fclose(op_file11);
$fclose(op_file12);
$fclose(op_file13);
$fclose(op_file14);
$fclose(op_file15);
$fclose(op_file16);
$fclose(op_file17);
$fclose(op_file18);
$fclose(op_file19);
$fclose(r_file0);
$fclose(r_file1);
$fclose(r_file2);
$fclose(r_file3);
$fclose(r_file4);
$fclose(r_file5);
$fclose(r_file6);
$fclose(r_file7);
$fclose(r_file8);
$fclose(r_file9);
$fclose(r_file10);

192

$fclose(r_file11);
$fclose(r_file12);
$fclose(r_file13);
$fclose(r_file14);
$fclose(r_file15);
$finish;
end

always
#injection CLK2 <= ~CLK2;

always@(posedge CLK2)
begin
code0 = $fscanf(r_file0, "%dddd", Destr0);
code0 = $fseek(r_file0, 1, 1);
code1 = $fscanf(r_file1, "%dddd", Destr1);
code1 = $fseek(r_file1, 1, 1);
code2 = $fscanf(r_file2, "%dddd", Destr2);
code2 = $fseek(r_file2, 1, 1);
code3 = $fscanf(r_file3, "%dddd", Destr3);
code3 = $fseek(r_file3, 1, 1);
code4 = $fscanf(r_file4, "%dddd", Destr4);
code4 = $fseek(r_file4, 1, 1);
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code5 = $fscanf(r_file5, "%dddd", Destr5);
code5 = $fseek(r_file5, 1, 1);
code6 = $fscanf(r_file6, "%dddd", Destr6);
code6 = $fseek(r_file6, 1, 1);
code7 = $fscanf(r_file7, "%dddd", Destr7);
code7 = $fseek(r_file7, 1, 1);
code8 = $fscanf(r_file8, "%dddd", Destr8);
code8 = $fseek(r_file8, 1, 1);
code9 = $fscanf(r_file9, "%dddd", Destr9);
code9 = $fseek(r_file9, 1, 1);
code10 = $fscanf(r_file10, "%dddd", Destr10);
code10 = $fseek(r_file10, 1, 1);
code11 = $fscanf(r_file11, "%dddd", Destr11);
code11 = $fseek(r_file11, 1, 1);
code12 = $fscanf(r_file12, "%dddd", Destr12);
code12 = $fseek(r_file12, 1, 1);
code13 = $fscanf(r_file13, "%dddd", Destr13);
code13 = $fseek(r_file13, 1, 1);
code14 = $fscanf(r_file14, "%dddd", Destr14);
code14 = $fseek(r_file14, 1, 1);
code15 = $fscanf(r_file15, "%dddd", Destr15);
code15 = $fseek(r_file15, 1, 1);
end
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always@(Destr0)
begin
if((Destr0 > 0)&&(Destr0 !== 100))
begin
Dest0 = Destr0/100;
case(Dest0)
5'd1: begin D0 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0; end
5'd2: begin D0 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D0 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D0 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
5'd5: begin D0 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D0 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D0 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D0 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D0 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D0 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D0 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D0 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D0 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D0 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D0 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D0 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
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default: D0 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
Dest0 = 5'd0;
D0 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest0)
begin
#5;
if((D0 !== 4'b0000)&&(Dest0 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info0[9:0] = {D0[3:0], src0[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info0[9:0] = {D0[3:0], src0[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info0[9:0] = {D0[3:0], src0[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info0[9:0] = {D0[3:0], src0[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
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Info0[9:0] = {4'b0000, src0[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets0 = spackets0 + 1;
end
else
Info0[9:0] = 10'd0;//Info0[9:0] = {D0[3:0],src0[3:0], 2'b00};
end
//1
always@(Destr1)
begin
if((Destr1 > 0)&&(Destr1 !== 200))
begin
Dest1 = Destr1/100;
case(Dest1)
5'd1: begin D1 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D1 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1; end
5'd3: begin D1 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D1 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
5'd5: begin D1 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D1 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D1 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D1 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D1 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D1 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
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5'd11: begin D1 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D1 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D1 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D1 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D1 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D1 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D1 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
Dest1 = 5'd0;
D1 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest1)
begin
#5;
if((D1 !== 4'b0001)&&(Dest1 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info1[9:0] = {D1[3:0], src1[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
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Info1[9:0] = {D1[3:0], src1[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info1[9:0] = {D1[3:0], src1[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info1[9:0] = {D1[3:0], src1[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
Info1[9:0] = {4'b0000, src1[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets1 = spackets1 + 1;
end
else
Info1[9:0] = 10'd0;//Info1[9:0] = {D1[3:0],src1[3:0], 2'b00};
end
//2
always@(Destr2)
begin
if((Destr2 > 0)&&(Destr2 !== 300))
begin
Dest2 = Destr2/100;
case(Dest2)
5'd1: begin D2 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D2 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D2 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2; end
5'd4: begin D2 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
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5'd5: begin D2 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D2 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D2 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D2 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D2 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D2 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D2 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D2 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D2 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D2 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D2 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D2 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D2 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
Dest2 = 5'd0;
D2 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest2)
begin
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#5;
if((D2 !== 4'b0010)&&(Dest2 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info2[9:0] = {D2[3:0], src2[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info2[9:0] = {D2[3:0], src2[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info2[9:0] = {D2[3:0], src2[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info2[9:0] = {D2[3:0], src2[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
Info2[9:0] = {4'b0000, src2[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets2 = spackets2 + 1;
end
else
Info2[9:0] = 10'd0;
end
//3
always@(Destr3)
begin
if((Destr3 > 0)&&(Destr3 !== 400))
begin
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Dest3 = Destr3/100;
case(Dest3)
5'd1: begin D3 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D3 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D3 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D3 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3; end
5'd5: begin D3 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D3 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D3 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D3 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D3 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D3 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D3 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D3 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D3 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D3 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D3 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D3 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D3 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
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Dest3 = 5'd0;
D3 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest3)
begin
#5;
if((D3 !== 4'b0011)&&(Dest3 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info3[9:0] = {D3[3:0], src3[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info3[9:0] = {D3[3:0], src3[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info3[9:0] = {D3[3:0], src3[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info3[9:0] = {D3[3:0], src3[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
Info3[9:0] = {4'b0000, src3[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets3 = spackets3 + 1;
end
else
Info3[9:0] = 10'd0;
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end
//4
always@(Destr4)
begin
if((Destr4 > 0)&&(Destr4 !== 500))
begin
Dest4 = Destr4/100;
case(Dest4)
5'd1: begin D4 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D4 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D4 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D4 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
5'd5: begin D4 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4; end
5'd6: begin D4 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D4 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D4 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D4 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D4 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D4 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D4 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D4 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D4 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D4 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
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5'd16: begin D4 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D4 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
Dest4 = 5'd0;
D4 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest4)
begin
#5;
if((D4 !== 4'b0100)&&(Dest4 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info4[9:0] = {D4[3:0], src4[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info4[9:0] = {D4[3:0], src4[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info4[9:0] = {D4[3:0], src4[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info4[9:0] = {D4[3:0], src4[3:0], 2'b10};
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@(posedge CLK)
Info4[9:0] = {4'b0000, src4[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets4 = spackets4 + 1;
end
else
Info4[9:0] = 10'd0;
end
//5
always@(Destr5)
begin
if((Destr5 > 0)&&(Destr5 !== 600))
begin
Dest5 = Destr5/100;
case(Dest5)
5'd1: begin D5 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D5 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D5 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D5 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
5'd5: begin D5 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D5 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5; end
5'd7: begin D5 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D5 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D5 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
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5'd10: begin D5 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D5 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D5 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D5 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D5 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D5 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D5 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D5 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
Dest5 = 5'd0;
D5 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest5)
begin
#5;
if((D5 !== 4'b0101)&&(Dest5 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info5[9:0] = {D5[3:0], src5[3:0], 2'b01};
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@(posedge CLK)
Info5[9:0] = {D5[3:0], src5[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info5[9:0] = {D5[3:0], src5[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info5[9:0] = {D5[3:0], src5[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
Info5[9:0] = {4'b0000, src5[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets5 = spackets5 + 1;

end
else
Info5[9:0] = 10'd0;
end
//6
always@((Destr6 > 0)&&(Destr6 !== 700))
begin
if(Destr6 > 0)
begin
Dest6 = Destr6/100;
case(Dest6)
5'd1: begin D6 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D6 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end

208

5'd3: begin D6 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D6 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
5'd5: begin D6 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D6 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D6 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6; end
5'd8: begin D6 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D6 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D6 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D6 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D6 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D6 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D6 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D6 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D6 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D6 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
Dest6 = 5'd0;
D6 = 4'b0000;
end
end

209

always@(Dest6)
begin
#5;
if((D6 !== 4'b0110)&&(Dest6 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info6[9:0] = {D6[3:0], src6[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info6[9:0] = {D6[3:0], src6[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info6[9:0] = {D6[3:0], src6[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info6[9:0] = {D6[3:0], src6[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
Info6[9:0] = {4'b0000, src6[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets6 = spackets6 + 1;

end
else
Info6[9:0] = 10'd0;
end
//7
always@(Destr7)
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begin
if((Destr7 > 0)&&(Destr7 !== 800))
begin
Dest7 = Destr7/100;
case(Dest7)
5'd1: begin D7 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D7 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D7 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D7 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
5'd5: begin D7 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D7 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D7 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D7 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7; end
5'd9: begin D7 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D7 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D7 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D7 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D7 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D7 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D7 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D7 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D7 = 4'b0000;
endcase
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end
else
begin
Dest7 = 5'd0;
D7 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest7)
begin
#5;
if((D7 !== 4'b0111)&&(Dest7 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info7[9:0] = {D7[3:0], src7[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info7[9:0] = {D7[3:0], src7[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info7[9:0] = {D7[3:0], src7[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info7[9:0] = {D7[3:0], src7[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
Info7[9:0] = {4'b0000, src7[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets7 = spackets7 + 1;
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end
else
Info7[9:0] = 10'd0;
end
//8
always@(Destr8)
begin
if((Destr8 > 0)&&(Destr8 !== 900))
begin
Dest8 = Destr8/100;
case(Dest8)
5'd1: begin D8 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D8 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D8 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D8 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
5'd5: begin D8 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D8 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D8 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D8 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D8 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8; end
5'd10: begin D8 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D8 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
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5'd12: begin D8 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D8 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D8 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D8 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D8 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D8 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
Dest8 = 5'd0;
D8 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest8)
begin
#5;
if((D8 !== 4'b1000)&&(Dest8 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info8[9:0] = {D8[3:0], src8[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info8[9:0] = {D8[3:0], src8[3:0], 2'b11};
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@(posedge CLK)
Info8[9:0] = {D8[3:0], src8[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info8[9:0] = {D8[3:0], src8[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
Info8[9:0] = {4'b0000, src8[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets8 = spackets8 + 1;

end
else
Info8[9:0] = 10'd0;
end
//9
always@(Destr9)
begin
if((Destr9 > 0)&&(Destr9 !== 1000))
begin
Dest9 = Destr9/100;
case(Dest9)
5'd1: begin D9 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D9 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D9 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D9 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
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5'd5: begin D9 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D9 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D9 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D9 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D9 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D9 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9; end
5'd11: begin D9 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D9 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D9 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D9 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D9 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D9 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D9 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
Dest9 = 5'd0;
D9 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest9)
begin
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#5;
if((D9 !== 4'b1001)&&(Dest9 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info9[9:0] = {D9[3:0], src9[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info9[9:0] = {D9[3:0], src9[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info9[9:0] = {D9[3:0], src9[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info9[9:0] = {D9[3:0], src9[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
Info9[9:0] = {4'b0000, src9[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets9 = spackets9 + 1;

end
else
Info9[9:0] = 10'd0;
end
//10
always@(Destr10)
begin
if((Destr10 > 0)&&(Destr10 !== 1100))
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begin
Dest10 = Destr10/100;
case(Dest10)
5'd1: begin D10 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D10 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D10 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D10 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
5'd5: begin D10 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D10 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D10 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D10 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D10 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D10 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D10 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10; end
5'd12: begin D10 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D10 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D10 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D10 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D10 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D10 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
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begin
Dest10 = 5'd0;
D10 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest10)
begin
#5;
if((D10 !== 4'b1010)&&(Dest10 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info10[9:0] = {D10[3:0], src10[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info10[9:0] = {D10[3:0], src10[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info10[9:0] = {D10[3:0], src10[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info10[9:0] = {D10[3:0], src10[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
Info10[9:0] = {4'b0000, src10[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets10 = spackets10 + 1;

end

219

else
Info10[9:0] = 10'd0;
end
//11
always@(Destr11)
begin
if((Destr11 > 0)&&(Destr11 !== 1200))
begin
Dest11 = Destr11/100;
case(Dest11)
5'd1: begin D11 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D11 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D11 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D11 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
5'd5: begin D11 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D11 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D11 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D11 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D11 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D11 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D11 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D11 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11; end
5'd13: begin D11 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end

220

5'd14: begin D11 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D11 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D11 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D11 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
Dest11 = 5'd0;
D11 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest11)
begin
#5;
if((D11 !== 4'b1011)&&(Dest11 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info11[9:0] = {D11[3:0], src11[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info11[9:0] = {D11[3:0], src11[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info11[9:0] = {D11[3:0], src11[3:0], 2'b11};
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@(posedge CLK)
Info11[9:0] = {D11[3:0], src11[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
Info11[9:0] = {4'b0000, src11[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets11 = spackets11 + 1;

end
else
Info11[9:0] = 10'd0;
end
//12
always@(Destr12)
begin
if((Destr12 > 0)&&(Destr12 !== 1300))
begin
Dest12 = Destr12/100;
case(Dest12)
5'd1: begin D12 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D12 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D12 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D12 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
5'd5: begin D12 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D12 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
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5'd7: begin D12 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D12 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D12 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D12 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D12 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D12 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D12 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12; end
5'd14: begin D12 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D12 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D12 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D12 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
Dest12 = 5'd0;
D12 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest12)
begin
#5;
if((D12 !== 4'b1100)&&(Dest12 !== 5'd0))
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begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info12[9:0] = {D12[3:0], src12[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info12[9:0] = {D12[3:0], src12[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info12[9:0] = {D12[3:0], src12[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info12[9:0] = {D12[3:0], src12[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
Info12[9:0] = {4'b0000, src12[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets12 = spackets12 + 1;

end
else
Info12[9:0] = 10'd0;
end
//13
always@(Destr13)
begin
if((Destr13 > 0)&&(Destr13 !== 1400))
begin
Dest13 = Destr13/100;
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case(Dest13)
5'd1: begin D13 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D13 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D13 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D13 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
5'd5: begin D13 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D13 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D13 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D13 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D13 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D13 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D13 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D13 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D13 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D13 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13; end
5'd15: begin D13 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D13 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D13 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
Dest13 = 5'd0;
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D13 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest13)
begin
#5;
if((D13 !== 4'b1101)&&(Dest13 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info13[9:0] = {D13[3:0], src13[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info13[9:0] = {D13[3:0], src13[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info13[9:0] = {D13[3:0], src13[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info13[9:0] = {D13[3:0], src13[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
Info13[9:0] = {4'b0000, src13[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets13 = spackets13 + 1;

end
else
Info13[9:0] = 10'd0;
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end
//14
always@(Destr14)
begin
if((Destr14 > 0)&&(Destr14 !== 1500))
begin
Dest14 = Destr14/100;
case(Dest14)
5'd1: begin D14 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D14 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D14 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D14 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
5'd5: begin D14 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D14 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D14 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D14 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
5'd9: begin D14 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D14 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D14 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D14 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D14 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D14 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D14 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14; end

227

5'd16: begin D14 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15 +1; end
default: D14 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
Dest14 = 5'd0;
D14 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest14)
begin
#5;
if((D14 !== 4'b1110)&&(Dest14 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
Info14[9:0] = {D14[3:0], src14[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info14[9:0] = {D14[3:0], src14[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info14[9:0] = {D14[3:0], src14[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info14[9:0] = {D14[3:0], src14[3:0], 2'b10};
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@(posedge CLK)
Info14[9:0] = {4'b0000, src14[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets14 = spackets14 + 1;

end
else
Info14[9:0] = 10'd0;
end
//15
always@(Destr15)
begin
if((Destr15 > 0)&&(Destr15 !== 1600))
begin
Dest15 = Destr15/100;
case(Dest15)
5'd1: begin D15 = 4'b0000; ps0 = ps0 +1; end
5'd2: begin D15 = 4'b0001; ps1 = ps1 +1; end
5'd3: begin D15 = 4'b0010; ps2 = ps2 +1; end
5'd4: begin D15 = 4'b0011; ps3 = ps3 +1; end
5'd5: begin D15 = 4'b0100; ps4 = ps4 +1; end
5'd6: begin D15 = 4'b0101; ps5 = ps5 +1; end
5'd7: begin D15 = 4'b0110; ps6 = ps6 +1; end
5'd8: begin D15 = 4'b0111; ps7 = ps7 +1; end
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5'd9: begin D15 = 4'b1000; ps8 = ps8 +1; end
5'd10: begin D15 = 4'b1001; ps9 = ps9 +1; end
5'd11: begin D15 = 4'b1010; ps10 = ps10 +1; end
5'd12: begin D15 = 4'b1011; ps11 = ps11 +1; end
5'd13: begin D15 = 4'b1100; ps12 = ps12 +1; end
5'd14: begin D15 = 4'b1101; ps13 = ps13 +1; end
5'd15: begin D15 = 4'b1110; ps14 = ps14 +1; end
5'd16: begin D15 = 4'b1111; ps15 = ps15; end
default: D15 = 4'b0000;
endcase
end
else
begin
Dest15 = 5'd0;
D15 = 4'b0000;
end
end
always@(Dest15)
begin
#5;
if((D15 !== 4'b1111)&&(Dest15 !== 5'd0))
begin
@(negedge CLK)
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Info15[9:0] = {D15[3:0], src15[3:0], 2'b01};
@(posedge CLK)
Info15[9:0] = {D15[3:0], src15[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info15[9:0] = {D15[3:0], src15[3:0], 2'b11};
@(posedge CLK)
Info15[9:0] = {D15[3:0], src15[3:0], 2'b10};
@(posedge CLK)
Info15[9:0] = {4'b0000, src15[3:0], 2'b00};
spackets15 = spackets15 + 1;

end
else
Info15[9:0] = 10'd0;
end

always
begin
#200 CLK <= ~CLK;
end

//Measure total packets sent
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always@(spackets0 or spackets1 or spackets2 or spackets3 or spackets4 or spackets5 or spackets6
or spackets7 or spackets8 or spackets9 or spackets10 or spackets11 or spackets12 or spackets13 or
spackets14 or spackets15)
begin
packetsSent = spackets0 + spackets1 + spackets2 + spackets3 + spackets4 + spackets5 + spackets6
+ spackets7 + spackets8 + spackets9 + spackets10 + spackets11 + spackets12 + spackets13 +
spackets14 + spackets15;
end

always@(posedge CLK)
begin
if(reset)
begin
Count = 0;
end
else
begin
Count = Count+ 14'b00000000000001;
end
end
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always@(negedge CLK) //capture Bandwidth at Negative edge
begin
if(reset)
BW = 0;
else
begin
BW = ((|data_00) | almost_full_00) + ((|data_01) | almost_full_01) + ((|data_10) | almost_full_10) +
((|data_11) | almost_full_11) + ((|data_12) | almost_full_12) + ((|data_20) | almost_full_20) +
((|data_21) | almost_full_21) + ((|data_22) | almost_full_22) + ((|data_30) | almost_full_30) +
((|data_31) | almost_full_31) + ((|data_33) | almost_full_33) + ((|data_40) | almost_full_40) +
((|data_41) | almost_full_41) + ((|data_42) | almost_full_42) + ((|data_43) | almost_full_43) +
((|data_50) | almost_full_50) + ((|data_51) | almost_full_51) + ((|data_52) | almost_full_52) +
((|data_53) | almost_full_53) + ((|data_60) | almost_full_60) + ((|data_61) | almost_full_61) +
((|data_63) | almost_full_63) + ((|data_70) | almost_full_70) + ((|data_71) | almost_full_71) +
((|data_72) | almost_full_72) + ((|data_73) | almost_full_73) + ((|data_80) | almost_full_80) +
((|data_81) | almost_full_81) + ((|data_82) | almost_full_82) + ((|data_83) | almost_full_83) +
((|data_91) | almost_full_91) + ((|data_92) | almost_full_92) + ((|data_101) | almost_full_101) +
((|data_102) | almost_full_102) + ((|data_103) | almost_full_103) + ((|data_111) | almost_full_111)
+ ((|data_112) | almost_full_112) + ((|data_113) | almost_full_113) + ((|data_120) | almost_full_120)
+ ((|data_123) | almost_full_123) + ((|data_130) | almost_full_130) + ((|data_132) | almost_full_132)
+ ((|data_133) | almost_full_133) + ((|data_140) | almost_full_140) + ((|data_142) | almost_full_142)
+ ((|data_143) | almost_full_143) + ((|data_152) | almost_full_152) + ((|data_152) | almost_full_152
);
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$fwrite(op_file17,"%d \n",Count);
$fwrite(op_file18,"%d \n",(48-BW));
end
end

always@(ps0 or ps1 or ps2 or ps3 or ps4 or ps5 or ps6 or ps7 or ps8 or ps9 or ps10 or ps11 or ps12
or ps13 or ps14 or ps15)
begin
pstotal = ps0 + ps1 + ps2 + ps3 + ps4 + ps5 + ps6 + ps7 + ps8 + ps9 + ps10 + ps11 + ps12 + ps13 +
ps14 + ps15;
end

always@(data_04)
begin
if(data_04[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin

if(data_04[1:0] == 2'b10)
begin
rpackets0 = rpackets0 + 1;
if(data_04[17:14] == 4'b0000) begin
$fwrite(op_file0,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_04[31:18]));
corr0 = corr0 + 1; end
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else
corr0 = corr0;
end
else
rpackets0 = rpackets0;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end

always@(data_14)
begin
if(data_14[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin

if(data_14[1:0] == 2'b10)
begin
rpackets1 = rpackets1 + 1;
if(data_14[17:14] == 4'b0001)
begin
$fwrite(op_file1, "%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_14[31:18]));
corr1 = corr1 + 1; end
else
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corr1 = corr1;
end
else
rpackets1 = rpackets1;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end

always@(data_24)
begin
if(data_24[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin

if(data_24[1:0] == 2'b10)
begin
rpackets2 = rpackets2 + 1;
if(data_24[17:14] == 4'b0010)begin
$fwrite(op_file2, "%d\n",(Count[13:0] - data_24[31:18]));
corr2 = corr2 + 1;end
else
corr2 = corr2;
end
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else
rpackets2 = rpackets2;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end

always@(data_34)
begin
if(data_34[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin

if(data_34[1:0] == 2'b10)
begin
rpackets4 = rpackets4 + 1;
if(data_34[17:14] == 4'b0100)begin
$fwrite(op_file4,"%d\n",(Count[13:0] - data_34[31:18]));
corr4 = corr4 + 1;end
else
corr4 = corr4;
end
else
rpackets4 = rpackets4;

237

end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end

always@(data_44)
begin
if(data_44[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin

if(data_44[1:0] == 2'b10)
begin rpackets5 = rpackets5 + 1;
if(data_44[17:14] == 4'b0101) begin
$fwrite(op_file5,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_44[31:18]));
corr5 = corr5 + 1; end
else
corr5 = corr5;
end
else
rpackets5 = rpackets5;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
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end

always@(data_54)
begin
if(data_54[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin

if(data_54[1:0] == 2'b10) begin
rpackets6 = rpackets6 + 1;
if(data_54[17:14] == 4'b0110)
begin
$fwrite(op_file6,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_54[31:18]));
corr6 = corr6 + 1;
end
else
corr6 = corr6;
end
else
rpackets6 = rpackets6;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end
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always@(data_64)
begin
if(data_64[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin
if(data_64[1:0] == 2'b10) begin
rpackets8 = rpackets8 + 1;
if(data_64[17:14] == 4'b1000)
begin
$fwrite(op_file8, "%d\n",(Count[13:0] - data_64[31:18]));
corr8 = corr8 + 1;
end
else
corr8 = corr8;
end
else
rpackets8 = rpackets8;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end
always@(data_74)
begin
if(data_74[1:0] > 2'b00)
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begin

if(data_74[1:0] == 2'b10) begin
rpackets9 = rpackets9 + 1;
if(data_74[17:14] == 4'b1001)
begin
$fwrite(op_file9,"%d\n",(Count[13:0] - data_74[31:18]));
corr9 = corr9 + 1;
end
else
corr9 = corr9;
end
else
rpackets9 = rpackets9;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end

always@(data_84)
begin
if(data_84[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin
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if(data_84[1:0] == 2'b10) begin
rpackets10 = rpackets10 + 1;
if(data_84[17:14] == 4'b1010)
begin
$fwrite(op_file10, "%d\n",(Count[13:0] - data_84[31:18]));
corr10 = corr10 + 1;
end
else
corr10 = corr10;
end
else
rpackets10 = rpackets10;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end

always@(data_94)
begin
if(data_94[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin
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if(data_94[1:0] == 2'b10) begin
rpackets3 = rpackets3 + 1;
if(data_94[17:14] == 4'b0011)
begin
$fwrite(op_file3,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_94[31:18]));

corr3 = corr3 + 1;end
else
corr3 = corr3;
end
else
rpackets3 = rpackets3;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end

always@(data_104)
begin if(data_104[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin

if(data_104[1:0] == 2'b10) begin
rpackets7 = rpackets7 + 1;
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if(data_104[17:14] == 4'b0111)
begin
corr7 = corr7 + 1;
$fwrite(op_file7,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_104[31:18]));
end
else
corr7 = corr7;
end
else
rpackets7 = rpackets7;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end

always@(data_114)
begin if(data_114[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin

if(data_114[1:0] == 2'b10) begin
rpackets11 = rpackets11 + 1;
if(data_114[17:14] == 4'b1011)
begin
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corr11 = corr11 + 1;
$fwrite(op_file11, "%d\n",(Count[13:0] - data_114[31:18]));
end
else
corr11 = corr11;
end
else
rpackets11 = rpackets11;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end

always@(data_124)
begin if(data_124[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin

if(data_124[1:0] == 2'b10) begin
rpackets12 = rpackets12 + 1;
if(data_124[17:14] == 4'b1100)
begin
$fwrite(op_file12, "%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_124[31:18]));
corr12 = corr12 + 1;
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end
else
corr12 = corr12;
end
else
rpackets12 = rpackets12;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end

always@(data_134)
begin if(data_134[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin

if(data_134[1:0] == 2'b10) begin
rpackets13 = rpackets13 + 1;
if(data_134[17:14] == 4'b1101)
begin
$fwrite(op_file13,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_134[31:18]));
corr13 = corr13 + 1;
end
else
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corr13 = corr13;
end
else
rpackets13 = rpackets13;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end

always@(data_144)
begin if(data_144[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin

if(data_144[1:0] == 2'b10) begin
rpackets14 = rpackets14 + 1;
if(data_144[17:14] == 4'b1110)
begin
$fwrite(op_file14, "%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_144[31:18]));
corr14 = corr14 + 1;
end
else
corr14 = corr14;
end
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else
rpackets14 = rpackets14;
end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end

always@(data_154)
begin
if(data_154[1:0] > 2'b00)
begin

if(data_154[1:0] == 2'b10) begin
rpackets15 = rpackets15 + 1;
if(data_154[17:14] == 4'b1111)begin
$fwrite(op_file15,"%d\n", (Count[13:0] - data_154[31:18]));
corr15 = corr15 + 1;
end
else
corr15 = corr15;
end
else
rpackets15 = rpackets15;
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end
else
packetsreceived = packetsreceived + 1;
end

always@(data_in0)
begin
if(data_in0[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq0 = 1'b1;
else
inreq0 = 1'b0;
end

always@(data_in1)
begin
if(data_in1[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq1 = 1'b1;
else
inreq1 = 1'b0;
end

always@(data_in2)

249

begin
if(data_in2[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq2 = 1'b1;
else
inreq2 = 1'b0;
end

always@(data_in3)
begin
if(data_in3[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq3 = 1'b1;
else
inreq3 = 1'b0;
end

always@(data_in4)
begin
if(data_in4[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq4 = 1'b1;
else
inreq4 = 1'b0;
end
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always@(data_in5)
begin
if(data_in5[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq5 = 1'b1;
else
inreq5 = 1'b0;
end

always@(data_in6)
begin
if(data_in6[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq6 = 1'b1;
else
inreq6 = 1'b0;
end

always@(data_in7)
begin
if(data_in7[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq7 = 1'b1;
else
inreq7 = 1'b0;
end
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always@(data_in8)
begin
if(data_in8[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq8 = 1'b1;
else
inreq8 = 1'b0;
end

always@(data_in9)
begin
if(data_in9[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq9 = 1'b1;
else
inreq9 = 1'b0;
end

always@(data_in10)
begin
if(data_in10[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq10 = 1'b1;
else
inreq10 = 1'b0;
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end

always@(data_in11)
begin
if(data_in11[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq11 = 1'b1;
else
inreq11 = 1'b0;
end

always@(data_in12)
begin
if(data_in12[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq12 = 1'b1;
else
inreq12 = 1'b0;
end

always@(data_in13)
begin
if(data_in13[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq13 = 1'b1;
else
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inreq13 = 1'b0;
end

always@(data_in14)
begin
if(data_in14[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq14 = 1'b1;
else
inreq14 = 1'b0;
end

always@(data_in15)
begin
if(data_in15[1:0] > 2'b00)
inreq15 = 1'b1;
else
inreq15 = 1'b0;
end

endmodule
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b. Five-port router
`timescale 1ns/1ns
// Copyright (C) 1991-2009 Altera Corporation
// Your use of Altera Corporation's design tools, logic functions
// and other software and tools, and its AMPP partner logic
// functions, and any output files from any of the foregoing
// (including device programming or simulation files), and any
// associated documentation or information are expressly subject
// to the terms and conditions of the Altera Program License
// Subscription Agreement, Altera MegaCore Function License
// Agreement, or other applicable license agreement, including,
// without limitation, that your use is for the sole purpose of
// programming logic devices manufactured by Altera and sold by
// Altera or its authorized distributors. Please refer to the
// applicable agreement for further details.
// PROGRAM

"Quartus II"

// VERSION

"Version 9.1 Build 222 10/21/2009 SJ Web Edition"

// CREATED

"Fri Jan 22 14:22:52 2010"

//Edited by Jonathan Frey 5/26/2015
module fiveportrouter4(CLK,
reset,
wrreq_E,
wrreq_S,
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wrreq_W,
wrreq_N,
wrreq_L,
NACK_in_E,
NACK_in_S,
NACK_in_W,
NACK_in_N,
NACK_in_L,
AlmostFull_in_E,
AlmostFull_in_S,
AlmostFull_in_W,
AlmostFull_in_N,
AlmostFull_in_L,
CurrentID,
dataino_E,
dataino_L,
dataino_N,
dataino_S,
dataino_W,
valid_in,
wrreq_out_E,
wrreq_out_S,
wrreq_out_W,

256

wrreq_out_N,
wrreq_out_L,
almost_full_E,
almost_full_S,
almost_full_W,
almost_full_N,
almost_full_L,
dataout_E,
dataout_L,
dataout_N,
dataout_S,
dataout_W,
empty);
parameter INPUTWIDTH = 32;
parameter FINALWIDTH = 36;
input CLK;
input reset;
input wrreq_E;
input wrreq_S;
input wrreq_W;
input wrreq_N;
input wrreq_L;
input NACK_in_E;
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input NACK_in_S;
input NACK_in_W;
input NACK_in_N;
input NACK_in_L;
input AlmostFull_in_E;
input AlmostFull_in_S;
input AlmostFull_in_W;
input AlmostFull_in_N;
input AlmostFull_in_L;
input[3 : 0] CurrentID;
input[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataino_E;
input[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataino_L;
input[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataino_N;
input[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataino_S;
input[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataino_W;
input[4 : 0] valid_in;
output wrreq_out_E;
output wrreq_out_S;
output wrreq_out_W;
output wrreq_out_N;
output wrreq_out_L;
output almost_full_E;
output almost_full_S;
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output almost_full_W;
output almost_full_N;
output almost_full_L;
output[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_E;
output[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_L;
output[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_N;
output[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_S;
output[INPUTWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_W;
output[4 : 0] empty;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_E;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_W;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_N;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_S;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_L;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_E_Sc_enc;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_W_Sc_enc;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_N_Sc_enc;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_S_Sc_enc;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain_L_Sc_enc;
wire[4 : 0] empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED;
wire[4 : 0] IntendedBufFull;
wire[4 : 0] NACK_in;
wire[24 : 0] Port_Ad;
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wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_0;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_1;
wire[3 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_2;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_3;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_4;
wire[3 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_5;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_6;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_7;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_8;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_9;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_10;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_11;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_12;
wire[3 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_13;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_14;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_15;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_16;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_17;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_18;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_19;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_20;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_21;
wire[3 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_22;
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wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_23;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_24;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_25;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_26;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_27;
wire SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_28;
wire[3 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_29;
wire[2 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_30;
wire[2 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_31;
wire[2 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_32;
wire[2 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_33;
wire[2 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_34;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_35;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_36;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_37;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_38;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_39;
wire[24 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_40;
wire[24 : 0] SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_41;
wire[2 : 0] select; /////For permutation, from keygen
wire ErrEpre,
ErrLpre,
ErrNpre,
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ErrSpre,
ErrWpre;
wire ErrE,
ErrL,
ErrN,
ErrS,
ErrW;

wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_Epre;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_Lpre;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_Spre;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_Npre;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_Wpre;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_E_enc;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_L_enc;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_S_enc;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_N_enc;
wire[FINALWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout_W_enc;
assign select = 3'b111;
///////////// START ENCODING PROCESS
HammingEncoder15_11 E0(.DataIn(dataino_E[31 : 0]),
.DataOut(datain_E_Sc_enc[35 : 0]));
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HammingEncoder15_11 E1(.DataIn(dataino_W[31 : 0]),
.DataOut(datain_W_Sc_enc[35 : 0]));

HammingEncoder15_11 E2(.DataIn(dataino_N[31 : 0]),
.DataOut(datain_N_Sc_enc[35 : 0]));

HammingEncoder15_11 E3(.DataIn(dataino_S[31 : 0]),
.DataOut(datain_S_Sc_enc[35 : 0]));

HammingEncoder15_11 E4(.DataIn(dataino_L[31 : 0]),
.DataOut(datain_L_Sc_enc[35 : 0]));
//END ENCODING PROCESS
//START FLIT SCRAMBLING PROCESS
Perm32plus4 p0(.inputa(datain_E_Sc_enc),
.select(select),
.outputb(datain_E));
Perm32plus4 p1(.inputa(datain_W_Sc_enc),
.select(select),
.outputb(datain_W));
Perm32plus4 p2(.inputa(datain_N_Sc_enc),
.select(select),
.outputb(datain_N));
Perm32plus4 p3(.inputa(datain_S_Sc_enc),
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.select(select),
.outputb(datain_S));
Perm32plus4 p4(.inputa(datain_L_Sc_enc),
.select(select),
.outputb(datain_L));
//END FLIT SCRAMBLING PROCESS
QYInputFIFO3 EastInFIFO(.clk(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq(wrreq_E),
.rdreq(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_27),
.full_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_28),
.datain(datain_E),
.IndexCounter_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_29),
.almost_full(almost_full_E),
.empty(empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[0]),
.full_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_28),
.dataout(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_35),
.IndexCounter_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_29),
.ErrDin(ErrEpre));
defparam EastInFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 36;
assign

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_27

=

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_25

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_26;
assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_26 = Port_Ad[4] | Port_Ad[9] | Port_Ad[14];
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assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_25 = Port_Ad[19] | Port_Ad[24];
QYInputFIFO3 SouthInFIFO(.clk(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq(wrreq_S),
.rdreq(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_20),
.full_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_21),
.datain(datain_S),
.IndexCounter_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_22),
.almost_full(almost_full_S),
.empty(empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[1]),
.full_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_21),
.dataout(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_38),
.IndexCounter_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_22),
.ErrDin(ErrSpre));
defparam SouthInFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 36;
assign

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_20

=

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_14

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_15;
assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_15 = Port_Ad[3] | Port_Ad[8] | Port_Ad[13];
assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_14 = Port_Ad[18] | Port_Ad[23];
QYInputFIFO3 WestInFIFO(.clk(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq(wrreq_W),
.rdreq(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_11),
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.full_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_12),
.datain(datain_W),
.IndexCounter_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_13),
.almost_full(almost_full_W),
.empty(empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[2]),
.full_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_12),
.dataout(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_39),
.IndexCounter_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_13),
.ErrDin(ErrWpre));
defparam WestInFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 36;
assign

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_11

=

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_16

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_17;
assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_17 = Port_Ad[2] | Port_Ad[7] | Port_Ad[12];
assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_16 = Port_Ad[17] | Port_Ad[22];
QYInputFIFO3 NorthInFIFO(.clk(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq(wrreq_N),
.rdreq(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_0),
.full_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_1),
.datain(datain_N),
.IndexCounter_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_2),
.almost_full(almost_full_N),
.empty(empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[3]),
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.full_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_1),
.dataout(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_37),
.IndexCounter_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_2),
.ErrDin(ErrNpre));
defparam NorthInFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 36;
assign

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_0

=

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_18

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_19;
assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_19 = Port_Ad[1] | Port_Ad[6] | Port_Ad[11];
assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_18 = Port_Ad[16] | Port_Ad[21];
QYInputFIFO3 LocalInFIFO(.clk(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.wrreq(wrreq_L),
.rdreq(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_3),
.full_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_4),
.datain(datain_L),
.IndexCounter_i(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_5),
.almost_full(almost_full_L),
.empty(empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[4]),
.full_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_4),
.dataout(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_36),
.IndexCounter_o(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_5),
.ErrDin(ErrLpre));
defparam LocalInFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 36;
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|

assign

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_3

=

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_23

SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_24;
assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_24 = Port_Ad[0] | Port_Ad[5] | Port_Ad[10];
assign SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_23 = Port_Ad[15] | Port_Ad[20];
CircularFIFO4 EastOutFIFO(.clk(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.valid_in(valid_in[0]),
.NACK(NACK_in[0]),
.almost_full(IntendedBufFull[0]),
.datain(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_6),
.wrreq(wrreq_out_E),
.select(select),
.dataout(dataout_Epre));
defparam EastOutFIFO.CodedFLITWIDTH = 36;
defparam EastOutFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 32;
//DP and DE EAST
DePerm32plus4 DP0(.inputa(dataout_Epre),
.select(select),
.outputb(dataout_E_enc));
HammingDecoder15_11 DE0(.DataIno(dataout_E_enc[35 : 0]),
.DataOut(dataout_E[31 : 0]),
.ErrDetection(ErrE));
CircularFIFO4 SouthOutFIFO(.clk(CLK),
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.reset(reset),
.valid_in(valid_in[1]),
.NACK(NACK_in[1]),
.almost_full(IntendedBufFull[1]),
.datain(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_7),
.wrreq(wrreq_out_S),
.select(select),
.dataout(dataout_Spre));
defparam SouthOutFIFO.CodedFLITWIDTH = 36;
defparam SouthOutFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 32;
//DP and DE SOUTH
DePerm32plus4 DP1(.inputa(dataout_Spre),
.select(select),
.outputb(dataout_S_enc));
HammingDecoder15_11 DE1(.DataIno(dataout_S_enc[35 : 0]),
.DataOut(dataout_S[31 : 0]),
.ErrDetection(ErrS));
CircularFIFO4 WestOutFIFO(.clk(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.valid_in(valid_in[2]),
.NACK(NACK_in[2]),
.almost_full(IntendedBufFull[2]),
.datain(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_8),

269

.wrreq(wrreq_out_W),
.select(select),
.dataout(dataout_Wpre));
defparam WestOutFIFO.CodedFLITWIDTH = 36;
defparam WestOutFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 32;
//DP and DE WEST
DePerm32plus4 DP2(.inputa(dataout_Wpre),
.select(select),
.outputb(dataout_W_enc));
HammingDecoder15_11 DE2(.DataIno(dataout_W_enc[35 : 0]),
.DataOut(dataout_W[31 : 0]),
.ErrDetection(ErrW));
CircularFIFO4 NorthOutFIFO(.clk(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.valid_in(valid_in[3]),
.NACK(NACK_in[3]),
.almost_full(IntendedBufFull[3]),
.datain(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_9),
.wrreq(wrreq_out_N),
.select(select),
.dataout(dataout_Npre));
defparam NorthOutFIFO.CodedFLITWIDTH = 36;
defparam NorthOutFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 32;
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//DP and DE NORTH
DePerm32plus4 DP3(.inputa(dataout_Npre),
.select(select),
.outputb(dataout_N_enc));
HammingDecoder15_11 DE3(.DataIno(dataout_N_enc[35 : 0]),
.DataOut(dataout_N[31 : 0]),
.ErrDetection(ErrN));
CircularFIFO4 LocalOutFIFO(.clk(CLK),
.reset(reset),
.valid_in(valid_in[4]),
.NACK(NACK_in[4]),
.almost_full(IntendedBufFull[4]),
.datain(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_10),
//errorinject//SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_10[35:25],25'd0}),
.wrreq(wrreq_out_L),
.select(select),
.dataout(dataout_Lpre));
defparam LocalOutFIFO.CodedFLITWIDTH = 36;
defparam LocalOutFIFO.FLITWIDTH = 32;
//DP and DE LOCAL
DePerm32plus4 DP4(.inputa(dataout_Lpre),
.select(select),
.outputb(dataout_L_enc));

271

HammingDecoder15_11 DE4(.DataIno(dataout_L_enc[35 : 0]),
.DataOut(dataout_L[31 : 0]),
.ErrDetection(ErrL));
FullCrossbar4 FullCrossbar(.CLK(CLK),
.Reset(reset),
.select(select),
.BufFull_in(IntendedBufFull),
.CurrentID(CurrentID),
.DestPort_pre_E(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_30),
.DestPort_pre_L(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_31),
.DestPort_pre_N(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_32),
.DestPort_pre_S(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_33),
.DestPort_pre_W(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_34),
.FlitIn_E(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_35),
.FlitIn_L(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_36),
.FlitIn_N(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_37),
.FlitIn_S(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_38),
.FlitIn_W(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_39),
.NACK(NACK_in),
.RRReg_pre(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_40),
.TableTag_pre(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_41),
.DestPort_E(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_30),
.DestPort_L(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_31),
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.DestPort_N(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_32),
.DestPort_S(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_33),
.DestPort_W(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_34),
.FlitOut_E(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_6),
.FlitOut_L(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_10),
.FlitOut_N(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_9),
.FlitOut_S(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_7),
.FlitOut_W(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_8),
.Port_Ad(Port_Ad),
.RRReg_cur(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_40),
.TableTag_cur(SYNTHESIZED_WIRE_41),
.ErrEpre(ErrEpre),
.ErrLpre(ErrLpre),
.ErrNpre(ErrNpre),
.ErrSpre(ErrSpre),
.ErrWpre(ErrWpre));
defparam FullCrossbar.FLITWIDTH = 36;
defparam FullCrossbar.NOCSIZE = 4;
assign empty = empty_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED;
assign IntendedBufFull[0] = AlmostFull_in_E;
assign IntendedBufFull[1] = AlmostFull_in_S;
assign IntendedBufFull[2] = AlmostFull_in_W;
assign IntendedBufFull[3] = AlmostFull_in_N;
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assign IntendedBufFull[4] = AlmostFull_in_L;
assign NACK_in[0] = NACK_in_E;
assign NACK_in[1] = NACK_in_S;
assign NACK_in[2] = NACK_in_W;
assign NACK_in[3] = NACK_in_N;
assign NACK_in[4] = NACK_in_L;
endmodule
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c. Input FIFO
//Use FPGA InputChannel to create a circular FIFO
`timescale 1ns/1ns
module QYInputFIFO3(clk,
reset,
wrreq,
rdreq, //connect to Port_Ad
datain,
IndexCounter_i,
full_i,
almost_full,
empty,
dataout,
IndexCounter_o,
full_o,
ErrDin);
parameter FLITWIDTH = 36;
input clk;
input reset;
input wrreq;
input rdreq;
input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain;
input[3 : 0] IndexCounter_i;
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input full_i;
input ErrDin;
output[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout;
output almost_full;
output empty;
output[3 : 0] IndexCounter_o;
output full_o;
wire clk;
wire reset;
wire wrreq;
wire rdreq;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain;
wire[3 : 0] IndexCounter_i;
wire full_i;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout;
reg almost_full;
reg empty;
reg[3 : 0] IndexCounter_o;
reg full_o;
//intermediate signals
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s1;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s2;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s3;
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reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s4;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s5;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s6;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s7;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s8;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s1;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s2;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s3;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s4;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s5;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s6;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s7;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s8;
reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s1;
reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s2;
reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s3;
reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s4;
reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s5;
reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s6;
reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s7;
reg[1 : 0] Ctrl_s8;
reg[3 : 0] IndexCounter_o_tmp;
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//Ctrl =00: write back Q, 01: write zero vector, 10: propagate previous DFF, 11: write new
data
always
@(rdreq or
wrreq or
full_i or
datain or
IndexCounter_i)
begin
if (rdreq)
if (wrreq) //read and write
begin
case (IndexCounter_i)
4'b0000:
begin //the data is read out, but the value should stay in the DFF
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
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end
4'b0001:
begin
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
end
4'b0010:
begin
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
end
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4'b0011:
begin
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
end
4'b0100:
begin
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
end
4'b0101:

280

begin
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
end
4'b0110:
begin
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
end
4'b0111:
begin
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Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
end
4'b1000:
begin
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
end
default:
begin
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
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Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
end
endcase
IndexCounter_o_tmp <= IndexCounter_i;
end
else
begin //push out and append zeros
if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0000)
begin
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01;
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IndexCounter_o_tmp <= IndexCounter_i;
end
else
begin
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b10;
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b01; //the last one is a little different
IndexCounter_o_tmp <= IndexCounter_i - 1'b1;
end
end
else
if (!full_i & wrreq) //append new data, and other DFFs remain
begin
if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0000)
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b11; //write new data
else
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b00; //remains
if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0001)
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Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
else
Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0010)
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
else
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0011)
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
else
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0100)
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
else
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0101)
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
else
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0110)
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
else
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
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if (IndexCounter_i == 4'b0111)
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b11;
else
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b00;
IndexCounter_o_tmp <= IndexCounter_i + 1'b1; //need optimization
end
else // remains the same data
begin
Ctrl_s1[1 : 0] <= 2'b0;
Ctrl_s2[1 : 0] <= 2'b0;
Ctrl_s3[1 : 0] <= 2'b0;
Ctrl_s4[1 : 0] <= 2'b0;
Ctrl_s5[1 : 0] <= 2'b0;
Ctrl_s6[1 : 0] <= 2'b0;
Ctrl_s7[1 : 0] <= 2'b0;
Ctrl_s8[1 : 0] <= 2'b0;
IndexCounter_o_tmp <= IndexCounter_i;
end
end
always
@(Ctrl_s1 or
Ctrl_s2 or
Ctrl_s3 or
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Ctrl_s4 or
Ctrl_s5 or
Ctrl_s6 or
Ctrl_s7 or
Ctrl_s8 or
datain or
fifo_output_s1 or
fifo_output_s2 or
fifo_output_s3 or
fifo_output_s4 or
fifo_output_s5 or
fifo_output_s6 or
fifo_output_s7 or
fifo_output_s8)
begin
case (Ctrl_s1)
2'b00:
fifo_input_s1 <= fifo_output_s1;
2'b01:
fifo_input_s1 <= 36'b0;
2'b10:
fifo_input_s1 <= fifo_output_s2;
2'b11:

287

fifo_input_s1 <= datain;
endcase
case (Ctrl_s2)
2'b00:
fifo_input_s2 <= fifo_output_s2;
2'b01:
fifo_input_s2 <= 36'b0;
2'b10:
fifo_input_s2 <= fifo_output_s3;
2'b11:
fifo_input_s2 <= datain;
endcase
case (Ctrl_s3)
2'b00:
fifo_input_s3 <= fifo_output_s3;
2'b01:
fifo_input_s3 <= 36'b0;
2'b10:
fifo_input_s3 <= fifo_output_s4;
2'b11:
fifo_input_s3 <= datain;
endcase
case (Ctrl_s4)
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2'b00:
fifo_input_s4 <= fifo_output_s4;
2'b01:
fifo_input_s4 <= 36'b0;
2'b10:
fifo_input_s4 <= fifo_output_s5;
2'b11:
fifo_input_s4 <= datain;
endcase
case (Ctrl_s5)
2'b00:
fifo_input_s5 <= fifo_output_s5;
2'b01:
fifo_input_s5 <= 36'b0;
2'b10:
fifo_input_s5 <= fifo_output_s6;
2'b11:
fifo_input_s5 <= datain;
endcase
case (Ctrl_s6)
2'b00:
fifo_input_s6 <= fifo_output_s6;
2'b01:
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fifo_input_s6 <= 36'b0;
2'b10:
fifo_input_s6 <= fifo_output_s7;
2'b11:
fifo_input_s6 <= datain;
endcase
case (Ctrl_s7)
2'b00:
fifo_input_s7 <= fifo_output_s7;
2'b01:
fifo_input_s7 <= 36'b0;
2'b10:
fifo_input_s7 <= fifo_output_s8;
2'b11:
fifo_input_s7 <= datain;
endcase
case (Ctrl_s8)
2'b00:
fifo_input_s8 <= fifo_output_s8;
2'b01:
fifo_input_s8 <= 36'b0;
2'b10:
fifo_input_s8 <= 36'b0;
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2'b11:
fifo_input_s8 <= datain;
endcase
end
stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s1(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s1),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s1));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s2(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s2),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s2));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s3(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s3),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s3));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s4(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s4),
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.DataOut(fifo_output_s4));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s5(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s5),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s5));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s6(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s6),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s6));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s7(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s7),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s7));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX QYFIFO_s8(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s8),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s8));

always
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@(fifo_output_s1)
begin

dataout = fifo_output_s1;
end
always
@(posedge clk or
posedge reset)
begin
if (reset)
begin
almost_full <= 1'b0;
empty <= 1'b1;
full_o <= 1'b0;
IndexCounter_o <= 4'b0000;
end
else
begin
//edited by jonathan (almost_full to extend from 6FIFO to 8)
almost_full

<=

(IndexCounter_o_tmp[3]

&

!IndexCounter_o_tmp[2]

!IndexCounter_o_tmp[1] & !IndexCounter_o_tmp[0]);
empty <= (IndexCounter_o_tmp == 4'b0000) ? 1'b1 : 1'b0;
full_o <= (IndexCounter_o_tmp == 4'b1000) ? 1'b1 : 1'b0;
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&

IndexCounter_o <= IndexCounter_o_tmp;
end
end
endmodule
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d. Full Crossbar
`timescale 1ns/1ns
/*
The functionality of the full crossbar are
(1)
Extract the information contained in each entered flit
(2)
Detect whether the intended the output port is available or not
(3)
If so, make connection
otherwise, wait for the available time slot
*/
module FullCrossbar4(CLK,
Reset,
select,
TableTag_pre,
RRReg_pre,
FlitIn_E,
FlitIn_S,
FlitIn_W,
FlitIn_N,
FlitIn_L,
CurrentID,

295

DestPort_pre_E,
DestPort_pre_S,
DestPort_pre_W,
DestPort_pre_N,
DestPort_pre_L,
NACK,
BufFull_in,
//output
TableTag_cur,
RRReg_cur,
FlitOut_E,
FlitOut_S,
FlitOut_W,
FlitOut_N,
FlitOut_L,
DestPort_E,
DestPort_S,
DestPort_W,
DestPort_N,
DestPort_L,
Port_Ad,
ErrEpre,
ErrLpre,
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ErrNpre,
ErrSpre,
ErrWpre //Before crossbar, important flit content [10:0] error detection
);
parameter FLITWIDTH = 36;
parameter NOCSIZE = 4;
input[2 : 0] select;
input CLK;
input Reset;
input[24 : 0] TableTag_pre;
input[24 : 0] RRReg_pre;
input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_E;
input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_S;
input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_W;
input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_N;
input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_L;
input[3 : 0] CurrentID;
input[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_E;
input[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_S;
input[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_W;
input[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_N;
input[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_L;
input[4 : 0] NACK;
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input[4 : 0] BufFull_in;
output[24 : 0] TableTag_cur;
output[24 : 0] RRReg_cur;
output[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_E;
output[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_S;
output[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_W;
output[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_N;
output[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_L;
output[2 : 0] DestPort_E;
output[2 : 0] DestPort_S;
output[2 : 0] DestPort_W;
output[2 : 0] DestPort_N;
output[2 : 0] DestPort_L;
output[24 : 0] Port_Ad;
wire CLK;
wire Reset;
wire[24 : 0] TableTag_pre;
wire[24 : 0] RRReg_pre;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_E;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_S;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_W;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_N;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitIn_L;
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wire[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_E;
wire[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_S;
wire[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_W;
wire[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_N;
wire[2 : 0] DestPort_pre_L;
wire[3 : 0] CurrentID;
wire[4 : 0] NACK;
wire[4 : 0] BufFull_in;
reg[24 : 0] TableTag_cur;
reg[24 : 0] RRReg_cur;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_E;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_S;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_W;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_N;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_L;
reg[2 : 0] DestPort_E;
reg[2 : 0] DestPort_S;
reg[2 : 0] DestPort_W;
reg[2 : 0] DestPort_N;
reg[2 : 0] DestPort_L;
reg[24 : 0] Port_Ad;
//internal signals
wire[4 : 0] Req_V_E;

299

wire[4 : 0] CReq_V_E;
wire[4 : 0] Req_V_S;
wire[4 : 0] CReq_V_S;
wire[4 : 0] Req_V_W;
wire[4 : 0] CReq_V_W;
wire[4 : 0] Req_V_N;
wire[4 : 0] CReq_V_N;
wire[4 : 0] Req_V_L;
wire[4 : 0] CReq_V_L;
wire[2 : 0] DestPort_E_tmp;
wire[2 : 0] DestPort_S_tmp;
wire[2 : 0] DestPort_W_tmp;
wire[2 : 0] DestPort_N_tmp;
wire[2 : 0] DestPort_L_tmp;
wire[4 : 0] TableTag_pre_oE;
wire[4 : 0] TableTag_pre_oS;
wire[4 : 0] TableTag_pre_oW;
wire[4 : 0] TableTag_pre_oN;
wire[4 : 0] TableTag_pre_oL;
wire[4 : 0] RRReg_pre_oE;
wire[4 : 0] RRReg_pre_oS;
wire[4 : 0] RRReg_pre_oW;
wire[4 : 0] RRReg_pre_oN;
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wire[4 : 0] RRReg_pre_oL;
wire NACK_oE;
wire NACK_oS;
wire NACK_oW;
wire NACK_oN;
wire NACK_oL;
wire BufFull_in_oE;
wire BufFull_in_oS;
wire BufFull_in_oW;
wire BufFull_in_oN;
wire BufFull_in_oL;
wire[4 : 0] TableTag_new_oE;
wire[4 : 0] TableTag_new_oS;
wire[4 : 0] TableTag_new_oW;
wire[4 : 0] TableTag_new_oN;
wire[4 : 0] TableTag_new_oL;
wire[4 : 0] RRReg_new_oE;
wire[4 : 0] RRReg_new_oS;
wire[4 : 0] RRReg_new_oW;
wire[4 : 0] RRReg_new_oN;
wire[4 : 0] RRReg_new_oL;
wire[4 : 0] Port_Ad_oE;
wire[4 : 0] Port_Ad_oS;
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wire[4 : 0] Port_Ad_oW;
wire[4 : 0] Port_Ad_oN;
wire[4 : 0] Port_Ad_oL;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_E_tmp;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_S_tmp;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_W_tmp;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_N_tmp;
reg[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] FlitOut_L_tmp;
output ErrEpre, ErrLpre, ErrNpre, ErrSpre, ErrWpre;
assign TableTag_pre_oE = TableTag_pre[4 : 0];
assign TableTag_pre_oS = TableTag_pre[9 : 5];
assign TableTag_pre_oW = TableTag_pre[14 : 10];
assign TableTag_pre_oN = TableTag_pre[19 : 15];
assign TableTag_pre_oL = TableTag_pre[24 : 20];
assign RRReg_pre_oE = RRReg_pre[4 : 0];
assign RRReg_pre_oS = RRReg_pre[9 : 5];
assign RRReg_pre_oW = RRReg_pre[14 : 10];
assign RRReg_pre_oN = RRReg_pre[19 : 15];
assign RRReg_pre_oL = RRReg_pre[24 : 20];
assign NACK_oE = NACK[0];
assign NACK_oS = NACK[1];
assign NACK_oW = NACK[2];
assign NACK_oN = NACK[3];
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assign NACK_oL = NACK[4];
assign BufFull_in_oE = BufFull_in[0];
assign BufFull_in_oS = BufFull_in[1];
assign BufFull_in_oW = BufFull_in[2];
assign BufFull_in_oN = BufFull_in[3];
assign BufFull_in_oL = BufFull_in[4];

InfoExtract4 FlitBreakE(.Flit(FlitIn_E),
.CurrentID(CurrentID),
.DestPort_pre(DestPort_pre_E),
.select(select),
//output
.DestPort(DestPort_E_tmp),
.Req_V(Req_V_E),
.CReq_V(CReq_V_E),
.ErrDetectionOut(ErrEpre));
InfoExtract4 FlitBreakS(.Flit(FlitIn_S),
.CurrentID(CurrentID),
.DestPort_pre(DestPort_pre_S),
.select(select),
//output
.DestPort(DestPort_S_tmp),
.Req_V(Req_V_S),
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.CReq_V(CReq_V_S),
.ErrDetectionOut(ErrSpre));
InfoExtract4 FlitBreakW(.Flit(FlitIn_W),
.CurrentID(CurrentID),
.DestPort_pre(DestPort_pre_W),
.select(select),
//output
.DestPort(DestPort_W_tmp),
.Req_V(Req_V_W),
.CReq_V(CReq_V_W),
.ErrDetectionOut(ErrWpre));
InfoExtract4 FlitBreakN(.Flit(FlitIn_N),
.CurrentID(CurrentID),
.DestPort_pre(DestPort_pre_N),
.select(select),
//output
.DestPort(DestPort_N_tmp),
.Req_V(Req_V_N),
.CReq_V(CReq_V_N),
.ErrDetectionOut(ErrNpre));
InfoExtract4 FlitBreakL(.Flit(FlitIn_L),
.CurrentID(CurrentID),
.DestPort_pre(DestPort_pre_L),
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.select(select),
//output
.DestPort(DestPort_L_tmp),
.Req_V(Req_V_L),
.CReq_V(CReq_V_L),
.ErrDetectionOut(ErrLpre));
//Round Robin In/Out port connection
//Rule-1: no 180 degree transmission (i.e. the data from east input port cannot be transfered
via east output port immediately)
//assign

Req_V_oE

=

{Req_V_E[0],

Req_V_S[0],Req_V_W[0],Req_V_N[0],Req_V_L[0]};
PortAdmission PortAd_E(
//.Req_V({Req_V_E[0],
Req_V_S[0],Req_V_W[0],Req_V_N[0],Req_V_L[0]}),
//.CReq_V({CReq_V_E[0],
CReq_V_S[0],CReq_V_W[0],CReq_V_N[0],CReq_V_L[0]}),
.Req_V({

Req_V_L[0],

Req_V_N[0],

Req_V_W[0],

Req_V_S[0],

Req_V_E[0] }),
.CReq_V({ CReq_V_L[0], CReq_V_N[0], CReq_V_W[0], CReq_V_S[0],
CReq_V_E[0] }),
.TableTag_pre(TableTag_pre_oE),
.RRReg_pre(RRReg_pre_oE),
.NACK(NACK_oE),
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.BufFull_in(BufFull_in_oE),
//output
//.Port_Ad({Port_Ad_oE[0],

Port_Ad_oS[0],

Port_Ad_oW[0],

Port_Ad_oN[0], Port_Ad_oL[0]}), //the direction with 'o' means that it is the output
direction
.Port_Ad({

Port_Ad_oL[0],

Port_Ad_oN[0],

Port_Ad_oW[0],

Port_Ad_oS[0], Port_Ad_oE[0] }), //Port_Ad_oX[Y]: Y is the output port direction, X is
the data source direction
.TableTag_new(TableTag_new_oE),
.RRReg_new(RRReg_new_oE));
PortAdmission PortAd_S(
.Req_V({

Req_V_L[1],

Req_V_N[1],

Req_V_W[1],

Req_V_S[1],

Req_V_E[1] }),
.CReq_V({ CReq_V_L[1], CReq_V_N[1], CReq_V_W[1], CReq_V_S[1],
CReq_V_E[1] }),
.TableTag_pre(TableTag_pre_oS),
.RRReg_pre(RRReg_pre_oS),
.NACK(NACK_oS),
.BufFull_in(BufFull_in_oS),
//output
.Port_Ad({

Port_Ad_oL[1],

Port_Ad_oS[1], Port_Ad_oE[1] }),
.TableTag_new(TableTag_new_oS),
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Port_Ad_oN[1],

Port_Ad_oW[1],

.RRReg_new(RRReg_new_oS));
PortAdmission PortAd_W(
.Req_V({

Req_V_L[2],

Req_V_N[2],

Req_V_W[2],

Req_V_S[2],

Req_V_E[2] }),
.CReq_V({ CReq_V_L[2], CReq_V_N[2], CReq_V_W[2], CReq_V_S[2],
CReq_V_E[2] }),
.TableTag_pre(TableTag_pre_oW),
.RRReg_pre(RRReg_pre_oW),
.NACK(NACK_oW),
.BufFull_in(BufFull_in_oW),
//output
.Port_Ad({

Port_Ad_oL[2],

Port_Ad_oN[2],

Port_Ad_oW[2],

Port_Ad_oS[2], Port_Ad_oE[2] }),
.TableTag_new(TableTag_new_oW),
.RRReg_new(RRReg_new_oW));
PortAdmission PortAd_N(
.Req_V({

Req_V_L[3],

Req_V_N[3],

Req_V_W[3],

Req_V_S[3],

Req_V_E[3] }),
.CReq_V({ CReq_V_L[3], CReq_V_N[3], CReq_V_W[3], CReq_V_S[3],
CReq_V_E[3] }),
.TableTag_pre(TableTag_pre_oN),
.RRReg_pre(RRReg_pre_oN),
.NACK(NACK_oN),
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.BufFull_in(BufFull_in_oN),
//output
.Port_Ad({

Port_Ad_oL[3],

Port_Ad_oN[3],

Port_Ad_oW[3],

Port_Ad_oS[3], Port_Ad_oE[3] }),
.TableTag_new(TableTag_new_oN),
.RRReg_new(RRReg_new_oN));
PortAdmission PortAd_L(
.Req_V({

Req_V_L[4],

Req_V_N[4],

Req_V_W[4],

Req_V_S[4],

Req_V_E[4] }),
.CReq_V({ CReq_V_L[4], CReq_V_N[4], CReq_V_W[4], CReq_V_S[4],
CReq_V_E[4] }),
.TableTag_pre(TableTag_pre_oL),
.RRReg_pre(RRReg_pre_oL),
.NACK(NACK_oL),
.BufFull_in(BufFull_in_oL),
//output
.Port_Ad({

Port_Ad_oL[4],

Port_Ad_oS[4], Port_Ad_oE[4] }),
.TableTag_new(TableTag_new_oL),
.RRReg_new(RRReg_new_oL));
//use Port_Ad_oE,S,W,N,L to make connection
always
@(Port_Ad_oE or

308

Port_Ad_oN[4],

Port_Ad_oW[4],

Port_Ad_oS or
Port_Ad_oW or
Port_Ad_oN or
Port_Ad_oL or
FlitIn_E or
FlitIn_S or
FlitIn_W or
FlitIn_N or
FlitIn_L)
begin
case

({

Port_Ad_oE[0],

Port_Ad_oS[0],

Port_Ad_oL[0] })
5'b00001:
FlitOut_E_tmp <= FlitIn_L;
5'b00010:
FlitOut_E_tmp <= FlitIn_N;
5'b00100:
FlitOut_E_tmp <= FlitIn_W;
5'b01000:
FlitOut_E_tmp <= FlitIn_S;
5'b10000:
FlitOut_E_tmp <= FlitIn_E;
default:
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Port_Ad_oW[0],

Port_Ad_oN[0],

FlitOut_E_tmp <= 0;
endcase
case

({

Port_Ad_oE[1],

Port_Ad_oS[1],

Port_Ad_oW[1],

Port_Ad_oN[1],

Port_Ad_oS[2],

Port_Ad_oW[2],

Port_Ad_oN[2],

Port_Ad_oL[1] })
5'b00001:
FlitOut_S_tmp <= FlitIn_L;
5'b00010:
FlitOut_S_tmp <= FlitIn_N;
5'b00100:
FlitOut_S_tmp <= FlitIn_W;
5'b01000:
FlitOut_S_tmp <= FlitIn_S;
5'b10000:
FlitOut_S_tmp <= FlitIn_E;
default:
FlitOut_S_tmp <= 0;
endcase
case

({

Port_Ad_oE[2],

Port_Ad_oL[2] })
5'b00001:
FlitOut_W_tmp <= FlitIn_L;
5'b00010:
FlitOut_W_tmp <= FlitIn_N;
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5'b00100:
FlitOut_W_tmp <= FlitIn_W;
5'b01000:
FlitOut_W_tmp <= FlitIn_S;
5'b10000:
FlitOut_W_tmp <= FlitIn_E;
default:
FlitOut_W_tmp <= 0;
endcase
case

({

Port_Ad_oE[3],

Port_Ad_oS[3],

Port_Ad_oL[3] })
5'b00001:
FlitOut_N_tmp <= FlitIn_L;
5'b00010:
FlitOut_N_tmp <= FlitIn_N;
5'b00100:
FlitOut_N_tmp <= FlitIn_W;
5'b01000:
FlitOut_N_tmp <= FlitIn_S;
5'b10000:
FlitOut_N_tmp <= FlitIn_E;
default:
FlitOut_N_tmp <= 0;
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Port_Ad_oW[3],

Port_Ad_oN[3],

endcase
case

({

Port_Ad_oE[4],

Port_Ad_oS[4],

Port_Ad_oL[4] })
5'b00001:
FlitOut_L_tmp <= FlitIn_L;
5'b00010:
FlitOut_L_tmp <= FlitIn_N;
5'b00100:
FlitOut_L_tmp <= FlitIn_W;
5'b01000:
FlitOut_L_tmp <= FlitIn_S;
5'b10000:
FlitOut_L_tmp <= FlitIn_E;
default:
FlitOut_L_tmp <= 0;
endcase
end
always
@(Reset or
Port_Ad_oE or
Port_Ad_oS or
Port_Ad_oW or
Port_Ad_oN or
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Port_Ad_oW[4],

Port_Ad_oN[4],

Port_Ad_oL)
begin
if (Reset)
Port_Ad <= 25'b0;
else
begin
Port_Ad[4

:

0]

<=

{

Port_Ad_oE[0],

Port_Ad_oS[0],

Port_Ad_oW[0],

Port_Ad_oE[1],

Port_Ad_oS[1],

Port_Ad_oW[1],

Port_Ad_oN[0], Port_Ad_oL[0] };
Port_Ad[9

:

5]

<=

{

Port_Ad_oN[1], Port_Ad_oL[1] };
Port_Ad[14 : 10] <= { Port_Ad_oE[2], Port_Ad_oS[2], Port_Ad_oW[2],
Port_Ad_oN[2], Port_Ad_oL[2] };
Port_Ad[19 : 15] <= { Port_Ad_oE[3], Port_Ad_oS[3], Port_Ad_oW[3],
Port_Ad_oN[3], Port_Ad_oL[3] };
Port_Ad[24 : 20] <= { Port_Ad_oE[4], Port_Ad_oS[4], Port_Ad_oW[4],
Port_Ad_oN[4], Port_Ad_oL[4] };
end
end
/* */
always
@(posedge CLK)
begin
if (Reset)
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begin
DestPort_E <= 3'b0;
DestPort_S <= 3'b0;
DestPort_W <= 3'b0;
DestPort_N <= 3'b0;
DestPort_L <= 3'b0;
TableTag_cur <= 25'b0;
RRReg_cur <= 25'b0;
//Port_Ad <= 25'b0;
FlitOut_E <= 0;
FlitOut_S <= 0;
FlitOut_W <= 0;
FlitOut_N <= 0;
FlitOut_L <= 0;
end
else
begin
DestPort_E <= DestPort_E_tmp;
DestPort_S <= DestPort_S_tmp;
DestPort_W <= DestPort_W_tmp;
DestPort_N <= DestPort_N_tmp;
DestPort_L <= DestPort_L_tmp;
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TableTag_cur <= { TableTag_new_oL, TableTag_new_oN, TableTag_new_oW,
TableTag_new_oS, TableTag_new_oE };
RRReg_cur

<=

{

RRReg_new_oL,

RRReg_new_oS, RRReg_new_oE };
FlitOut_E <= FlitOut_E_tmp;
FlitOut_S <= FlitOut_S_tmp;
FlitOut_W <= FlitOut_W_tmp;
FlitOut_N <= FlitOut_N_tmp;
FlitOut_L <= FlitOut_L_tmp;
end
end
endmodule
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RRReg_new_oN,

RRReg_new_oW,

e. Info Extraction
`timescale 1ns/1ns
module InfoExtract4(Flit,
CurrentID,
DestPort_pre,
select,
//output
DestPort,
Req_V,
CReq_V,
ErrDetectionOut);
parameter FLITWIDTH = 36;
parameter NOCSIZE = 16;
input[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] Flit;
input[3 : 0] CurrentID;
input[2 : 0] DestPort_pre;
input[2 : 0] select;
output[2 : 0] DestPort;
output[4 : 0] Req_V;
output[4 : 0] CReq_V;
wire[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] Flit;
wire[3 : 0] CurrentID;
wire[2 : 0] DestPort_pre;
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reg[2 : 0] DestPort;
reg[4 : 0] Req_V;
reg[4 : 0] CReq_V;
wire[14 : 0] Info_enc;
wire[10 : 0] Info;
//internal signal
reg Req;
reg CReq;
reg[3 : 0] DestID;
reg[1 : 0] X_C;
reg[1 : 0] X_D;
reg[1 : 0] Y_C;
reg[1 : 0] Y_D;
output ErrDetectionOut;
PFDS p0(.inputa(Flit[FLITWIDTH - 1 : 0]),
.select(select),
.outputb(Info_enc[14 : 0]));
HammingDecoder15_11_Partial D0(.DataIno(Info_enc[14 : 0]),
.DataOut(Info[10 : 0]),
.ErrDetection(ErrDetectionOut));

always
@(Info or
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Flit)
begin
if ((Info[0] == 1'b1) & (Info[1] == 1'b0))
begin
Req = 1'b1;
CReq = 1'b0;
DestID = Info[9 : 6];
end
else
if ((Info[0] == 1'b0) & (Info[1] == 1'b1))
begin
Req = 1'b0;
CReq = 1'b1;
DestID = 4'b0;
end
else
begin
Req = 1'b0;
CReq = 1'b0;
DestID = 4'b0;
end
end
//Compute Destport
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always
@(CurrentID or
DestID) //X_C[0] is gMSB, same with Y_C[0]
begin
//NoC size 4x4
if (NOCSIZE == 9)
begin
case (CurrentID)
4'b0000:
begin
Y_C = 2'b00;
X_C = 2'b00;
end
4'b0001:
begin
Y_C = 2'b00;
X_C = 2'b01;
end
4'b0010:
begin
Y_C = 2'b00;
X_C = 2'b10;
end
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4'b0011:
begin
Y_C = 2'b01;
X_C = 2'b00;
end
4'b0100:
begin
Y_C = 2'b01;
X_C = 2'b01;
end
4'b0101:
begin
Y_C = 2'b01;
X_C = 2'b10;
end
4'b0110:
begin
Y_C = 2'b10;
X_C = 2'b00;
end
4'b0111:
begin
Y_C = 2'b10;
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X_C = 2'b01;
end
4'b1000:
begin
Y_C = 2'b10;
X_C = 2'b10;
end
default:
begin
Y_C = 2'b00;
X_C = 2'b00;
end
endcase
case (DestID)
4'b0000:
begin
Y_D = 2'b00;
X_D = 2'b00;
end
4'b0001:
begin
Y_D = 2'b00;
X_D = 2'b01;
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end
4'b0010:
begin
Y_D = 2'b00;
X_D = 2'b10;
end
4'b0011:
begin
Y_D = 2'b01;
X_D = 2'b00;
end
4'b0100:
begin
Y_D = 2'b01;
X_D = 2'b01;
end
4'b0101:
begin
Y_D = 2'b01;
X_D = 2'b10;
end
4'b0110:
begin
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Y_D = 2'b10;
X_D = 2'b00;
end
4'b0111:
begin
Y_D = 2'b10;
X_D = 2'b01;
end
4'b1000:
begin
Y_D = 2'b10;
X_D = 2'b10;
end
default:
begin
Y_D = 2'b00;
X_D = 2'b00;
end
endcase
end
else //NOCSIZE==16
begin
case (CurrentID)
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4'b0000:
begin
Y_C = 2'b00;
X_C = 2'b00;
end
4'b0001:
begin
Y_C = 2'b00;
X_C = 2'b01;
end
4'b0010:
begin
Y_C = 2'b00;
X_C = 2'b10;
end
4'b0011:
begin
Y_C = 2'b00;
X_C = 2'b11;
end
4'b0100:
begin
Y_C = 2'b01;
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X_C = 2'b00;
end
4'b0101:
begin
Y_C = 2'b01;
X_C = 2'b01;
end
4'b0110:
begin
Y_C = 2'b01;
X_C = 2'b10;
end
4'b0111:
begin
Y_C = 2'b01;
X_C = 2'b11;
end
4'b1000:
begin
Y_C = 2'b10;
X_C = 2'b00;
end
4'b1001:
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begin
Y_C = 2'b10;
X_C = 2'b01;
end
4'b1010:
begin
Y_C = 2'b10;
X_C = 2'b10;
end
4'b1011:
begin
Y_C = 2'b10;
X_C = 2'b11;
end
4'b1100:
begin
Y_C = 2'b11;
X_C = 2'b00;
end
4'b1101:
begin
Y_C = 2'b11;
X_C = 2'b01;
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end
4'b1110:
begin
Y_C = 2'b11;
X_C = 2'b10;
end
4'b1111:
begin
Y_C = 2'b11;
X_C = 2'b11;
end
default:
begin
Y_C = 2'b00;
X_C = 2'b00;
end
endcase
case (DestID)
4'b0000:
begin
Y_D = 2'b00;
X_D = 2'b00;
end
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4'b0001:
begin
Y_D = 2'b00;
X_D = 2'b01;
end
4'b0010:
begin
Y_D = 2'b00;
X_D = 2'b10;
end
4'b0011:
begin
Y_D = 2'b00;
X_D = 2'b11;
end
4'b0100:
begin
Y_D = 2'b01;
X_D = 2'b00;
end
4'b0101:
begin
Y_D = 2'b01;
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X_D = 2'b01;
end
4'b0110:
begin
Y_D = 2'b01;
X_D = 2'b10;
end
4'b0111:
begin
Y_D = 2'b01;
X_D = 2'b11;
end
4'b1000:
begin
Y_D = 2'b10;
X_D = 2'b00;
end
4'b1001:
begin
Y_D = 2'b10;
X_D = 2'b01;
end
4'b1010:
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begin
Y_D = 2'b10;
X_D = 2'b10;
end
4'b1011:
begin
Y_D = 2'b10;
X_D = 2'b11;
end
4'b1100:
begin
Y_D = 2'b11;
X_D = 2'b00;
end
4'b1101:
begin
Y_D = 2'b11;
X_D = 2'b01;
end
4'b1110:
begin
Y_D = 2'b11;
X_D = 2'b10;
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end
4'b1111:
begin
Y_D = 2'b11;
X_D = 2'b11;
end
default:
begin
Y_D = 2'b00;
X_D = 2'b00;
end
endcase
end
end
always
@(X_C or
Y_C or
X_D or
Y_D or
Req or
DestPort_pre)
begin
if (Req)

331

if (X_C == X_D) //move on y-direction, 3'b100, local port. DestPort[2] is MSB
begin
if (Y_C == Y_D)
DestPort = 3'b100;
else
begin

case ({ Y_C, Y_D }) //design for 3x3
/*4'b0001, 4'b0110,*/
4'b1000, 4'b0100, 4'b1001, 4'b1100, 4'b1101, 4'b1110:
DestPort = 3'b011; //go through north
/*4'b0100, 4'b1001,*/
4'b0010, 4'b0001, 4'b0110, 4'b0011, 4'b1011, 4'b0111:
DestPort = 3'b001; //go through south
default:
DestPort = 3'b100; //go through local
endcase

end
end
else //move on x-direction
begin
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case ({ X_C, X_D })
4'b0001, 4'b0110, 4'b0010, 4'b0011, 4'b0111, 4'b1011:
DestPort = 3'b000; //go through east
4'b0100, 4'b1001, 4'b1000, 4'b1100, 4'b1101, 4'b1110:
DestPort = 3'b010; //go through west
default:
DestPort = 3'b100; // go through local
endcase
end
else
DestPort = DestPort_pre;
end
always
@(DestPort or
DestPort_pre or
Req or
CReq)
begin
if (Req)
case (DestPort)
3'b000:
Req_V = { 4'b0, 1'b1 };
3'b001:
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Req_V = { 3'b0, 1'b1, 1'b0 };
3'b010:
Req_V = { 2'b0, 1'b1, 2'b0 };
3'b011:
Req_V = { 1'b0, 1'b1, 3'b0 };
3'b100:
Req_V = { 1'b1, 4'b0 };
default:
Req_V = { 4'b0, 1'b1 };
endcase
else
Req_V = 5'b00000;
if (CReq)
case (DestPort_pre)
3'b000:
CReq_V = { 4'b0, 1'b1 };
3'b001:
CReq_V = { 3'b0, 1'b1, 1'b0 };
3'b010:
CReq_V = { 2'b0, 1'b1, 2'b0 };
3'b011:
CReq_V = { 1'b0, 1'b1, 3'b0 };
3'b100:
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CReq_V = { 1'b1, 4'b0 };
default:
CReq_V = { 4'b0, 1'b1 };
endcase
else
CReq_V = 5'b00000;
end
endmodule
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f. Port Admission
`timescale 1ns/1ns
module PortAdmission(Req_V,
CReq_V,
TableTag_pre,
RRReg_pre,
NACK,
BufFull_in,
//output
Port_Ad, //the direction with 'o' means that it is the output direction
TableTag_new,
RRReg_new);
input[4 : 0] Req_V; //changed msb
input[4 : 0] CReq_V; //changed msb
input[4 : 0] TableTag_pre;
input[4 : 0] RRReg_pre;
input NACK;
input BufFull_in;
output[4 : 0] Port_Ad;
output[4 : 0] TableTag_new;
output[4 : 0] RRReg_new;
wire[4 : 0] Req_V; //changed msb
wire[4 : 0] CReq_V; //changed msb
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wire[4 : 0] TableTag_pre;
wire[4 : 0] RRReg_pre;
wire NACK;
wire BufFull_in;
reg[4 : 0] Port_Ad;
reg[4 : 0] TableTag_new;
reg[4 : 0] RRReg_new;
//internal signals
wire[4 : 0] RR_Port_Ad;
wire[4 : 0] RR_RRReg;
wire[4 : 0] RR_TableTag;
RoundRobin RR(.Req_V(Req_V),
.RRReg_in(RRReg_pre),
.TableTag_in(TableTag_pre),
//output
.RRReg_out(RR_RRReg),
.TableTag_out(RR_TableTag),
.Port_Ad(RR_Port_Ad));
always
@(NACK or
BufFull_in or
TableTag_pre or
RRReg_pre or
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CReq_V or
RR_Port_Ad or
RR_RRReg or
RR_TableTag)
begin
if (NACK | BufFull_in)
begin
TableTag_new <= TableTag_pre;
RRReg_new <= RRReg_pre;
Port_Ad <= 5'b0;
end
else
if (TableTag_pre[0] | TableTag_pre[1] | TableTag_pre[2] | TableTag_pre[3] |
TableTag_pre[4])
begin
Port_Ad <= RRReg_pre;
RRReg_new <= RRReg_pre;
if (CReq_V[0] | CReq_V[1] | CReq_V[2] | CReq_V[3] | CReq_V[4])
TableTag_new <= 5'b0;
else
TableTag_new <= TableTag_pre;
end
else
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begin
Port_Ad <= RR_Port_Ad;
RRReg_new <= RR_RRReg;
TableTag_new <= RR_TableTag;
end
end
endmodule
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g. Hamming Decoder
`timescale 1ns/1ns
module HammingDecoder15_11(DataIno,
DataOut,
ErrDetection);
input[35 : 0] DataIno;
output[31 : 0] DataOut;
wire[35 : 0] DataIno;
wire[3 : 0] ECC;
reg[31 : 0] DataOut;
output reg ErrDetection;
//internal reg
reg[3 : 0] syndrome;
assign ECC[3 : 0] = DataIno[14 : 11];
always
@(DataIno or
ECC)
begin
syndrome[0] <= ECC[0] ^ DataIno[0] ^ DataIno[3] ^ DataIno[4] ^ DataIno[6] ^
DataIno[8] ^ DataIno[9] ^ DataIno[10];
syndrome[1] <= ECC[1] ^ DataIno[0] ^ DataIno[1] ^ DataIno[3] ^ DataIno[5] ^
DataIno[6] ^ DataIno[7] ^ DataIno[8];

340

syndrome[2] <= ECC[2] ^ DataIno[1] ^ DataIno[2] ^ DataIno[4] ^ DataIno[6] ^
DataIno[7] ^ DataIno[8] ^ DataIno[9];
syndrome[3] <= ECC[3] ^ DataIno[2] ^ DataIno[3] ^ DataIno[5] ^ DataIno[7] ^
DataIno[8] ^ DataIno[9] ^ DataIno[10];
end
always
@(syndrome or
DataIno)
begin
ErrDetection <= (syndrome[3] | syndrome[2] | syndrome[1] | syndrome[0]);
DataOut[10] <= DataIno[10] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //1001 syn[0]-->syn[3]
DataOut[9] <= DataIno[9] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //1011
DataOut[8] <= DataIno[8] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //1111
DataOut[7] <= DataIno[7] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //0111
DataOut[6] <= DataIno[6] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(~syndrome[3])); //1110
DataOut[5] <= DataIno[5] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //0101
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DataOut[4] <= DataIno[4] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(~syndrome[3])); //1010
DataOut[3] <= DataIno[3] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //1101
DataOut[2] <= DataIno[2] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //0011
DataOut[1] <= DataIno[1] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(~syndrome[3])); //0110
DataOut[0] <= DataIno[0] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) &
(~syndrome[3])); //1100
DataOut[31 : 11] <= DataIno[35 : 15];
end
endmodule
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h. Hamming Encoder
`timescale 1ns/1ns
module HammingEncoder15_11(DataIn,
DataOut);
input[31 : 0] DataIn;
output[35 : 0] DataOut;
reg[35 : 0] DataOut;
always
@(DataIn)
begin
DataOut[10 : 0] <= DataIn[10 : 0];
DataOut[35 : 15] <= DataIn[31 : 11];
DataOut[11] <= DataIn[0] ^ DataIn[3] ^ DataIn[4] ^ DataIn[6] ^ DataIn[8] ^ DataIn[9]
^ DataIn[10];
DataOut[12] <= DataIn[0] ^ DataIn[1] ^ DataIn[3] ^ DataIn[5] ^ DataIn[6] ^ DataIn[7]
^ DataIn[8];
DataOut[13] <= DataIn[1] ^ DataIn[2] ^ DataIn[4] ^ DataIn[6] ^ DataIn[7] ^ DataIn[8]
^ DataIn[9];
DataOut[14] <= DataIn[2] ^ DataIn[3] ^ DataIn[5] ^ DataIn[7] ^ DataIn[8] ^ DataIn[9]
^ DataIn[10];
end
endmodule
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i. Mux8
`timescale 1ns/1ns
module mux8(select,
d,
q);
input[2 : 0] select;
input[7 : 0] d;
output q;
reg q;
wire[2 : 0] select;
wire[7 : 0] d;
always
@(select or
d)
begin
case (select)
3'b000:
q = d[0];
3'b001:
q = d[1];
3'b010:
q = d[2];
3'b011:
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q = d[3];
3'b100:
q = d[4];
3'b101:
q = d[5];
3'b110:
q = d[6];
3'b111:
q = d[7];
endcase
end
endmodule
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j. Partial Flit De-Permutation
`timescale 1ns/1ns
module PFDS(inputa,
select,
outputb);
input[35 : 0] inputa;
input[2 : 0] select;
output[14 : 0] outputb;
wire[7 : 0] mux0input,
mux1input,
mux2input,
mux3input,
mux4input,
mux5input,
mux6input,
mux7input,
mux8input,
mux9input,
mux10input,
mux11input,
mux12input,
mux13input,
mux14input;
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assign mux0input = { inputa[0], inputa[34], inputa[19], inputa[20], inputa[10], inputa[2],
inputa[1], inputa[10] };
assign mux1input = { inputa[1], inputa[35], inputa[0], inputa[21], inputa[11], inputa[3],
inputa[2], inputa[19] };
assign mux2input = { inputa[2], inputa[0], inputa[20], inputa[22], inputa[12], inputa[4],
inputa[0], inputa[12] };
assign mux3input = { inputa[3], inputa[1], inputa[1], inputa[23], inputa[13], inputa[5],
inputa[35], inputa[17] };
assign mux4input = { inputa[4], inputa[2], inputa[21], inputa[24], inputa[14], inputa[6],
inputa[34], inputa[14] };
assign mux5input = { inputa[5], inputa[3], inputa[2], inputa[25], inputa[15], inputa[7],
inputa[33], inputa[15] };
assign mux6input = { inputa[6], inputa[4], inputa[22], inputa[26], inputa[16], inputa[8],
inputa[32], inputa[16] };
assign mux7input = { inputa[7], inputa[5], inputa[3], inputa[27], inputa[17], inputa[9],
inputa[31], inputa[13] };
assign mux8input = { inputa[8], inputa[6], inputa[23], inputa[28], inputa[18], inputa[10],
inputa[30], inputa[18] };
assign mux9input = { inputa[9], inputa[7], inputa[4], inputa[29], inputa[19], inputa[11],
inputa[29], inputa[11] };
assign mux10input = { inputa[10], inputa[8], inputa[24], inputa[30], inputa[20],
inputa[12], inputa[28], inputa[0] };
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assign mux11input = { inputa[11], inputa[9], inputa[5], inputa[1], inputa[29], inputa[13],
inputa[27], inputa[9] };
assign mux12input = { inputa[12], inputa[10], inputa[25], inputa[32], inputa[30],
inputa[14], inputa[26], inputa[2] };
assign mux13input = { inputa[13], inputa[11], inputa[6], inputa[3], inputa[31], inputa[15],
inputa[25], inputa[7] };
assign mux14input = { inputa[14], inputa[12], inputa[26], inputa[34], inputa[32],
inputa[16], inputa[24], inputa[4] };
mux8 dm0(.select(select),
.d(mux0input),
.q(outputb[0]));
mux8 dm1(.select(select),
.d(mux1input),
.q(outputb[1]));
mux8 dm2(.select(select),
.d(mux2input),
.q(outputb[2]));
mux8 dm3(.select(select),
.d(mux3input),
.q(outputb[3]));
mux8 dm4(.select(select),
.d(mux4input),
.q(outputb[4]));
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mux8 dm5(.select(select),
.d(mux5input),
.q(outputb[5]));
mux8 dm6(.select(select),
.d(mux6input),
.q(outputb[6]));
mux8 dm7(.select(select),
.d(mux7input),
.q(outputb[7]));
mux8 dm8(.select(select),
.d(mux8input),
.q(outputb[8]));
mux8 dm9(.select(select),
.d(mux9input),
.q(outputb[9]));
mux8 dm10(.select(select),
.d(mux10input),
.q(outputb[10]));
mux8 dm11(.select(select),
.d(mux11input),
.q(outputb[11]));
mux8 dm12(.select(select),
.d(mux12input),
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.q(outputb[12]));
mux8 dm13(.select(select),
.d(mux13input),
.q(outputb[13]));
mux8 dm14(.select(select),
.d(mux14input),
.q(outputb[14]));
endmodule
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k. Partial Hamming Decoder
`timescale 1ns/1ns
module HammingDecoder15_11_Partial(DataIno,
DataOut,
ErrDetection);
input[14 : 0] DataIno;
output[10 : 0] DataOut;
wire[14 : 0] DataIno;
wire[3 : 0] ECC;
reg[10 : 0] DataOut;
output reg ErrDetection;
//internal reg
reg[3 : 0] syndrome;
//assign DataIn[10:0] = DataIno[10:0];
assign ECC[3 : 0] = DataIno[14 : 11];
always
@(DataIno or
ECC)
begin
syndrome[0] <= ECC[0] ^ DataIno[0] ^ DataIno[3] ^ DataIno[4] ^ DataIno[6] ^
DataIno[8] ^ DataIno[9] ^ DataIno[10];
syndrome[1] <= ECC[1] ^ DataIno[0] ^ DataIno[1] ^ DataIno[3] ^ DataIno[5] ^
DataIno[6] ^ DataIno[7] ^ DataIno[8];
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syndrome[2] <= ECC[2] ^ DataIno[1] ^ DataIno[2] ^ DataIno[4] ^ DataIno[6] ^
DataIno[7] ^ DataIno[8] ^ DataIno[9];
syndrome[3] <= ECC[3] ^ DataIno[2] ^ DataIno[3] ^ DataIno[5] ^ DataIno[7] ^
DataIno[8] ^ DataIno[9] ^ DataIno[10];
end
always
@(syndrome or
DataIno)
begin
ErrDetection <= (syndrome[3] | syndrome[2] | syndrome[1] | syndrome[0]);
DataOut[10] <= DataIno[10] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //1001 syn[0]-->syn[3]
DataOut[9] <= DataIno[9] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //1011
DataOut[8] <= DataIno[8] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //1111
DataOut[7] <= DataIno[7] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //0111
DataOut[6] <= DataIno[6] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(~syndrome[3])); //1110
DataOut[5] <= DataIno[5] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //0101
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DataOut[4] <= DataIno[4] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(~syndrome[3])); //1010
DataOut[3] <= DataIno[3] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //1101
DataOut[2] <= DataIno[2] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (~syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(syndrome[3])); //0011
DataOut[1] <= DataIno[1] ^ ((~syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (syndrome[2]) &
(~syndrome[3])); //0110
DataOut[0] <= DataIno[0] ^ ((syndrome[0]) & (syndrome[1]) & (~syndrome[2]) &
(~syndrome[3])); //1100
end
endmodule
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l. Round Robin

`timescale 1ns/1ns //edited by Jonathan to remove Branch for FPGA
module RoundRobin(Req_V,
RRReg_in,
TableTag_in,
//output
RRReg_out,
TableTag_out,
Port_Ad);
input[4 : 0] Req_V;
input[4 : 0] RRReg_in;
input[4 : 0] TableTag_in;
output[4 : 0] RRReg_out;
output[4 : 0] TableTag_out;
output[4 : 0] Port_Ad;
wire[4 : 0] Req_V;
wire[4 : 0] RRReg_in;
wire[4 : 0] TableTag_in;
reg[4 : 0] RRReg_out;
reg[4 : 0] TableTag_out;
reg[4 : 0] Port_Ad;
//internal signals
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reg[4 : 0] Req_priority;
reg[4 : 0] Port_ad_tmp0;
reg[4 : 0] Port_ad_tmp1;
reg[4 : 0] Port_ad_tmp2;
reg[4 : 0] Port_ad_tmp3;
reg[4 : 0] Port_ad_tmp4;
always
@(RRReg_in or
Req_V)
begin
/*East output port*/
/*round robin prioirty*/
Port_ad_tmp0[1] <= RRReg_in[0] & Req_V[1];
Port_ad_tmp0[2] <= !(RRReg_in[0] & Req_V[1]) & Req_V[2];
Port_ad_tmp0[3] <= !(RRReg_in[0] & Req_V[1]) & (!Req_V[2]) & Req_V[3];
Port_ad_tmp0[4] <= !(RRReg_in[0] & Req_V[1]) & (!Req_V[2]) & (!Req_V[3]) &
Req_V[4];
Port_ad_tmp0[0] <= !(RRReg_in[0] & Req_V[1]) & (!Req_V[2]) & (!Req_V[3]) &
(!Req_V[4]) & Req_V[0];
/*South output port*/
Port_ad_tmp1[2] <= RRReg_in[1] & Req_V[2];
Port_ad_tmp1[3] <= !(RRReg_in[1] & Req_V[2]) & Req_V[3];
Port_ad_tmp1[4] <= !(RRReg_in[1] & Req_V[2]) & (!Req_V[3]) & Req_V[4];
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Port_ad_tmp1[0] <= !(RRReg_in[1] & Req_V[2]) & (!Req_V[3]) & (!Req_V[4]) &
Req_V[0];
Port_ad_tmp1[1] <= !(RRReg_in[1] & Req_V[2]) & (!Req_V[3]) & (!Req_V[4]) &
(!Req_V[0]) & Req_V[1];
/*West output port*/
Port_ad_tmp2[3] <= RRReg_in[2] & Req_V[3];
Port_ad_tmp2[4] <= !(RRReg_in[2] & Req_V[3]) & Req_V[4];
Port_ad_tmp2[0] <= !(RRReg_in[2] & Req_V[3]) & (!Req_V[4]) & Req_V[0];
Port_ad_tmp2[1] <= !(RRReg_in[2] & Req_V[3]) & (!Req_V[4]) & (!Req_V[0]) &
Req_V[1];
Port_ad_tmp2[2] <= !(RRReg_in[2] & Req_V[3]) & (!Req_V[4]) & (!Req_V[0]) &
(!Req_V[1]) & Req_V[2];
/*North output port*/
Port_ad_tmp3[4] <= RRReg_in[3] & Req_V[4];
Port_ad_tmp3[0] <= !(RRReg_in[3] & Req_V[4]) & Req_V[0];
Port_ad_tmp3[1] <= !(RRReg_in[3] & Req_V[4]) & (!Req_V[0]) & Req_V[1];
Port_ad_tmp3[2] <= !(RRReg_in[3] & Req_V[4]) & (!Req_V[0]) & (!Req_V[1]) &
Req_V[2];
Port_ad_tmp3[3] <= !(RRReg_in[3] & Req_V[4]) & (!Req_V[0]) & (!Req_V[1]) &
(!Req_V[2]) & Req_V[3];
/*Local output port*/
Port_ad_tmp4[0] <= RRReg_in[4] & Req_V[0];
Port_ad_tmp4[1] <= !(RRReg_in[4] & Req_V[0]) & Req_V[1];
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Port_ad_tmp4[2] <= !(RRReg_in[4] & Req_V[0]) & (!Req_V[1]) & Req_V[2];
Port_ad_tmp4[3] <= !(RRReg_in[4] & Req_V[0]) & (!Req_V[1]) & (!Req_V[2]) &
Req_V[3];
Port_ad_tmp4[4] <= !(RRReg_in[4] & Req_V[0]) & (!Req_V[1]) & (!Req_V[2]) &
(!Req_V[3]) & Req_V[4];
end
always
@(Req_V)
/*priority: Local, East, South, West, North. The reason to make local input port the
highest priority is to inject flits to network as soon as possible. Alternatively, we can put the
request from the local input port the lowest priority to prevent increasing network
congestion*/
begin
Req_priority[4] = Req_V[4];
Req_priority[0] = !Req_V[4] & Req_V[0];
Req_priority[1] = !Req_V[4] & !Req_V[0] & Req_V[1];
Req_priority[2] = !Req_V[4] & !Req_V[0] & !Req_V[1] & Req_V[2];
Req_priority[3] = !Req_V[4] & !Req_V[0] & !Req_V[1] & !Req_V[2] & Req_V[3];
end
always
@(RRReg_in or
TableTag_in or
Port_ad_tmp0 or
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Port_ad_tmp1 or
Port_ad_tmp2 or
Port_ad_tmp3 or
Port_ad_tmp4 or
Req_priority or
Req_V)
begin
case (RRReg_in) //the output port is only occupied by input port at one time, so all
possible non-zero RRReg_in listed are five.
5'b00001:
begin
Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp0;
RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp0;
TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp0;
end
5'b00010:
begin
Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp1;
RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp1;
TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp1;
end
5'b00100:
begin
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Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp2;
RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp2;
TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp2;
end
5'b01000:
begin
Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp3;
RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp3;
TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp3;
end
5'b10000:
begin
Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp4;
RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp4;
TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp4;
end
default:
begin
case (Req_priority)
5'b00001:
begin
Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp0;
RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp0;
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TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp0;
end
5'b00010:
begin
Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp1;
RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp1;
TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp1;
end
5'b00100:
begin
Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp2;
RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp2;
TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp2;
end
5'b01000:
begin
Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp3;
RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp3;
TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp3;
end
5'b10000:
begin
Port_Ad <= Port_ad_tmp4;
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RRReg_out <= Port_ad_tmp4;
TableTag_out <= Port_ad_tmp4;
end
default:
begin
Port_Ad <= 5'b0;
RRReg_out <= RRReg_in;
TableTag_out <= TableTag_in;
end
endcase
end //the intended output port is not occupied by any packet yet
endcase
end
endmodule
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m. Circular Output FIFO
`timescale 1ns/1ns
//Use FPGA InputChannel to create a circular FIFO
module CircularFIFO4(clk,
reset,
valid_in,
datain,
NACK,
almost_full,
dataout,
wrreq,
select);
parameter FLITWIDTH = 32;
parameter CodedFLITWIDTH = 36;
input[2 : 0] select;
input clk;
input reset;
input valid_in;
input[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain;
input NACK;
input almost_full;
output[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout;
output wrreq;
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wire clk;
wire reset;
wire valid_in;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] datain;
wire NACK;
wire almost_full;
reg[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] dataout;
reg wrreq;
//added to fix problem with wrreq
wire[10 : 0] Info;
wire[14 : 0] fifo_output_s1_enc;
wire ErrDetection;
//reg[FLITWIDTH-1:0] dataout_uncoded;
//intermediate signals
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s1;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s2;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s3;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s4;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s1;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s2;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s3;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s4;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s5;
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wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s6;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s7;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_input_s8;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s5;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s6;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s7;
wire[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0] fifo_output_s8;
//assign

fifo_input_s1

almost_full?(fifo_output_s1&ErrDetection):(NACK?fifo_output_s2:datain);

=
detection

method, changed 10/7/2015 for correction
assign fifo_input_s1 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s1 : (NACK ? fifo_output_s2 : datain);
assign fifo_input_s2 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s2 : fifo_output_s3;
assign fifo_input_s3 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s3 : fifo_output_s4; //if insert more
stages, follow this rule. Just make the first and last stages different
assign fifo_input_s4 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s4 : fifo_output_s5;
assign fifo_input_s5 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s5 : fifo_output_s6;
assign fifo_input_s6 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s6 : fifo_output_s7;
assign fifo_input_s7 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s7 : fifo_output_s8;
assign fifo_input_s8 = almost_full ? fifo_output_s8 : fifo_output_s1;
stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s1(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s1),
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.DataOut(fifo_output_s1));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s2(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s2),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s2));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s3(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s3),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s3));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s4(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s4),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s4));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s5(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s5),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s5));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s6(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
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.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s6),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s6));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s7(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s7),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s7));
stagereg31_Proposed_EX circular_s8(.Preset_act_low(1'b1),
.Clear_act_low(!reset),
.CLK(clk),
.DataIn(fifo_input_s8),
.DataOut(fifo_output_s8));
always
@(fifo_output_s1)
begin
dataout <= fifo_output_s1;
end
PFDS p0(.inputa(fifo_output_s1[CodedFLITWIDTH - 1 : 0]),
.select(select[2 : 0]),
.outputb(fifo_output_s1_enc[14 : 0]));
HammingDecoder15_11_Partial D0(.DataIno(fifo_output_s1_enc[14 : 0]),
.DataOut(Info[10 : 0]),
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.ErrDetection(ErrDetection));

always
@(reset or
Info[0] or
Info[1] or
almost_full) //or ErrDetection) 10/7/2015
begin
if (reset) //| ErrDetection)//or ErrDetection
wrreq <= 1'b0;
else
if ((Info[0] | Info[1]) & (~almost_full)) //changed from fifo_output_s1 since
scrambling etc. added almost full fix //added almost_full to fix stuck data on links
wrreq <= 1'b1;
else
wrreq <= 1'b0;
end
endmodule

367

n. Stagereg31
`timescale 1ns/1ns
// Copyright (C) 1991-2009 Altera Corporation
// Your use of Altera Corporation's design tools, logic functions
// and other software and tools, and its AMPP partner logic
// functions, and any output files from any of the foregoing
// (including device programming or simulation files), and any
// associated documentation or information are expressly subject
// to the terms and conditions of the Altera Program License
// Subscription Agreement, Altera MegaCore Function License
// Agreement, or other applicable license agreement, including,
// without limitation, that your use is for the sole purpose of
// programming logic devices manufactured by Altera and sold by
// Altera or its authorized distributors. Please refer to the
// applicable agreement for further details.
// PROGRAM

"Quartus II"

// VERSION

"Version 9.1 Build 222 10/21/2009 SJ Web Edition"

// CREATED

"Fri Jan 15 13:55:43 2010"

module stagereg31_Proposed_EX(Preset_act_low,
Clear_act_low,
CLK,
DataIn,
DataOut);
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input Preset_act_low;
input Clear_act_low;
input CLK;
input[35 : 0] DataIn;
output[35 : 0] DataOut;
reg[35 : 0] DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED;
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[23] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[23] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[23] = DataIn[23];
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end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[22] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[22] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[22] = DataIn[22];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
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negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[21] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[21] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[21] = DataIn[21];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
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begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[20] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[20] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[20] = DataIn[20];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[15] = 0;
end
else
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if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[15] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[15] = DataIn[15];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[14] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[14] = 1;
end
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else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[14] = DataIn[14];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[13] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[13] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[13] = DataIn[13];
end
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end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[12] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[12] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[12] = DataIn[12];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
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negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[7] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[7] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[7] = DataIn[7];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
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DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[6] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[6] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[6] = DataIn[6];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[5] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
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begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[5] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[5] = DataIn[5];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[4] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[4] = 1;
end
else
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begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[4] = DataIn[4];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[19] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[19] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[19] = DataIn[19];
end
end
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always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[18] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[18] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[18] = DataIn[18];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
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begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[17] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[17] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[17] = DataIn[17];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[16] = 0;
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end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[16] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[16] = DataIn[16];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[11] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
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DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[11] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[11] = DataIn[11];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[10] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[10] = 1;
end
else
begin
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DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[10] = DataIn[10];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[9] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[9] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[9] = DataIn[9];
end
end
always
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@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[8] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[8] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[8] = DataIn[8];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
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if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[3] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[3] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[3] = DataIn[3];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[2] = 0;
end
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else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[2] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[2] = DataIn[2];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[1] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[1] = 1;
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end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[1] = DataIn[1];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[0] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[0] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[0] = DataIn[0];
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end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[24] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[24] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[24] = DataIn[24];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
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negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[31] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[31] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[31] = DataIn[31];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
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begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[30] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[30] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[30] = DataIn[30];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[29] = 0;
end
else
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if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[29] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[29] = DataIn[29];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[28] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[28] = 1;
end
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else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[28] = DataIn[28];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[27] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[27] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[27] = DataIn[27];
end
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end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[26] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[26] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[26] = DataIn[26];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
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negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[25] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[25] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[25] = DataIn[25];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
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DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[35] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[35] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[35] = DataIn[35];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[34] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
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begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[34] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[34] = DataIn[34];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[33] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[33] = 1;
end
else
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begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[33] = DataIn[33];
end
end
always
@(posedge CLK or
negedge Clear_act_low or
negedge Preset_act_low)
begin
if (!Clear_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[32] = 0;
end
else
if (!Preset_act_low)
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[32] = 1;
end
else
begin
DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED[32] = DataIn[32];
end
end
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assign DataOut = DataOut_ALTERA_SYNTHESIZED;
endmodule
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o. Permutation
`timescale 1ns/1ns
module Perm32plus4(
//inputs
inputa,
select,
//outputs
outputb);
input[35 : 0] inputa;
wire[7 : 0] mux0input,
mux1input,
mux2input,
mux3input,
mux4input,
mux5input,
mux6input,
mux7input,
mux8input,
mux9input,
mux10input,
mux11input,
mux12input,
mux13input,
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mux14input,
mux15input,
mux16input,
mux17input,
mux18input,
mux19input,
mux20input,
mux21input,
mux22input,
mux23input,
mux24input,
mux25input,
mux26input,
mux27input,
mux28input,
mux29input,
mux30input,
mux31input,
mux32input,
mux33input,
mux34input,
mux35input;
input[2 : 0] select;
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wire[2 : 0] select;
reg[35 : 0] q;
output[35 : 0] outputb;
wire[35 : 0] inputa;
//reg[38:0] outputb;
assign mux0input = { inputa[0], inputa[2], inputa[1], inputa[20], inputa[20], inputa[34],
inputa[2], inputa[10] };
assign mux1input = { inputa[1], inputa[3], inputa[3], inputa[11], inputa[21], inputa[35],
inputa[0], inputa[19] };
assign mux2input = { inputa[2], inputa[4], inputa[5], inputa[22], inputa[22], inputa[0],
inputa[1], inputa[12] };
assign mux3input = { inputa[3], inputa[5], inputa[7], inputa[13], inputa[23], inputa[1],
inputa[35], inputa[17] };
assign mux4input = { inputa[4], inputa[6], inputa[9], inputa[24], inputa[24], inputa[2],
inputa[34], inputa[14] };
assign mux5input = { inputa[5], inputa[7], inputa[11], inputa[15], inputa[25], inputa[3],
inputa[33], inputa[15] };
assign mux6input = { inputa[6], inputa[8], inputa[13], inputa[26], inputa[26], inputa[4],
inputa[32], inputa[16] };
assign mux7input = { inputa[7], inputa[9], inputa[15], inputa[17], inputa[27], inputa[5],
inputa[31], inputa[13] };
assign mux8input = { inputa[8], inputa[10], inputa[17], inputa[28], inputa[28], inputa[6],
inputa[30], inputa[18] };
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assign mux9input = { inputa[9], inputa[11], inputa[19], inputa[19], inputa[29], inputa[7],
inputa[29], inputa[11] };
assign mux10input = { inputa[10], inputa[12], inputa[21], inputa[30], inputa[0], inputa[8],
inputa[28], inputa[0] };
assign mux11input = { inputa[11], inputa[13], inputa[23], inputa[31], inputa[1], inputa[9],
inputa[27], inputa[9] };
assign mux12input = { inputa[12], inputa[14], inputa[25], inputa[32], inputa[2],
inputa[10], inputa[26], inputa[2] };
assign mux13input = { inputa[13], inputa[15], inputa[27], inputa[33], inputa[3],
inputa[11], inputa[25], inputa[7] };
assign mux14input = { inputa[14], inputa[16], inputa[29], inputa[34], inputa[4],
inputa[12], inputa[24], inputa[4] };
assign mux15input = { inputa[15], inputa[17], inputa[31], inputa[35], inputa[5],
inputa[13], inputa[23], inputa[5] };
assign mux16input = { inputa[16], inputa[18], inputa[33], inputa[29], inputa[6],
inputa[14], inputa[22], inputa[6] };
assign mux17input = { inputa[17], inputa[19], inputa[35], inputa[27], inputa[7],
inputa[15], inputa[21], inputa[3] };
assign mux18input = { inputa[18], inputa[20], inputa[34], inputa[16], inputa[8],
inputa[16], inputa[20], inputa[8] };
assign mux19input = { inputa[19], inputa[21], inputa[0], inputa[18], inputa[9], inputa[17],
inputa[19], inputa[1] };
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assign mux20input = { inputa[20], inputa[22], inputa[2], inputa[0], inputa[10], inputa[18],
inputa[18], inputa[30] };
assign mux21input = { inputa[21], inputa[23], inputa[4], inputa[1], inputa[31], inputa[19],
inputa[17], inputa[29] };
assign mux22input = { inputa[22], inputa[24], inputa[6], inputa[2], inputa[32], inputa[20],
inputa[16], inputa[35] };
assign mux23input = { inputa[23], inputa[25], inputa[8], inputa[3], inputa[33], inputa[21],
inputa[15], inputa[33] };
assign mux24input = { inputa[24], inputa[26], inputa[10], inputa[4], inputa[34],
inputa[22], inputa[14], inputa[34] };
assign mux25input = { inputa[25], inputa[27], inputa[12], inputa[5], inputa[35],
inputa[23], inputa[13], inputa[24] };
assign mux26input = { inputa[26], inputa[28], inputa[14], inputa[6], inputa[18],
inputa[24], inputa[12], inputa[27] };
assign mux27input = { inputa[27], inputa[29], inputa[16], inputa[7], inputa[19],
inputa[25], inputa[11], inputa[22] };
assign mux28input = { inputa[28], inputa[30], inputa[18], inputa[8], inputa[30],
inputa[26], inputa[10], inputa[32] };
assign mux29input = { inputa[29], inputa[31], inputa[20], inputa[9], inputa[11],
inputa[27], inputa[9], inputa[31] };
assign mux30input = { inputa[30], inputa[32], inputa[22], inputa[10], inputa[12],
inputa[28], inputa[8], inputa[20] };
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assign mux31input = { inputa[31], inputa[33], inputa[24], inputa[21], inputa[13],
inputa[29], inputa[7], inputa[21] };
assign mux32input = { inputa[32], inputa[34], inputa[26], inputa[12], inputa[14],
inputa[30], inputa[6], inputa[28] };
assign mux33input = { inputa[33], inputa[35], inputa[28], inputa[23], inputa[15],
inputa[31], inputa[5], inputa[23] };
assign mux34input = { inputa[34], inputa[0], inputa[30], inputa[14], inputa[16],
inputa[32], inputa[4], inputa[26] };
assign mux35input = { inputa[35], inputa[1], inputa[32], inputa[25], inputa[17],
inputa[33], inputa[3], inputa[25] };
mux8 m0(.select(select),
.d(mux0input),
.q(outputb[0]));
mux8 m1(.select(select),
.d(mux1input),
.q(outputb[1]));
mux8 m2(.select(select),
.d(mux2input),
.q(outputb[2]));
mux8 m3(.select(select),
.d(mux3input),
.q(outputb[3]));
mux8 m4(.select(select),
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.d(mux4input),
.q(outputb[4]));
mux8 m5(.select(select),
.d(mux5input),
.q(outputb[5]));
mux8 m6(.select(select),
.d(mux6input),
.q(outputb[6]));
mux8 m7(.select(select),
.d(mux7input),
.q(outputb[7]));
mux8 m8(.select(select),
.d(mux8input),
.q(outputb[8]));
mux8 m9(.select(select),
.d(mux9input),
.q(outputb[9]));
mux8 m10(.select(select),
.d(mux10input),
.q(outputb[10]));
mux8 m11(.select(select),
.d(mux11input),
.q(outputb[11]));
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mux8 m12(.select(select),
.d(mux12input),
.q(outputb[12]));
mux8 m13(.select(select),
.d(mux13input),
.q(outputb[13]));
mux8 m14(.select(select),
.d(mux14input),
.q(outputb[14]));
mux8 m15(.select(select),
.d(mux15input),
.q(outputb[15]));
mux8 m16(.select(select),
.d(mux16input),
.q(outputb[16]));
mux8 m17(.select(select),
.d(mux17input),
.q(outputb[17]));
mux8 m18(.select(select),
.d(mux18input),
.q(outputb[18]));
mux8 m19(.select(select),
.d(mux19input),
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.q(outputb[19]));
mux8 m20(.select(select),
.d(mux20input),
.q(outputb[20]));
mux8 m21(.select(select),
.d(mux21input),
.q(outputb[21]));
mux8 m22(.select(select),
.d(mux22input),
.q(outputb[22]));
mux8 m23(.select(select),
.d(mux23input),
.q(outputb[23]));
mux8 m24(.select(select),
.d(mux24input),
.q(outputb[24]));
mux8 m25(.select(select),
.d(mux25input),
.q(outputb[25]));
mux8 m26(.select(select),
.d(mux26input),
.q(outputb[26]));
mux8 m27(.select(select),
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.d(mux27input),
.q(outputb[27]));
mux8 m28(.select(select),
.d(mux28input),
.q(outputb[28]));
mux8 m29(.select(select),
.d(mux29input),
.q(outputb[29]));
mux8 m30(.select(select),
.d(mux30input),
.q(outputb[30]));
mux8 m31(.select(select),
.d(mux31input),
.q(outputb[31]));
mux8 m32(.select(select),
.d(mux32input),
.q(outputb[32]));
mux8 m33(.select(select),
.d(mux33input),
.q(outputb[33]));
mux8 m34(.select(select),
.d(mux34input),
.q(outputb[34]));
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mux8 m35(.select(select),
.d(mux35input),
.q(outputb[35]));
endmodule
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p. De-Permutation
`timescale 1ns/1ns
module DePerm32plus4(
//inputs
inputa,
select,
//outputs
outputb);
input[35 : 0] inputa;
wire[7 : 0] mux0input,
mux1input,
mux2input,
mux3input,
mux4input,
mux5input,
mux6input,
mux7input,
mux8input,
mux9input,
mux10input,
mux11input,
mux12input,
mux13input,
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mux14input,
mux15input,
mux16input,
mux17input,
mux18input,
mux19input,
mux20input,
mux21input,
mux22input,
mux23input,
mux24input,
mux25input,
mux26input,
mux27input,
mux28input,
mux29input,
mux30input,
mux31input,
mux32input,
mux33input,
mux34input,
mux35input;
input[2 : 0] select;
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wire[2 : 0] select;
reg[35 : 0] q;
output[35 : 0] outputb;
wire[35 : 0] inputa;
//reg[38:0] outputb;
assign mux0input = { inputa[0], inputa[34], inputa[19], inputa[20], inputa[10], inputa[2],
inputa[1], inputa[10] };
assign mux1input = { inputa[1], inputa[35], inputa[0], inputa[21], inputa[11], inputa[3],
inputa[2], inputa[19] };
assign mux2input = { inputa[2], inputa[0], inputa[20], inputa[22], inputa[12], inputa[4],
inputa[0], inputa[12] };
assign mux3input = { inputa[3], inputa[1], inputa[1], inputa[23], inputa[13], inputa[5],
inputa[35], inputa[17] };
assign mux4input = { inputa[4], inputa[2], inputa[21], inputa[24], inputa[14], inputa[6],
inputa[34], inputa[14] };
assign mux5input = { inputa[5], inputa[3], inputa[2], inputa[25], inputa[15], inputa[7],
inputa[33], inputa[15] };
assign mux6input = { inputa[6], inputa[4], inputa[22], inputa[26], inputa[16], inputa[8],
inputa[32], inputa[16] };
assign mux7input = { inputa[7], inputa[5], inputa[3], inputa[27], inputa[17], inputa[9],
inputa[31], inputa[13] };
assign mux8input = { inputa[8], inputa[6], inputa[23], inputa[28], inputa[18], inputa[10],
inputa[30], inputa[18] };
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assign mux9input = { inputa[9], inputa[7], inputa[4], inputa[29], inputa[19], inputa[11],
inputa[29], inputa[11] };
assign mux10input = { inputa[10], inputa[8], inputa[24], inputa[30], inputa[20],
inputa[12], inputa[28], inputa[0] };
assign mux11input = { inputa[11], inputa[9], inputa[5], inputa[1], inputa[29], inputa[13],
inputa[27], inputa[9] };
assign mux12input = { inputa[12], inputa[10], inputa[25], inputa[32], inputa[30],
inputa[14], inputa[26], inputa[2] };
assign mux13input = { inputa[13], inputa[11], inputa[6], inputa[3], inputa[31], inputa[15],
inputa[25], inputa[7] };
assign mux14input = { inputa[14], inputa[12], inputa[26], inputa[34], inputa[32],
inputa[16], inputa[24], inputa[4] };
assign mux15input = { inputa[15], inputa[13], inputa[7], inputa[5], inputa[33], inputa[17],
inputa[23], inputa[5] };
assign mux16input = { inputa[16], inputa[14], inputa[27], inputa[18], inputa[34],
inputa[18], inputa[22], inputa[6] };
assign mux17input = { inputa[17], inputa[15], inputa[8], inputa[7], inputa[35], inputa[19],
inputa[21], inputa[3] };
assign mux18input = { inputa[18], inputa[16], inputa[28], inputa[19], inputa[26],
inputa[20], inputa[20], inputa[8] };
assign mux19input = { inputa[19], inputa[17], inputa[9], inputa[9], inputa[27], inputa[21],
inputa[19], inputa[1] };
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assign mux20input = { inputa[20], inputa[18], inputa[29], inputa[0], inputa[0], inputa[22],
inputa[18], inputa[30] };
assign mux21input = { inputa[21], inputa[19], inputa[10], inputa[31], inputa[1],
inputa[23], inputa[17], inputa[31] };
assign mux22input = { inputa[22], inputa[20], inputa[30], inputa[2], inputa[2], inputa[24],
inputa[16], inputa[27] };
assign mux23input = { inputa[23], inputa[21], inputa[11], inputa[33], inputa[3],
inputa[25], inputa[15], inputa[33] };
assign mux24input = { inputa[24], inputa[22], inputa[31], inputa[4], inputa[4], inputa[26],
inputa[14], inputa[25] };
assign mux25input = { inputa[25], inputa[23], inputa[12], inputa[35], inputa[5],
inputa[27], inputa[13], inputa[35] };
assign mux26input = { inputa[26], inputa[24], inputa[32], inputa[6], inputa[6], inputa[28],
inputa[12], inputa[34] };
assign mux27input = { inputa[27], inputa[25], inputa[13], inputa[17], inputa[7],
inputa[29], inputa[11], inputa[26] };
assign mux28input = { inputa[28], inputa[26], inputa[33], inputa[8], inputa[8], inputa[30],
inputa[10], inputa[32] };
assign mux29input = { inputa[29], inputa[27], inputa[14], inputa[16], inputa[9],
inputa[31], inputa[9], inputa[21] };
assign mux30input = { inputa[30], inputa[28], inputa[34], inputa[10], inputa[28],
inputa[32], inputa[8], inputa[20] };
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assign mux31input = { inputa[31], inputa[29], inputa[15], inputa[11], inputa[21],
inputa[33], inputa[7], inputa[29] };
assign mux32input = { inputa[32], inputa[30], inputa[35], inputa[12], inputa[22],
inputa[34], inputa[6], inputa[28] };
assign mux33input = { inputa[33], inputa[31], inputa[16], inputa[13], inputa[23],
inputa[35], inputa[5], inputa[23] };
assign mux34input = { inputa[34], inputa[32], inputa[32], inputa[14], inputa[24],
inputa[0], inputa[4], inputa[24] };
assign mux35input = { inputa[35], inputa[33], inputa[17], inputa[15], inputa[25],
inputa[1], inputa[3], inputa[22] };
mux8 dm0(.select(select),
.d(mux0input),
.q(outputb[0]));
mux8 dm1(.select(select),
.d(mux1input),
.q(outputb[1]));
mux8 dm2(.select(select),
.d(mux2input),
.q(outputb[2]));
mux8 dm3(.select(select),
.d(mux3input),
.q(outputb[3]));
mux8 dm4(.select(select),

416

.d(mux4input),
.q(outputb[4]));
mux8 dm5(.select(select),
.d(mux5input),
.q(outputb[5]));
mux8 dm6(.select(select),
.d(mux6input),
.q(outputb[6]));
mux8 dm7(.select(select),
.d(mux7input),
.q(outputb[7]));
mux8 dm8(.select(select),
.d(mux8input),
.q(outputb[8]));
mux8 dm9(.select(select),
.d(mux9input),
.q(outputb[9]));
mux8 dm10(.select(select),
.d(mux10input),
.q(outputb[10]));
mux8 dm11(.select(select),
.d(mux11input),
.q(outputb[11]));
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mux8 dm12(.select(select),
.d(mux12input),
.q(outputb[12]));
mux8 dm13(.select(select),
.d(mux13input),
.q(outputb[13]));
mux8 dm14(.select(select),
.d(mux14input),
.q(outputb[14]));
mux8 dm15(.select(select),
.d(mux15input),
.q(outputb[15]));
mux8 dm16(.select(select),
.d(mux16input),
.q(outputb[16]));
mux8 dm17(.select(select),
.d(mux17input),
.q(outputb[17]));
mux8 dm18(.select(select),
.d(mux18input),
.q(outputb[18]));
mux8 dm19(.select(select),
.d(mux19input),
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.q(outputb[19]));
mux8 dm20(.select(select),
.d(mux20input),
.q(outputb[20]));
mux8 dm21(.select(select),
.d(mux21input),
.q(outputb[21]));
mux8 dm22(.select(select),
.d(mux22input),
.q(outputb[22]));
mux8 dm23(.select(select),
.d(mux23input),
.q(outputb[23]));
mux8 dm24(.select(select),
.d(mux24input),
.q(outputb[24]));
mux8 dm25(.select(select),
.d(mux25input),
.q(outputb[25]));
mux8 dm26(.select(select),
.d(mux26input),
.q(outputb[26]));
mux8 dm27(.select(select),
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.d(mux27input),
.q(outputb[27]));
mux8 dm28(.select(select),
.d(mux28input),
.q(outputb[28]));
mux8 dm29(.select(select),
.d(mux29input),
.q(outputb[29]));
mux8 dm30(.select(select),
.d(mux30input),
.q(outputb[30]));
mux8 dm31(.select(select),
.d(mux31input),
.q(outputb[31]));
mux8 dm32(.select(select),
.d(mux32input),
.q(outputb[32]));
mux8 dm33(.select(select),
.d(mux33input),
.q(outputb[33]));
mux8 dm34(.select(select),
.d(mux34input),
.q(outputb[34]));
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mux8 dm35(.select(select),
.d(mux35input),
.q(outputb[35]));
endmodule
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